While the Flamingo FP-5 will enhance Ukraine’s strike options against Russia, it cannot decisively tilt the balance of power in Kyiv’s favor.
In the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict, Ukraine has ramped up its domestic weapons production to counter Russian aggression. One standout development is the Flamingo FP-5 drone, a ground-launched cruise missile that promises long-range strikes deep into Russian territory.
Announced in August 2025 on the heels of President Donald Trump’s summit in Alaska with Russian leader Vladimir Putin—a meeting that might mark a decisive turning point against Ukraine in the diplomatic arena—the FP-5 Flamingo represents Ukraine’s push for self-reliance in advanced weaponry amid Western restrictions on using supplied missiles against Russia.
Often referred to as a “drone” in media due to its unarmed nature, the Flamingo is technically a jet-powered cruise missile designed for precision attacks on strategic targets, like oil refineries, military depots, and infrastructure.
Interestingly, this system is coming online at the precise moment that the Americans are running low on critical weapons to supply the Ukrainians with—and as President Donald Trump is seeking a negotiated settlement to the war with Russia.
Understanding the FP-5 Missile
The Flamingo FP-5, developed by Ukrainian firm Fire Point, marks a significant leap in Ukraine’s indigenous defense technology. Founded after the 2022 invasion by professionals from diverse fields, like construction and game design, Fire Point has rapidly scaled production of domestic armaments for the war.
The Flamingo missile weighs around 13,227 pounds at takeoff. It is powered by an AI-25TL turbofan engine—repurposed from L-39 jet trainer aircraft—and a solid rocket booster for launch. It can cruise at 528-559 miles per hour, reaching a maximum speed of 590 mph.
The Flamingo’s standout feature is an 1,864-mile range, enabling strikes across much of European Russia, including as far as Novosibirsk. The 2,535-pound warhead—potentially adapted from high-explosive bombs, like the FAB-1500 or US-sourced Mk 84—offers devastating power, two and a half times that of the American Tomahawk missile. Guidance relies on GPS/GNSS with inertial backup, featuring jamming-resistant antennas for high accuracy. Launched from mobile trailers, it requires 20-40 minutes of prep time and flies at up to three-mile altitude.
Fire Point’s production schedule for the Flamingo is remarkably ambitious. Although it currently manufactures 30 of the missiles per month, the company has announced that it intends to ramp this up to 210 per month by October, and potentially thousands per month by next year. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy hailed the missile as Ukraine’s “most successful missile” yet, with early units already deployed in strikes causing Russian airport closures and fuel price hikes. Compared to Ukraine’s FP-1 kamikaze drones (994-mile range, 132-pound warhead), the FP-5 offers superior payload and speed, making it a real threat to Russia.
Yet despite the missile’s advanced nature, and the threat it poses to the Russian interior, the Flamingo does very little to change the facts of the war. The fact of the matter is that Russia has significant advantages on the ground in Ukraine—and has the capacity to sustain strikes on Ukrainian cities long after Kyiv’s resources have run dry.
Russia’s Air Defenses Will Limit the P-5’s Effectiveness
There is an interesting parallel to Ukraine’s situation in the history of the 20th century. In 1944-1945, as the outcome of World War II became clear, Germany began to field advanced indigenous wünderwaffe, such as the V-1 and V-2 rockets. While the weapons were stunning in their audacity and advancement, they were intended to change the dynamics of the war—and did nothing of the kind. If anything, they made the eventual outcome worse for Germany by giving the Nazi high command a false hope that the war could still be won.
Besides, Moscow has been dealing with threats akin to that of the Flamingo for years. The FP-5 faces formidable Russian defenses honed against Ukrainian long-range drones and missiles. Russia’s integrated air defense network, including the S-400, S-300, Buk-M3, Tor-M2, and Pantsir-S1 systems, is designed to intercept low-flying cruise missiles. These layered systems cover vast areas, with S-400 radars detecting targets at 373 miles and engaging those targets at 249 miles.
Over the last three years of war, both Russia and Ukraine have become proficient at air defense. In recent attacks, Ukraine’s air force reported intercepting 577 of 614 Russian drones and missiles in one wave, with Russia claiming similar success rates against Ukrainian drones.
Electronic warfare (EW) is a key countermeasure against Ukrainian drones. Systems like Krasukha-4 and Murmansk-BN can jam GPS signals, spoof navigation, or disrupt communications, forcing missiles like the FP-5 to rely on less accurate inertial guidance. Russia’s EW prowess has also neutralized advanced Western-supplied weapons, such as Storm Shadow missiles, in past engagements.
And, anticipating that some strikes will succeed, Russia has undergone more conventional ways of protecting its war industry—dispersing assets, relocating depots deeper inland, and using decoys to waste Ukraine’s resources. With nearly 1,000 intercepts of Ukrainian projectiles since late 2024, Russia’s defenses remain robust, potentially limiting the FP-5’s effectiveness to sporadic disruptions rather than systemic damage.
“Wonder Weapons” Don’t Win Wars—Boots on the Ground Do
So, while the Flamingo FP-5 enhances Ukraine’s strike options, it won’t decisively tilt the war due to Russia’s entrenched ground superiority. Long-range missiles like ATACMS or FP-5 can disrupt logistics, but they fail to address Ukraine’s manpower shortages—the issue most likely to end the war in the near future.
Russia’s artillery outguns Ukraine five to one in some sectors, firing more than 10,000 shells daily versus Ukraine’s 2,000. Fortified lines in Donbas and Zaporizhzhia, bolstered by minefields and drones, enable slow but steady advances, as seen in Russia’s recent capture of towns like Avdiivka and Vuhledar. Air superiority allows Russia to bomb Ukrainian positions relentlessly, while its war economy produces 1.5 million shells annually.
Even abundant long-range strikes won’t reverse the basic math problem for Ukraine. The FP-5 can cause disruptions in Russia’s otherwise robust lines, but Ukraine lacks the ground forces to take advantage of such disruptions. Plus, with Russia’s larger population base and economy, they can absorb losses imposed by Ukraine on their forces while sustaining offensives.
Ukraine cannot. Production constraints mean Ukraine may not field enough FP-5s quickly, and escalation risks could prompt Russian retaliation, like intensified strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure.
Ultimately, wars are won on the ground, where Russia’s advantages in manpower, firepower, and resilience prevail.
The Ukraine Flamingo FP-5 drone exemplifies innovative warfare, offering long-range precision to challenge Russian rear areas. The national defenses of Russia, however, combined with its ground dominance in artillery and troops, ensure it won’t deliver a strategic turnaround. As the conflict grinds on, tools like the FP-5 may prolong Ukraine’s resistance, but will do little else.
And with comprehensive support from the West waning due to logistical and political complications, Ukraine finds itself in much the same position that Germany in 1944 did: fighting to the bitter end, with diminishing returns, being outgunned by numerically superior (Russian) forces, despite having some interesting indigenously produced weapons. These systems will do little other than temporarily slow down the Russian advance. It would be far better for Ukraine’s leaders to hash out a negotiated end to the war before all is lost.
About the Author: Brandon J. Weichert
Brandon J. Weichert is a senior national security editor at The National Interest. Recently, Weichert became the host of The National Security Hour on America Outloud News and iHeartRadio, where he discusses national security policy every Wednesday at 8pm Eastern. He is also a contributor at Popular Mechanics and has consulted regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including The Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, The Asia Times, and countless others. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.
Image: Shutterstock / Drop of Light.
