The Israel-Iran conflict has shown that Central Asia’s bid for strategic autonomy is deeply fragile.
In a world of unraveling alliances and multiplying crises, Central Asia is quietly finding its voice. The five republics of the region—Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan—have increasingly pursued a strategy of multi-vector diplomacy, seeking to balance relations with competing major powers. Yet the escalating confrontation between Iran and Israel threatens to constrict the geopolitical space Central Asia has carefully carved out for itself.
Amid global turbulence, particularly Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Central Asian states have accelerated efforts to diversify trade, attract new partners, and strengthen regional cooperation. High-level summits, cross-border infrastructure projects, and coordinated foreign policy efforts—especially in the domains of connectivity, commerce, and security—have collectively signaled a region reaching for greater strategic autonomy.
But autonomy hinges on viable options. And one of those options—Iran—is now in a vulnerable state. If last month’s Iran-Israel confrontation had escalated into a broader regional conflict, it would have severely curtailed Central Asia’s strategic maneuverability, disrupted critical trade routes, and forced the region into geopolitical choices it has long sought to avoid.
A War That Isn’t Theirs—But Costs Them Dearly
The fallout from Israel’s preemptive strikes on Iranian territory in June 2025 is already reshaping regional calculations. While Central Asian governments have maintained formal neutrality, they are anything but insulated. Iran is a central node in the region’s emerging trade and transit architecture. The North-South Transport Corridor (NSTC)—running through Iran to Gulf ports and Turkey—remains the shortest and most cost-effective route for Central Asia’s maritime access to the Gulf and further, at a time when the northern corridor through Russia remains under sanction, Chinese lending is slowing, and Western aid is in retreat.
This is where the contradictions begin to pile up. Over the past two years, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states—Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar—have emerged as Central Asia’s most active new partners, pledging billions of dollars in investments in renewable energy, gas pipelines, agribusiness, and infrastructure. This surge of Gulf capital has raised optimism of replicating or even surpassing China’s peak Belt and Road-era engagement. Yet much of this investment is mainly contingent on infrastructure corridors that pass through Iran, the very route now threatened by military escalation.
Despite their ambitions in Central Asia, GCC states remain tethered to US security guarantees and are unlikely to jeopardize that alliance by routing cargo or capital through Iranian territory. This creates a strategic bottleneck. Central Asia’s diversification efforts and export-led growth strategies are being hemmed in by a conflict it neither provoked nor controls.
Alternative routes, such as the Trans-Afghan Corridor and Iraq’s Development Road Project (DRP), are under construction but face daunting challenges. The Afghan route, backed by Qatar, the UAE, and Uzbekistan, remains primarily vulnerable to security risks. The DRP through Iraq and Turkey is geopolitically cumbersome and logistically inefficient. For now, Iran remains the most viable transit option—but also the most politically toxic and precarious.
Caught between the promise of Gulf financing and the risks of Iranian proximity, Central Asian leaders find themselves navigating a narrowing path. Their most strategic connectivity route is increasingly unusable, while the promised alternatives remain unfinished or uncertain.
The Iran Dilemma, With Russian and Chinese Characteristics
Iran’s importance to Central Asia goes beyond logistics. It is a close partner to the region’s two most influential actors—Russia and China. Moscow and Tehran are now openly coordinating military operations, and Beijing continues to rely on Iran for energy security and as a key component of its Belt and Road Initiative. As the West hardens its pro-Israel stance and moves to isolate Iran further, Central Asia may come under increasing pressure from the Sino-Russian axis to align more clearly.
This tension is already straining institutional frameworks. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which includes four Central Asian states alongside China, Russia, and Iran, is fraying under the weight of divergent positions. Pakistan tilts toward Iran; India hedges its bets; and the organization’s silence on the Gaza war underscores its diminishing coherence. Should the Iran-Israel conflict deepen, Central Asia may be forced into the kind of explicit geopolitical alignment it has long resisted.
Public Sympathy and the Foreign Policy Puzzle
Domestic politics add another layer of complexity. Central Asia’s populations—majority-Muslim but governed by secular regimes—are watching developments in Gaza and Tehran with rising discomfort. A recent regional survey by the “FOKUS” center (May-June 2025) reveals fragmented yet notable sympathy for Iran.
In Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, about 43 percent of respondents support political alignment with Tehran. In Uzbekistan, public skepticism prevails, with 39 percent of the population opposing such an alignment. Support for direct military engagement remains low, but the significant proportion of undecided respondents—especially the 25 percent in Kyrgyzstan—suggests growing uncertainty and latent volatility.
These public sentiments could soon have significant political implications. Leaders striving to maintain neutrality may find themselves increasingly pressured, either rhetorically or diplomatically, by their domestic audiences if Iran is viewed as increasingly victimized by Western or Israeli aggression. Sustaining quiet balancing acts is becoming more challenging under the scrutiny of public opinion.
This tension has already prompted official concern. In a June 17 statement, Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs addressed the intensifying discourse on social media, warning that the conflict was taking on ideological and sectarian overtones. Citizens were urged to remain calm, avoid viewing the conflict through the lens of religion or ideology, and rely on verified information, while adhering to official communication channels. This carefully worded appeal reflects the government’s anxiety that unmanaged public discourse could lead to political instability or erode its neutral foreign policy stance.
Strategic Autonomy Under Siege
Central Asia’s pursuit of strategic autonomy is not derailed, but it is under growing strain. Economic corridors are now politicized. Public sentiment is growing more volatile. And the traditional balancing act between great powers is becoming increasingly fraught.
In the short term, Central Asian governments must accelerate efforts to diversify transit routes, ensuring they are less vulnerable to geopolitical shocks. The Middle Corridor, the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, and the Trans-Afghan route, along with enhanced air and digital connectivity, must become policy priorities—not just infrastructure projects.
In the long term, regional resilience will require more than diplomatic hedging. It will require the consolidation of regional cooperation frameworks, stronger diplomatic agency in multilateral forums, and a deeper investment in strategic foresight.
The Iran-Israel conflict did not begin in Central Asia. But if regional leaders fail to respond with clarity and coordination, they could soon find themselves paying the price for a war they neither chose nor wanted.
About the Authors: Alouddin Komilov and Otabek Akromov
Alouddin Komilov is a policy analyst at the Center for Progressive Reforms (NGO) and an adjunct assistant professor at Webster University in Tashkent.
Otabek Akromov is a PhD researcher at the Australian National University and a policy analyst at the Center for Progressive Reforms.
Image: Canghai76
