President Lee Jae-myung promises a pragmatic nuclear energy policy for South Korea, but ambiguity, international pressures, and public concern continue to pose challenges.
On March 28, 2017, Lee Jae-myung, then mayor of Seongnam and a Democratic Party primary candidate, visited Busan and announced a policy for Yeongnam, the Southeastern region of South Korea, and home to many nuclear power plants. In a speech, he pledged to “halt the extension of existing nuclear plants, stop new nuclear plant constructions, and refrain from planning new reactors,” demonstrating firm determination to dismantle nuclear energy in the region.
Unfortunately, Lee lost the primary, but his competitor, Moon Jae-in, became president in May 2017. Sharing Lee’s stance on nuclear energy policy, Moon announced a phase-out policy during an event marking the shutdown of the Kori-1 reactor, South Korea’s first commercialized nuclear power plant, on June 19, 2017. However, the policy radically shifted under Moon’s successor, Yoon Seok-yul, who reversed the previous policy with a strong pro-nuclear drive. These rapid pendulum swings in nuclear energy strategy have fueled political conflict, public debate, and uncertainty for the nuclear industry.
The Revival of The Phase-Out Nuclear Energy Policy?
Following Yoon’s removal from office after the unanimous decisions from the Constitutional Court this April, Lee Jae-myung was elected the twenty-first South Korean President. In the meantime, questions have been raised about whether he would return to the nuclear exit policy, prompting worries about the sustainability of energy supply, the revival of political conflict, and the competitiveness of South Korea’s nuclear export strategy.
Contrary to his previous stance, Lee has so far acknowledged the significance of nuclear energy and aimed to include it in the country’s energy mix, along with other renewable energy sources, for a sustainable energy supply and high-tech development, such as artificial intelligence (AI). Lee’s shift to a pragmatic and balanced approach is compatible with public interest, but uncertainty remains due to a strategic ambiguity, potential public resistance, and questions of international credibility.
Moon Jae-in’s Nuclear Exit (2017-2022)
Before taking office, Moon Jae-in had advocated for a nuclear phase-out policy since his 2012 presidential campaign. Consistent with his stance, in a speech at the Kori reactor in June 2017, he announced plans to scrap new nuclear plant construction, prohibit the extension of reactor lifetimes, close the Wolseong Unit 1 reactor early, and strengthen nuclear safety standards. Citing safety concerns at nuclear plants and phase-out policies in Western countries, he proposed shifting the focus to renewable energy and LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas). Strong backlash against Moon’s policy came from conservative parties, the nuclear power community— including the Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power “[KHNP] labor union, reactor construction companies, workers of fuel manufacturing”—and academics, which raised concerns about a potential collapse of the nuclear industry, depletion of skilled labor workers, an increase in electricity prices, instability in power supply, and a weakening of South Korea’s nuclear competitiveness.
Despite Moon’s bold decision, the policy proved difficult to implement in practice. On October 20, 2017, the Public Deliberation Committee concluded that the construction of Shin Kori 5 and 6 reactors had to resume. Furthermore, electricity production from nuclear plants increased from 26.8 percent in 2017 to 29.6 percent in 2022, along with a slight increase in nuclear expenditure from 738 billion South Korean won (KRW) in 2017 to 864 billion KRW in 2021.
The government also struggled to win the hearts and minds of the public. Public support for the policy initially rose but later declined, with 60.5 percent approval in 2017, 72 percent in 2018, and 56.4 percent in 2019. In 2022, a public poll revealed a divided result, with 39.6 percent in favor of nuclear expansion policy and 38.6 percent supporting nuclear reduction and phase-down.
Yoon Seok-yul’s Nuclear Revival Drive (2022-2024)
As a presidential candidate, Yoon Seok-yul already signaled his pro-nuclear stance by visiting nuclear-related facilities and laboratories in late 2021. He later pledged to reverse the phase-out policy by resuming nuclear plant construction, developing small modular reactors (SMRs), and maintaining nuclear power at 30 percent of electricity generation. The nuclear industry welcomed the move, whereas opposition parties and anti-nuclear civic groups strongly condemned the policy.
In subsequent years, the construction of the Shin Hanul 3 and 4 reactors resumed, while the Shin Hanul 1 and 2 reactorsbegan commercial operation. The government also announced its determination to invest 399.2 billion KRW over six years into the Innovative SMR project. South Korea’s nuclear industry also achieved success in nuclear exports, participating in Egypt’s nuclear power plant construction and Romania’s tritium removal facility construction. Through these actions, Yoon was able to meet his goal of maintaining nuclear energy’s share of electricity production above 30 percent between 2023 and 2024.
However, the pro-nuclear policy did not receive majority approval as public support for renewable energy rose slightly higher than for nuclear energy: 41.9 percent support for the pro-nuclear policy and 47.5 percent for renewable energy in 2022. This trend continued in 2023.
While reversing the phase-out policy to expand nuclear power, Yoon’s administration also fueled concerns about nuclear proliferation in South Korea. Against the backdrop of escalating security tensions, including North Korea’s nuclear advancement, growing security ties between North Korea and Russia, and intensifying US-China competition, President Yoon, cabinet members, and ruling party politicians advocated for Seoul’s nuclear armament and other nuclear options, reflecting increasing public interest. The issue remains debated, but it is widely believed that these developments resulted in Seoul’s recent designation as a “sensitive country” by the Department of Energy (DOE), creating uncertainties for South Korea’s high-tech cooperation with the United States.
