Reflecting the uncertain terms with which the Trump Administration views Canada, the active renegotiations of the long-standing Columbia River Treaty have been stymied in recent months.
At the ground level of the Columbia River Basin, a dispute holds many communities—and their source of energy—in limbo.
The Treaty of Cooperation and Good Faith
Signed in 1961, the Columbia River Treaty called for two “entities”—one American and one Canadian—to execute the treaty and then for the principles of the document to be used to construct a unique, regional community for decades.
Signed on one of President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s final days in office, the Columbia River Treaty originally focused on two fundamental priorities: Canada agreed to build several dams that would bear the brunt of flood control for the American Pacific Northwest, and, in exchange, the United States agreed to give Canada half of the additional electricity produced on the river. The original pact went into effect in the fall of 1964, with some provisions expiring after sixty years.
Since it was ratified, the treaty has operated with American interests represented by the Bonneville Power Administration and the Northwestern Division of the US Army Corps of Engineers. Canada’s interests were represented by the British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority, the representative of which is appointed by the federal cabinet.
Under the terms of the treaty, Canada directs the Pacific Northwest’s largest river from its headwaters in British Columbia and has to ensure that enough water is sent downstream to meet the United States’ hydropower needs. The primary point of contention for the region is the hydroelectricity that the rivers provide to communities and industries on both sides of the border. Flood control is an additional concern. Canada is also responsible for providing water storage to help prevent flooding, supports irrigation, and protects fish habitats.
In the original treaty, the current flood risk management provisions were set to change to a less-defined approach in 2024 to stimulate adjustment and renegotiation. In particular, discussions have focused on water flowing across the border, namely from the “Treaty Projects.” These include Canadian Treaty projects—Keenleyside (also known as Arrow), Duncan, and Mica dams—and Libby Dam in the United States.
It was not intended to be a challenging renegotiation. Reportedly, negotiators were only weeks from completing the details of an updated version of the treaty at the time of the 2024 American presidential election. When the election went to Trump, a decade of talks crashed into the new president’s apparent hostility toward Canada. He called Canada the “fifty-first state,” imposed tariffs on Canadian exports, and referred to its water supply as a “very big faucet” for American use.
Columbia’s Balance Under Threat
As Trump’s rhetoric toward Canada intensified, Canadians began to feel as if their sovereignty was at least not appreciated and possibly under direct threat. “The Canadians feel such a sense of betrayal,” Jay Inslee, until recently the governor of Washington, said recently. In reference to the delicate cultural and economic interests on each side of the border, Inslee added, “It is not easy to negotiate that,” Inslee said, “and it makes it much harder when the guy across the table thinks you are a snake in the grass.”
Under Trump’s orders, the United States paused negotiations on the treaty last month. “If the two parties really get in a tit-for-tat over this river, Canada is the winner,” says Barbara Cosens of the University of Idaho College of Law. “There’s a saying in water law that … ‘It’s better to be upstream with a shovel than downstream with a right,’ because you can just stop that water.” “Trump cannot just pause these,” explains John Wagner of the University of British Columbia, “because they were approved by an exchange of notes between the Canadian and US governments before Trump took office.”
But if Trump and administration officials decide not to resume negotiations on a final agreement, Wagner adds, “[the Treaty] will be dead in the water.”
The Columbia River Treaty in a New Era?
In the newest renegotiations, the parties included Indigenous tribes. They had not been included in the original negotiations, and the ensuing river development significantly impacted their fishing grounds and towns. Jay Johnson, of the Syilx Okanagan Nation and part of the current Canadian negotiation team, said that the tribes on both sides of the border found common ground in restoring salmon migration. The updated plan created provisions for extra water in dry years, which he called “essential for the survivability of salmon, particularly in the context of climate change.”
Regarding the treaty, Jonathan Wilkinson, Canada’s minister of energy and natural resources, said, “It provides benefits on both sides of the border, and absent that treaty, you’ve got a lot of problems.”
Evidently, there is political division on the issue in the United States. “There is zero daylight between the Republicans and Democrats on this one,” said Scott Simms, chief executive of the Public Power Council, which represents the consumer-owned utilities in the region.
If the United States and Canada are unable to hammer out a final agreement, the earlier sixty-one-year-old treaty will be reinstated, but the issues the updates were meant to solve will be unaddressed. On the other hand, if either nation decides to terminate the treaty, it will set off a ten-year process of dissolving the two nations’ co-management infrastructure.
Another way of describing the situation, explains Joseph Bogaard, executive director at the Washington-based nonprofit Save Our Wild Salmon Coalition, is that “our two nations, which share a long border together and share the Columbia Basin watershed, are going to best be served in the near term and over the long term by healthy, collaborative, constructive, reciprocal relationships. And that tradition, it seems, is sort of in peril at the moment.”
“If we’re not working together,” he continues, “we’re not collaborating, we’re not finding ways forward together. It’s going to lead to bad outcomes for both countries. And certainly salmon are going to be increasingly a casualty, and the health of the river will be a casualty….”
About the Author: Brian C. Black
Brian C. Black is Distinguished Professor of History and Environmental Studies at Penn State Altoona and author, most recently, of ‘Ike’s Road Trip: How Eisenhower’s 1919 Convoy Paved the Way for the Roads We Travel.’ (Godine, 2024). ENERGY TRANSITION 2025 is an ongoing series to place details of our current energy shift into historical context.
Image: Shutterstock/Rigucci
