US policymakers should watch out for and counteract actors that may attempt to sabotage crucial negotiations with Iran and Israel.
Avoiding unnecessary conflict is critical to advancing US security while also protecting Americans’ prosperity and well-being. Even successful wars consume resources and command the attention of policymakers who might otherwise be focused on other human needs. Failed or inconclusive wars, like those fought in Iraq and Afghanistan, have proved costly and counterproductive. Accordingly, many Americans are open to trying to resolve disputes through diplomacy and dialogue.
Donald Trump has been keenly attuned to such sentiments. Since the start of his first successful campaign in 2015, he has castigated his political opponents for supporting pointless conflicts, and boasted of his ability to avoid them through bilateral deals and often highly personalistic diplomacy—recall the “beautiful” letters he exchanged with North Korea’s Kim Jong-un.
Unfortunately, several recent American attempts to reach deals with long-standing adversaries, or to convince bitter enemies to reconcile their differences, have been derailed by spoilers. Trump and other US officials should take these setbacks into account as they plan their diplomatic efforts for the future.
The planning for Israel’s Operation Rising Lion might have been in the works for a year or more, but its decision to strike Iran when it did may have forestalled a new US-Iran nuclear deal. Meanwhile, Hamas’s vicious attack on Israeli civilians on October 7, 2023, which similarly had been planned for months or years, seems to have been timed to thwart a reconciliation deal between Israel and Saudi Arabia, a continuation of the Abraham Accords between Israel and several other Arab states brokered during Trump’s first term.
The full effects of the failure of diplomacy and the recourse to war won’t be known for some time. The so-called “Twelve-Day War” involving Israel, Iran, and the United States killed hundreds and wounded thousands more. Future death and destruction might be avoided if the ceasefire holds. Yet, the risk of escalation and a wider war that would involve much more than surgical strikes on nuclear facilities still looms.
The stated rationale for the Israeli attacks, which started on June 13, was to deny Iran a nuclear bomb. Israeli officials claimed that Iran was mere days from obtaining the requisite material for a weapon. This ran counter to the consensus opinion of US intelligence agencies, which had earlier concluded that Iran was not nearly that close to weaponization, nor was it clear that it had decided on that course at all.
The first Israeli attacks took place just two days before the sixth round of US-Iran talks were to be held in Muscat, Oman. Special Envoy Steve Witkoff had a mandate from President Trump to achieve a nuclear deal. But instead of allowing negotiations to run their course, the Israeli government decided to strike. Notably, one of the first targets of the campaign was the lead negotiator for the US-Iran deal, Ali Shamkhani.
Israel, under the leadership of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, has taken a maximalist position with respect to Iran. Netanyahu has consistently argued against negotiations of any kind and has often called for military strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, civilian infrastructure, or senior leadership.
After the Obama administration negotiated the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Netanyahu opposed it, even going so far as to lobby members of Congress directly. Most objective observers have concluded that the 2015 nuclear deal successfully constrained Iran’s ability to build a nuclear weapon. It was able to endure isolated criticism because many parties, including the UN Security Council plus the EU, had bought in. Even after Trump withdrew the United States from the agreement in 2018, Iran continued to comply with the terms for a time.
Then, as now, critics such as Netanyahu warned that easing sanctions without toppling the “Axis of Resistance” would not eliminate the possibility of a bomb. They have insisted on no nuclear enrichment of any kind, while Tehran has maintained its right to a peaceful nuclear program. Maximalist demands created an impasse, and assertions that Tehran was not negotiating in good faith. The only solution, some suggested, was regime change.
Netanyahu and his cabinet believed that Trump would back Israeli objectives—including by supporting Israeli strikes on Iran—but were surprised when Trump proved willing to negotiate bilaterally with Iran, threatening to secure a deal that Israeli leaders opposed. Trump showed great interest in dialing down tensions, saying in March that he “would prefer to make a deal, because I’m not looking to hurt Iran. They’re great people.” In May, however, Trump instructed Witkoff to insist on no enrichment of any kind, precisely the stance that had disrupted past negotiations.
Trump has since made contradictory statements regarding the possibility of reaching a deal. Shortly after Israel launched its campaign, Trump claimed in a Truth Social post, “Iran must make a deal, before there is nothing left.” But in the days since the US strikes on Fordow, Isfahan, and Natanz, the President has expressed ambivalence about negotiations. “I don’t think it’s necessary,” he told reporters on June 25. “We may sign an agreement,” he continued, but “I don’t care if I have an agreement or not.” For now, the military option appears to have supplanted a diplomatic solution.
Similarly, Hamas’s October 7 attacks and their aftermath have significantly set back the possibility of normalization between Israel and other Arab states. This appears to have been their intention all along. Hamas saw a possible deal on the horizon that ran counter to its interests. On September 20, 2023, just weeks before the attacks, Saudi crown prince Mohammad bin Salman claimed the kingdom was close to a normalization deal; since the attacks, such a deal has fallen apart.
Spoilers often have maximalist goals. They worry that negotiations, of any kind, will deliver only half a loaf, at best. They are committed to everything, or nothing at all. Hamas has consistently maintained a position of unremitting hostility toward Israel. It saw the Abraham Accords as a betrayal of Arab unity vis-à-vis Israel, and was committed to undermining any such agreements.
Of course, these normalization pacts ignored Palestinian concerns. The best they could muster was a gesture towards a two-state solution. To Hamas, however, the mere prospect of a deal of any kind was unacceptable. It lobbied the Arab world to oppose, or renege on, normalization with Israel, and stuck firm to its rejectionist stance of non-recognition of the Jewish state. For now, despite the setbacks it has suffered at the hands of the Israeli Defense Forces in Gaza and elsewhere, Hamas has succeeded in this one respect: no Arab country that had not already recognized Israel prior to October 7 has moved toward normalization with Tel Aviv.
In light of these recent cases, US policymakers should anticipate how other interested parties might act to derail negotiations and diplomacy. That Israeli leaders and Hamas are acutely concerned with Iranian nuclear negotiations with the United States and Saudi normalization with Israel, respectively, is to be expected.
If the Trump administration is determined to rely mostly on one-on-one negotiations or broker one-on-one talks, it must understand the risks. Ignoring the concerns of other interested parties renders such bilateral agreements susceptible to disruption. Any actor who sees negotiations, or a deal of any sort, as a threat that must be stopped is, in turn, a threat to US diplomacy and ultimately to US interests.
If President Trump is determined to follow through on his commitment to avoid war and broker peace, he and others in his administration must have a plan for ensuring that other interested parties are unwilling or unable to play the role of spoiler.
About the Authors: Christopher Preble and Griffin Stibor
Christopher Preble is a senior fellow and director of the Reimagining US Grand Strategy Program at the Stimson Center.
Griffin Stibor is an intern at the Reimagining US Grand Strategy Program at the Stimson Center.
Image: Noam Galai / Shutterstock.com.
