The legislative branch must reassert its constitutional authority over war powers.
In the aftermath of the US strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities, a brief but notable chorus of congressional criticism emerged, questioning both the constitutionality and strategic wisdom of the operation. Lawmakers from across the ideological spectrum—from progressives like Rep. Ro Khanna (D-CA) to moderate Democrats such as Sen. Tim Kaine (D-VA), libertarian Republicans like Sen. Rand Paul (R-KY), and even MAGA-aligned Republicans such as Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene (R-GA)—all raised concerns about unchecked presidential war powers and the prospects of another “forever war” in the Middle East.
President Trump responded by pressuring Republican dissenters, while most Democrats retreated. US and Israeli officials have already signaled readiness to strike again if Iran rebuilds. With the threat of renewed conflict looming, Congress now stands at a critical juncture—between the last attack and the very real risk of another—and must act swiftly to reassert its constitutional authority over war powers, both in the short and long term.
How can Congress do this? While both Congress and the Supreme Court can and should address war powers, significant political and legal obstacles remain. For Congress, the most direct and significant way to rein in the president would be through legislation. But with Republican majorities in both chambers, such a bill is unlikely to pass. Even if it did, President Trump would almost certainly veto it, and overriding that veto would require a two-thirds majority in both houses—an even less likely prospect.
As for the courts, although lower federal courts have shown some resistance to President Trump in other policy realms, any substantial challenge to presidential war powers would ultimately fall in the Supreme Court’s purview. Given the Court’s longstanding reluctance to intervene in war powers disputes and the current conservative majority’s tendency to favor executive authority, a meaningful judicial check seems equally, if not more, improbable.
Alternatively, a more viable path may be to form a bipartisan coalition—bringing together progressives, libertarians, and disaffected MAGA members—to reassert Congress’ constitutional role over war powers. This coalition can pursue two tracks of reform: one focused on immediate, short-term action; the other on long-term structural change.
In the short term, Congress should hold public hearings on the recent Iran strike and introduce resolutions expressing its sentiments and demanding congressional debate and approval before any further military action. Lawmakers such as Khanna, Kaine, Paul, and Green—who have already voiced their concerns—are well-positioned to lead this effort. Even symbolic measures can raise public awareness, build pressure on the administration, and lay the groundwork for future legislative restraint.
In the long term, Congress must confront the systemic erosion of its war powers. A critical step would be to establish a permanent joint committee on war powers to examine how executive authority has expanded across administrations regardless of party, develop a framework that addresses war powers and clearly distinguishes core from peripheral strategic interests, tying military force posture directly to Congress’ power of the purse. Such a framework would guide future decisions on when military force is justified and when it is not.
For instance, preventing Iran from becoming a regional hegemon and dominating the Persian Gulf—and thereby controlling a near-monopoly on the world’s oil supply—would almost certainly be a core national interest. By contrast, concerns such as Iran’s nuclear program, which is largely defensive and unlikely to provide it any offensive advantage, especially against the United States, fall into the peripheral category. This distinction matters because it should guide when and how the US government commits military force.
However, if Iran were to attack and conquer another Gulf state (something it does not seem willing or able to do), it would pose a direct threat to a core interest. This would arguably justify a strong military response—similar to the US reaction to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, for which President George HW Bush secured both UN and Congressional approval for Operation Desert Storm in January 1991. But prolonged involvement in localized conflicts or strikes over Iran’s nuclear ambitions without Congressional approval risks entangling the United States in conflicts that neither serve vital interests nor have clear endgames.
By recalibrating our force posture—reducing the US military’s forward presence abroad and shifting balancing efforts to more than capable regional actors (eg, Israel and Saudi Arabia)—the president would lack the capability to drag the nation into peripheral conflicts unilaterally. This would compel the executive branch to seek Congressional authorization, restoring the constitutional balance of war powers and realigning our actions with our interests.
Such a recalibration carries implications beyond limiting presidential overreach. By aligning military commitments strictly with core interests, Congress can reduce the risk and cost of unnecessary wars, restoring some much-needed public trust in federal institutions and the Constitution itself. Public scrutiny and sustained political pressure—through media, civic organizations, and constituents—will also be essential to ensure that momentum for reform does not fade.
Congress must act now—before another unauthorized strike sets the stage for a wider war and further erodes the constitutional balance of powers. This moment is about more than Iran; it’s about whether the United States remains a republic where decisions of war and peace are made by the people’s representatives, not by a single individual. If lawmakers fail to reassert their authority, they risk cementing a dangerous precedent—one in which endless war becomes an executive habit rather than a democratic choice.
About the Author: Sean Henninger
Sean Henninger is a PhD candidate in Political Science at Boston College and recently completed the summer research associate program at RAND. His dissertation focuses on spheres of influence and great power accommodation, and his broader research interests include grand strategy, alliance politics, and deterrence theory. The views expressed are his own and do not reflect those of the organizations with which he is affiliated.
Image: Rikinik / Shutterstock.com.
