The United States and South Korea’s heightened energy cooperation could present an “easy win” in the upcoming summit.
On August 25, 2025, US President Donald Trump and newly elected South Korean President Lee Jae-myung will meet face-to-face in Washington, DC. The first Trump-Lee summit follows swiftly on the heels of the two nations’ “July Deal,” which brokered the reduction of reciprocal tariffs from twenty-five percent to fifteen percent alongside additional agreements for South Korean investment of $100 billion in US energy, specifically, and up to $350 billion in US industry sectors broadly.
Amid ongoing US-South Korean trade negotiations, much remains on the docket for discussion. High on the agenda will be locking in South Korea’s stated commitments for US energy purchases—most likely liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports—and upscaling investments in key energy sectors such as the civil nuclear industry.
With a potential large-scale “energy deal” on the table, the outcomes of the summit could have large implications for the future of US-South Korean energy cooperation.
South Korea’s “Pragmatic” Diplomacy
South Korea—one of the United States’ largest trade partners—has faced months of political turmoil following the now-impeached previous president’s call for martial law in December 2024. Eight months later, South Korean President Lee has taken the helm at a time of fierce partisan division at home and shifting geopolitics in the broader Indo-Pacific region.
To strategically address both foreign and domestic challenges, the Lee administration announced a platform of “pragmatic” diplomacy—synthesizing policy imperatives to strengthen South Korea’s position domestically and on the international stage.
However, on energy policy, Lee’s administration remains cautious. The new Korean government has announced its proactive support to shift towards a “renewable-centered” energy policy; however, it remains hesitant to downplay civil nuclear energy—one of South Korea’s fastest rising export markets. President Lee’s selection of both anti-nuclear and pro-nuclear ministerial candidates highlights the fact that South Korea cannot fully turn away from the promises of nuclear energy.
As a heavily energy import-dependent nation, South Korea cannot afford to devote political capital towards a singular energy mix strategy. Rather, an “all of the above” decarbonization approach—leaning into both nuclear energy and renewables—seems the best strategy. Moving forward, the Lee administration will need to pragmatically and strategically assess the importance of a dual-pronged energy policy both at home and abroad.
The Trump-Lee summit will be an excellent stage to demonstrate such diplomatic flexibility. As Lee aims to restore confidence in South Korea’s global standing, penning a strong trade deal—beneficial to both the US and South Korea’s national security and energy interests—is paramount.
Focus on LNG Imports: A Tit-for-Tat Negotiation Strategy
As the largest trading partner for many nations, the United States has long reaped the benefits of specialized economic relations with Indo-Pacific partner nations. Earlier this year, the Trump administration called for the “unleashing” of US energy markets and pressured the expeditious expansion of US LNG exports. Most recently, though, in the wake of the tariff scares, many US trading partners—South Korea included—are scrambling to meet the demands of US energy partnerships.
In recent years, the United States has dominated the global LNG export market. Already, South Korea is one of the largest importers of LNG, relying heavily on shipments from the United States over the past years. With the potential estimate for Asia to account for sixty to seventy percent of global oil and gas imports by 2050, it makes sense that the Trump administration is targeting increased purchasing agreements with nations in the Indo-Pacific region.
Ahead of the summit, discussions of an expanded US-South Korean LNG deal have resurrected debates surrounding the Alaska LNG pipeline project. Uncertainties around the project continue to make for murky business prospects—and the United States’ trading partners in the Indo-Pacific have realized these downsides.
As the United States solidifies its position as the world’s top LNG exporter, the government has an opportunity to advance domestic infrastructure development—such as LNG terminals, liquefaction plants, and pre-shipment storage facilities—to expand exports to the Indo-Pacific, particularly to energy-import-reliant nations like South Korea and Japan. However, there will have to be clear pathways for return on their investments for trading partners to add more than cursory, nonbinding notes of interest in large-scale projects, such as the Alaska pipeline.
Following in Japan and Taiwan’s bargaining footsteps, South Korea may see it as more immediately beneficial to conclude broader purchasing agreements rather than committing to long-term LNG infrastructure investment.
U.S.-South Korean Nuclear Energy Cooperation (and Competition)
One of the biggest areas of potential energy cooperation—and, incidentally, competition—is the convergence of US and South Korean civil nuclear energy sectors. The Trump administration has declared today as the time of nuclear energy expansion in the United States—postulating rapid industry growth from ninety-seven GW to 400 GW by the year 2050.
Over the decades, South Korea’s nuclear energy industry has risen to punch above its weight in the global market. From building four APR-1400 nuclear reactors in the United Arab Emirates to winning the recent Czech nuclear deal, South Korea’s leading nuclear companies, such as Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power (KHNP), Doosan Enerbility, and Hyundai E&C, continue to demonstrate the nation’s exceptional capabilities in delivering large-scale reactor projects on time and on budget.
However, competition between the leading American nuclear energy company, Westinghouse, and South Korea’s state-owned utility, Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO), has continued to present a stumbling block to US-South Korean industry-to-industry relations. Moving forward, the upcoming Trump-Lee summit presents an opportunity to build upon the successful brokering of the Westinghouse-KEPCO agreement earlier this year.
An expanded statement on US-South Korean civil nuclear cooperation—centered potentially on a joint venture project—would not only bolster regrowth of America’s domestic industry but also further solidify US-led civil nuclear leadership globally. Additionally, with companies such as Hyundai E&C already signing an agreement to support the development of the United States’ power grid infrastructure for next-generation artificial intelligence (AI), further investments into US domestic industry would be a natural next step.
Looking Forward
Clearly, energy cooperation is poised to be a defining outcome of the upcoming Trump-Lee summit, with LNG purchase agreements and civil nuclear industry development high on the US-South Korean bilateral agenda. While South Korea’s reliance on imported energy makes expanded LNG deals attractive, the real test for the relationship lies in reconciling competition in the nuclear energy sector.
Establishing a joint US-South Korean nuclear venture focused on the US domestic nuclear landscape would not only mitigate cross-industry frictions but also advance shared strategic and economic interests. For both leaders, forging such an enhanced US-South Korean energy partnership will be pivotal in shaping a durable energy alliance and strengthening the broader bilateral relationship.
About the Author: Kayla T. Orta
Kayla T. Orta is a Nonresident Fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. A former US Department of Defense NSEP Boren Scholar to South Korea, her expertise lies in US-Indo-Pacific and US-Korean foreign relations, especially at the intersection of security and technology policy, including nonproliferation, nuclear diplomacy, and civil nuclear energy markets. Most recently, she worked as the Senior Associate at the Wilson Center’s Hyundai Motor-Korea Foundation Center for Korean History and Public Policy. Her most recent book, titled “Avoiding Meltdowns & Blackouts: Confidence-building in Inter-Korean Engagement on Nuclear Safety and Energy Development” (Wilson Center, 2023), features insights from US and South Korean nuclear policy experts.
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