The DF-26D missile variant exemplifies China’s strategic pivot toward asymmetric warfare, directly contesting US hegemony in the Indo-Pacific.
The race for military dominance continues in the Indo-Pacific between the People’s Republic of China and the United States. As part of their overarching anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy for denying the US military the ability to project power into the Indo-Pacific during a military crisis, such as a fight over Taiwan, the Chinese have developed the DF-26.
Also known as the “Guam Killer,” this intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) is specifically meant to target the distant US military facilities on Guam, from where a core element of any US military response against a Chinese threat in the region would launch.
More recently, an upgraded variant of that missile, the DF-26D, was unveiled by the Chinese military during a parade in Beijing in early August. This upgraded missile underscores the rapidity and robustness of China’s military modernization in the Indo-Pacific.
The DF-26D’s missile capabilities pose significant challenges to American power projection, potentially reshaping naval and aerial strategies in contested waters, like the South China Sea and around Taiwan—or potentially even over the disputed Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea.
Understanding the DF-26D Missile
The original DF-26 was introduced in 2015 and operationalized by 2018. In its first form, that missile could hit targets roughly 1,864 to 2,485 miles away. Developed by the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC), it represented a leap in dual-capable weaponry, allowing swaps between nuclear and conventional payloads in the field. Variants like the DF-26B focused on anti-ship roles, integrating maneuverable re-entry vehicles for targeting moving naval assets.
China’s DF-26D variant builds on this foundation with reported enhancements for greater survivability and precision. Amid hypersonic advancements, including tests of glide vehicles, the DF-26D incorporates navigation, electronic warfare (EW) countermeasures, and jamming systems to evade interception. This development aligns with China’s broader push for hypersonic weaponry, as seen in companion systems, like the YJ-19, YJ-20, and YJ-17—all aimed at neutralizing US naval superiority.
The DF-26D retains the core attributes of its predecessor while introducing upgrades that enhance its lethality. With a range exceeding the original variant’s 2,485 miles—potentially up to 3,106 miles!—the missile can target assets well into the Second Island Chain, including Guam, US bases in Japan, and potentially even carrier strike groups in the Philippine Sea. Road-mobile and solid-fueled, the missile launches from transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) vehicles, ensuring rapid deployment and reduced vulnerability to preemptive strikes.
The DF-26D’s payload capacity of 2,645 to 3,968 pounds supports both conventional high-explosive warheads for precision strikes and nuclear options for deterrence. The anti-ship variant features terminal guidance, enabling mid-course corrections to hit moving targets like aircraft carriers at hypersonic speeds, complicating the defenses of the US Navy. Enhanced EW suites and decoys reduce the effectiveness of US interceptors like the SM-6, while improved Circular Error Probable (CEP) ensures high accuracy against fortified or mobile threats.
Integrated into China’s “kill web”—a network of sensors, satellites, and artificial intelligence-driven targeting—the DF-26D benefits from real-time intelligence, making it an essential component of China’s multi-domain operations. This hypersonic capability, combined with maneuverability, positions it as a more flexible and potent evolution of the DF-21D.
The DF-26D Will Be a Major Disruptor in the Indo-Pacific
US defense planners are by most accounts worried about the DF-26D, as this new Chinese system significantly erodes American power projection into vital Indo-Pacific domains. By threatening aircraft carriers more thoroughly—and at greater distances—the DF-26D has forced the US Navy to plan for fighting well beyond standoff ranges.
But they are making those carriers operate so far away that the airwings of the carriers will be significantly degraded, as they will be operating too far away from any battlespace.
Specifically, in any Taiwan contingency, with the DF-26D now present, US carriers will need to remain beyond 1,000 km from the strait, limiting air support and exposing vulnerabilities to saturation attacks.
Fixed bases, like Andersen Air Force Base on Guam, become high-risk targets, prompting the US to disperse assets under initiatives like Agile Combat Employment. This dispersal increases costs, strains alliances, and complicates command structures, as seen in US efforts to expand access in the Philippines and Australia. DF-26D’s dual-capable nature heightens escalation risks, blurring lines between conventional and nuclear conflicts.
Furthermore, the DF-26D challenges US missile defenses, requiring investments in hypersonic interceptors and space-based sensors, diverting resources from other priorities. It undermines American deterrence—potentially emboldening China in gray-zone operations, while straining US alliances as partners like Japan and South Korea face indirect threats.
The DF-26D missile variant exemplifies China’s strategic pivot toward asymmetric warfare, directly contesting US hegemony in the Indo-Pacific. Its extended range, hypersonic features, and anti-ship precision compel the US to rethink power projection, fostering innovations in distributed basing and countermeasures. In fact, this system has contributed significantly to the upended military balance of power that now exists in China’s favor in the Indo-Pacific.
As Beijing parades such systems, Washington is left in the lurch. To respond, it will be forced to enhance US-allied cooperation to maintain a free and open region. But the US has been far too slow to adapt so far—and already, the DF-26D is sending ripples across the geopolitics of the region.
About the Author: Brandon J. Weichert
Brandon J. Weichert is a senior national security editor at The National Interest. Recently, Weichert became the host of The National Security Hour on America Outloud News and iHeartRadio, where he discusses national security policy every Wednesday at 8pm Eastern. He is also a contributor at Popular Mechanics and has consulted regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including The Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, The Asia Times, and others. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.
Image: Shutterstock / yuyangc.
