While the nuclear energy executive orders have good promise, the devil is in their implementation.
It has been nearly a month since President Trump signed four executive orders (EOs) to strengthen US nuclear energy leadership in new nuclear reactor technologies. Already, Westinghouse has announced it is aiming to meet the president’s goal of deploying ten new large reactors. This announcement, along with the EOs’ intentions and directives, underscore a commitment to revitalizing the US nuclear energy sector. This level of ambition from the White House is commendable and is in line with recent bipartisan support of nuclear energy. It is also potentially game-changing. However, the devil is in the details of implementation.
Charting a Course for Nuclear Energy Leadership
The EOs aim to quadruple US nuclear energy capacity by 2050 and position the United States as a global leader by prioritizing: (1) building new reactors, (2) streamlining nuclear reactor licensing, (3) strengthening the US nuclear fuel supply chain, (4) recycling used nuclear fuel, (5) enabling US nuclear reactor exports, and (6) bolstering the American nuclear workforce.
These are the right priorities. They address key barriers to new nuclear energy commercialization, including the United States’ dependence on foreign adversaries like Russia to enrich uranium and the need to modernize nuclear energy regulations to reduce their impact on project costs and schedules.
These priorities also align with what industry and advocates have been working on for years. The goals of the broader nuclear energy ecosystem directly mirror the direction that is being laid out by the administration. For example, the NIA has been committed to modernizing the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), building the nuclear workforce pipeline, and advocating for key federal policies. This shows that the administration has their finger on the pulse of what is stifling progress.
Navigating the Obstacles
These EOs are ambitious and highly encouraging on paper, but a deeper look at their details reveals that their impact may be limited by real-world constraints. So, what exactly are those details?
In NIA’s EO Fact Sheet, we provide an objective and comprehensive summary of every directive in these EOs. We also provide a timeline of when specific actions are scheduled to take place, as seen below.
Credit goes to the NIA.
While the EOs contain many helpful provisions, the sheer scope of what they aim to accomplish, combined with their aggressive timelines, raises serious concerns about feasibility. Being overly ambitious is not the issue. The issue is the mismatch between that ambition and the current capacity of federal agencies like the NRC and Department of Energy (DOE). The NRC and many offices within DOE currently lack the staff to implement the directives and are facing cuts to both their budgets and staffing levels. This disconnect means the goals can only be achieved with the addition of more staff, resources, and strong leadership.
Effective implementation is key because of the consequences of failing to deliver on the EOs’ high expectations. Nuclear energy has a long history of missed deployment targets and cost overruns, which have damaged the industry’s credibility and eroded public support. In recent years, advocates, policymakers, and stakeholders have worked hard to rebuild that credibility by setting more realistic expectations and demonstrating steady progress. Public support for nuclear energy is growing again, but another wave of missed deadlines and broken promises could quickly reverse that momentum.
Success also depends on adequate funding. The estimated cost of building ten new large reactors, five GW of uprates, three test reactors, and one Army reactor exceeds $75 billion.
Fortunately, viable funding solutions exist through effectively implementing the Department of Defense’s (DoD) and Department of Energy’s (DOE) public-private cost-sharing demonstration programs, DOE’s Loan Programs Office, and existing tax credits, but only if we preserve and support them. Additionally, several provisions in the EOs appear duplicative or in conflict with existing NRC and DOE efforts (e.g., NRC’s ongoing regulatory reforms under the ADVANCE Act, and DOE’s HALEU Availability Program and Consent-Based Siting Program). As a result, success depends on removing duplication and resolving these conflicts to ensure the EOs will help these agencies continue to make progress rather than introduce confusion and delays.
The most concerning provisions in the EOs are those that direct the NRC to work with the White House’s Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to undertake a review and wholesale revision of its regulations and guidance documents. It directs the NRC to propose new rules within nine months and finalize those rules within eighteen months. This is problematic for several reasons.
First, the timeline associated with the wholesale revision of NRC regulations is extremely aggressive. Second, the NRC is currently reviewing several applications to construct new nuclear reactors. A wholesale revision of NRC regulations within eighteen months risks diverting critical attention and resources away from these reviews, jeopardizing the NRC’s ability to complete them on time. Third, DOGE’s and OMB’s involvement in NRC activities risks introducing additional delays in regulatory reviews and decision-making. These delays could lead to schedule delays for industry, increased costs, and a cascade of setbacks.
Finally, White House oversight of the NRC undermines its status as an independent agency. The NRC has a long-standing history of operating as an independent agency to insulate it from political pressure, allowing it to remain mission-focused.
The NRC plays an enabling role by issuing permits and licenses for constructing and operating nuclear reactors. Any modifications to its regulatory frameworks must be made with care to avoid creating unintended barriers to progress.
Steering Toward Successful Implementation
The NRC is already actively working to streamline its regulations and help enable the rapid deployment of new nuclear reactors through dozens of rulemakings. Building on this progress is the key to effective implementation. Stakeholders are working with NRC throughout this process and are proposing innovative solutions. For example, the NIA has recently recommended a way to streamline environmental review for microreactors, and ClearPath and the Clean Air Task Force have made recommendations with regard to ongoing rulemaking for reactors that pose a low risk to public health and safety.
The goals outlined in the EOs are within reach. But achieving them will require mindful, calculated, and deliberate steps forward. The focus must be on implementing practical solutions that accelerate progress without compromising the integrity of the NRC’s regulatory frameworks.
About the Author: Erik Cothron
Erik Cothron is a senior analyst for the Nuclear Innovation Alliance, where he helps create the conditions for advanced nuclear reactor success through research projects, stakeholder engagement, and policy advocacy. Prior to joining the Nuclear Innovation Alliance, Mr. Cothron was an energy consultant for Guidehouse, working with the U.S. Department of Energy on its energy efficiency program. He received his bachelor’s and master’s degrees in material science and engineering from Virginia Tech, along with a graduate certificate in nuclear engineering and a concentration in nuclear materials.
Image: Shutterstock/Stefan_Sutka
