The battle lines in the Middle East have shifted to reveal three coalitions: the Turkey-Qatar bloc, the battered Iranian “Axis of Resistance,” and the “pro-stability” grouping of Israel and the Gulf States.
As the Gaza war comes to a fragile (and possibly temporary) end, it’s prudent to take stock of the geostrategic environment Israel will have to face in the foreseeable future.
At first glance, the picture is rosy. Although the regional conflict precipitated by the atrocities of October 7 ranks as Israel’s longest war, it has yielded major military achievements.
Through it, Israel has managed to mostly eliminate the immediate threat posed by Hezbollah in Lebanon. The Israeli military’s Fall 2024 Lebanon campaign profoundly destabilized the group, eliminating thousands of its fighters and the bulk of its previously formidable missile arsenal. It also set the stage for a winter offensive by rebels in neighboring Syria that led to the overthrow of the Assad regime and the elimination of a key Iranian ally (as well as the Islamic Republic’s land bridge to Lebanon).
Thereafter, the June 2025 “12-day war” resulted in significant setbacks to the Iranian regime’s nuclear program and its efforts to amass ballistic missiles. And while Israel struggled with its ground offensive against Hamas in the Gaza Strip, the credible threat of a final move into Gaza City in October 2025, coupled with unprecedented US diplomatic pressure, succeeded in bringing Israel’s surviving hostages home and establishing an uneasy ceasefire.
To be sure, significant problems remain. Hamas is still very much alive in Gaza, where it is showing signs of reconstituting its forces and re-establishing control over parts of the Strip. Israel, moreover, is about to face significant US and international pressure to decouple the issues of Gaza reconstruction and the group’s disarmament—something which, if left unaddressed, will contradict its own strategic objectives (not to mention the collective trauma of October 7).
In Lebanon, meanwhile, Hezbollah is openly defying the Lebanese government’s decision to dismantle its military capabilities, while renewed Israeli strikes on the group’s infrastructure and operatives in Lebanon may soon lead to a broader escalation on Israel’s northern front. Even so, Israel is determined not to repeat past mistakes and allow a buildup of terrorist capabilities on its borders, no matter how fatigued it might now be. Meanwhile, the regime in Tehran, though battered, is openly preparing for a second war with Israel and heavily investing in supporting the capabilities of Yemen’s Houthi rebels and other elements of its extensive proxy network that remain intact.
Nevertheless, a positive assessment is appropriate, insofar as Israel’s strategic position in the region is now more secure and more advantageous than at any time since the dark day of October 7. Yet the war has had unintended consequences as well, the most prominent of them being the rise of a new, and deeply hostile, Muslim Brotherhood axis.
This grouping, of course, did not materialize out of thin air. It has been a regional feature for at least a decade, propelled by Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s neo-Ottoman foreign policy and his abiding hostility toward Israel, as well as Qatar’s deep financial support for Hamas and other Sunni radicals. But these trends are now converging—and metastasizing.
For the first time, Turkey faces direct friction with Israel through its newly established client state in Syria. That is deeply worrisome because Israel is now confronted by a self-declared enemy that openly calls for its destruction, and is simultaneously a member of NATO and a close ally of the United States. Problematic, too, is the dual role that Qatar has played as a mediator for extremist groups and an enabler of them, while also enjoying an unprecedented degree of political intimacy with Washington.
Thus, Israel now finds itself facing not one but two openly hostile alliances: an Iranian-Shia axis in the east, which—though battered—has not been broken, and the neo-Ottoman Muslim Brotherhood axis, which aims to control the Eastern Mediterranean and establish a direct presence in Gaza. In between sit a group of nation-states and monarchies that seek to avert the hostile hegemony of either camp. Indeed, containing both extremes is the true, enduring basis for eventual Saudi-Israeli normalization.
But as always, there’s a catch. That issue is the Palestinians. The past two years have amply shown that, as long as Palestinian activists—whether the Islamists of Hamas or the secular nationalists of Fatah—can still envision the eventual destruction of Israel, no compromise that includes a genuine acceptance of the Jewish state is likely to be considered. As such, the Palestinian issue will inevitably be further weaponized by both axes to weaken and, if possible, entirely prevent coordination among what could be called the region’s “pro-stability” bloc (made up of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Jordan, Egypt, Israel, and others).
Yes, the Sunni axis led by Ankara and Doha and the Shia one directed by Tehran are also in competition with one another. But they share an interest in weakening the region’s moderate political current, and in undermining Israel in particular. And while, unlike Iran, Turkey probably won’t risk a direct conflict with the Jewish state, it can nevertheless pose a significant challenge, whether through support of Hamas and similar organizations or by threatening the Israeli air corridor over Syria, to Iran.
Given the very real possibility of a second Iranian-Israeli conflict, that potential is deeply concerning. As the new regime of Syrian president Ahmed al-Shara stabilizes and further consolidates power, Turkey will also gain the ability to harass Israel in the Golan Heights, raising the specter of something heretofore unseen: direct skirmishes between the IDF and Turkish-affiliated forces.
There is, of course, an undeniable benefit to the fact that the Iranians are out of Syria, Hezbollah is now isolated in Lebanon, and at least some of Israel’s concerns regarding Gaza may end up being alleviated. But none of this should obscure the bigger picture. The region’s politically moderate bloc of nations is now encircled by not one but two radical and ambitious axes. That new regional structure and those adversaries are here to stay.
About the Author: Brigadier General Eran Ortal
Brigadier General Eran Ortal (Israel Defense Forces, retired) is a visiting scholar at the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, DC.
Image: Kostas Alkousis / Shutterstock.com.