Lee Jae-myung’s Pragmatic Approach Toward Energy Policy
Lee Jae-myung’s nuclear energy policy has evolved to be more pragmatic since his 2017 declaration of the “nuclear zero era.” Lee, as a Democratic Party candidate in the 2022 presidential election, opposed both the early closure of existing nuclear plants and the suspension of nuclear power plant construction. His stance became even more practical in this year’s presidential campaign. Rejecting heavy reliance on a single energy source, Lee stated that “even if we move to a renewable energy-centric society, we need stable energy sources, including nuclear energy, for so-called base-load electricity.” He stressed the flexible integration of diverse energy sources in order to develop AI, SMRs, and other technologies.
Aligning with Lee’s pragmatic stance, the ruling party announced a review of extending nuclear power plants in May and proposed a special bill on SMR development in June. In the same month, the Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energyannounced that it would seek sites for nuclear reactors in accordance with the eleventh Basic Plan for Electricity Supply and Demand.
It has been just two months since Lee’s inauguration, but criticism against his middle-ground nuclear policy has been limited. Progressive parties and anti-nuclear civic groups have condemned the policy as “a pro-nuclear policy” or “impractical for managing nuclear waste,” but no criticism has come from major political parties, and the nuclear industry has shown a mixture of relief and concern.
Until now, public interest has supported the government’s balanced energy policy. A June survey on the new administration’s energy policy direction revealed that 34.6 percent of the public approved the expansion of nuclear energy development, 30.6 percent favored a shift to a renewable energy policy, and the remainder backed energy diversification and hydrogen development.
Policy Implications for Seoul’s Energy Policy
The Lee government’s nuclear energy policy sets out a range of objectives, including securing energy supply, advancing climate commitments, ensuring political stability, and strengthening international nuclear-economic engagement.
Strengthening Energy Security
By pursuing the diversification of energy sources, South Korea can enhance the long-term sustainability of energy production, mitigating uncertainties arising from the transition to a renewable energy-centric society and sudden fluctuations in oil and LNG prices.
Contribution to Carbon Neutrality
Due to nuclear power’s near-zero carbon emissions, it will play a significant role in meeting South Korea’s 2050 carbon neutrality goal set by the Carbon Neutrality Act.
Reducing Social and Political Conflict
Given public preference and the nuclear industry’s optimism, the adoption of a pragmatic energy mix policy has the potential to ease recurring political disputes experienced during the Moon administration.
Expanding Nuclear Exports
Recent developments in bilateral agreements on nuclear cooperation during the South Korea-US trade deal on July 30 and the South Korea-Vietnam summit on August 13 present the Lee government’s readiness to actively support nuclear exports, reinforcing South Korea’s competitiveness in the global nuclear energy market.
Challenges to Lee’s Nuclear Energy Stance and Policy
Despite the administration’s stated support for nuclear energy, difficulties remain stemming from policy ambiguity, public resistance, and external constraints.
Strategic Ambiguity
President Lee has talked about the direction of his nuclear policy, but he has been reluctant to announce an official blueprint to avoid reviving old disputes. During the presidential campaign, on April 24, Lee’s camp reacted to his energy policy announcement, which excluded nuclear energy, by emphasizing that “There is considerable attention and controversy surrounding nuclear power…[and] there must be clear social consensus.” After the presidential inauguration, on August 13, the Presidential Committee on State Affairs Planning was expected to present the blueprint of nuclear energy; however, it was not released at all. The establishment of a new Climate and Energy department is expected to clarify Lee’s nuclear energy direction. However, the continuing ambiguity could instead revive old conflicts.
Site Selection and Local Opposition
While the government and the ruling party are supportive of nuclear construction, including both large reactors and small modular reactors, site selection is likely to draw resistance from local residents and civic groups. In addition, the siting of nuclear waste management facilities is expected to intensify opposition.
Constraints from “Sensitive Country” Designation.
South Korea was placed on the DOE’s “sensitive country” list, which took effect in April, and could complicate nuclear-related cooperation between Seoul and Washington. In line with this, Lee Jae-myung has shown a firm commitment to nonproliferation, and the Ministry of Science and ICT has recently issued a “Guide to Research Security in International Joint Research,” outlining US research security systems and regulations that Korean researchers must be aware of when conducting joint research to avoid violations. Nevertheless, it remains uncertain to what extent the designation will restrict South Korea’s participation in nuclear research and joint projects with the United States.
Conclusion
The previous two administrations demonstrated a sharp shift in nuclear energy policy. Moon Jae-in’s phase-out policy was not able to deliver substantive outcomes, while Yoon Seok-yul’s pro-nuclear stance was overshadowed by proliferation-related remarks that undermined international credibility. In contrast, Lee Jae-myung presents a pragmatic path, combining nuclear energy with renewable energy sources, which aligns with the constant trend in public interests.
For Lee’s government to succeed in nuclear energy policy, it must reduce ambiguity, resolve local resistance, and mitigate international constraints while leveraging stable political and public support for a balanced transition.
About the Author: Daeyeon Lee
Daeyeon Lee is an international security analyst. He recently graduated from the Middlebury Institute of International Studies with an M.A. in Nonproliferation and Terrorism Studies. His research focuses on arms control, nuclear security, the nuclear politics of the Korean Peninsula, and relations between the two Koreas and the United States. He is a junior member of Korea Diplomacy Plaza. Previously, he served as a research associate at the Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.
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