Syrian president Ahmed al-Shara’s drive to centralize the country and marginalize minority communities shows no sign of abating.
Seven months after seizing power, Syria’s transitional president, Ahmed al-Shara, had successfully recast himself from a jihadist once subject to a $10 million US bounty into a pragmatic statesman and the nation’s best hope for reunification and stability. His polished diplomacy, combined with international fatigue over the Syria file and mounting concern over the region’s unraveling order, secured broad foreign endorsement. That included the United States, which revoked the terrorist designation of his former militia, Hayat Tahrir al‑Sham, lifted most sanctions, and backed him diplomatically through Tom Barrack, its ambassador to Turkey and special envoy to Syria.
However, rather than stabilizing the country, this veneer of international legitimacy concealed the absence of a genuine political transition, which in turn exacerbated Syria’s internal divisions. Shara’s ill-fated offensive on Suweida laid bare the fragility of his regime. At the same time, footage of atrocities committed by security forces and allied factions severely damaged his carefully constructed image at home and abroad. It also exposed a deeper ideological fault line over the very structure of the state, one that, if left unaddressed, risks dragging Syria into renewed instability and violence.
Despite lacking full territorial control or a monopoly on force, Shara has moved ahead with an aggressively centralized system of governance that has only deepened fragmentation on the ground. The Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Druze militias remain the most prominent holdouts, rejecting integration into central command structures altogether due to the ruling authorities’ rigid commitment to an Islamist authoritarian model. Their calls for decentralization, pluralism, and democratic participation have been consistently dismissed.
Instead of compromising to bridge these internal divisions, Shara has used his growing international legitimacy to entrench power while avoiding even the most superficial concessions. From the outset, the Victory Conference and constitutional declaration laid the groundwork for this absolutist order, preventing the emergence of political parties and granting the presidency sweeping control over both the legislature and judiciary. This enables the new authorities to embed a radical Islamist ideology within state institutions as part of an effort to reshape Syria’s social fabric.
What is emerging goes beyond mere authoritarian tendencies and reveals the scaffolding of a totalitarian system, a reality obscured by narratives that portray Shara’s rule as a necessary path to stability. On the ground, this ideological project is taking shape in two key ways. The first is through the rise of a de facto morality police. Under the pretext of upholding public decency and Islamic values, security forces and affiliated factions have tightened control over daily life, harassing women over their attire and raiding or vandalizing bars, cafes, and cultural venues.
The second is through the construction of a national identity anchored in Sunni revivalism and neo-Umayyad symbolism. The original Umayyad dynasty was an Islamic caliphate that ruled from Damascus in the seventh and eighth centuries AD, stretching from the Iberian Peninsula to the edges of Central Asia. Invoking this imperial legacy offers a vision of restored strength that appeals to Sunni communities scarred by civil war, but also inflames sectarian tensions. Within segments of the Bani Umayya base, chants calling for the death or expulsion of minorities have become alarmingly common, alongside killings and kidnappings.
Whereas the Assad regime weaponized sectarianism as a divide-and-rule tactic, Shara has made it a central pillar of his ideological state-building. This framework delegitimizes dissent from minority communities by casting it as separatist subversion, while mobilizing supporters around an exclusionary vision of national unity. It underpinned two of Shara’s most forceful attempts to reassert control, both of which devolved into mass sectarian slaughter.
In March, the new authorities and their supporters killed nearly 1,500 Alawite civilians in the coastal region during a brutal crackdown on an attempted insurgency by remnants of the former regime. A similar pattern unfolded in July, when local clashes between Bedouins and Druze were used as a pretext for launching an offensive on Druze-dominated Suweida. The objective was to dislodge Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijari—the province’s most influential religious authority and a vocal opponent of the new government—and dismantle Druze militias resisting integration into the state security structure.
The offensive ultimately collapsed into a humiliating retreat for Damascus, undone by both its own political miscalculation and Israeli intervention. The campaign of collective punishment united Druze factions behind Hijari, who has since become a focal point of resistance. It also triggered pressure from Israel’s own Druze population to intervene in their community’s defense. Furthermore, the scale and nature of the violence bore chilling echoes of the October 7 attacks, sharpening Israel’s distrust of Shara.
In response, Israeli forces struck armed units advancing on Suweida and targeted military installations outside the province, including the Syrian military headquarters in Damascus. It has since delivered humanitarian aid and is suspected of providing covert military support. Although a fragile ceasefire has held since July 19, another full-scale offensive would prompt a more forceful response, including potential strikes on senior members of the leadership.
These developments have closed the brief window of optimism among Syria’s minorities, who make up roughly one-quarter of the population. Many now feel that this government not only fails to represent them, but also bears direct responsibility for their persecution. This disillusionment has emboldened both the Druze and the SDF, who now form the core of a widening bloc opposed to Shara’s rule. Frustration is also mounting across the broader population, driven by rampant crime, impunity, and the dire economic situation.
Syria’s reconstruction could cost up to $400 billion, and despite its economic potential, it continues to suffer from an acute lack of investor confidence. Without comprehensive reforms, Syria is unlikely to attract the external capital it desperately needs to maintain internal stability, transparency, and a unified government. Meanwhile, Syria is grappling with one of its most severe droughts in seven decades, with an estimated 75 percent wheat crop failure worsening the ongoing food crisis. Absent tangible improvements in living conditions, Shara’s popularity could unravel by the end of the year. After all, a regime that offers neither freedom, security, nor prosperity rests on dangerously fragile foundations.
Syria now stands at a crossroads. Shara can continue on the current path of centralization through coercion. This strategy will almost certainly provoke deeper resistance and risk plunging the country back into full-scale civil war. The alternative is to launch a genuine political transition by annulling the constitutional declaration and permitting the formation of independent political parties. This must include concessions on decentralization to prevent an authoritarian relapse and reflect Syria’s diversity, paired with transitional justice, accountability, and enforcement against sectarian incitement.
While there is a legitimate case for easing economic sanctions, it must not become a blank check for Shara, especially when symbolic diplomatic gestures have repeatedly failed to compel meaningful reform. The irony of viewing Syria only through a security lens is that it reinforces the very governance model fueling the country’s instability. Only sustained external pressure, tied to structural reform, can prevent Syria from sliding into another cycle of repression and revolt.
About the Author: Kelly Kassis
Kelly Kassis is a geopolitical analyst focusing on the Middle East and Russia and the Director of International Relations at the Center for Political and Foreign Affairs.
Image: Mohammad Bash / Shutterstock.com.
