For the short term, Tehran will prefer quiet security and intelligence cooperation with the Taliban rather than overt recognition.
Russia’s formal recognition of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan in early July has stirred cautious optimism in Kabul, where Taliban officials hope it signals a shift in international attitudes, even as broader engagement remains unlikely. With the Islamic Emirate demonstrating a durable grip on power, that optimism may be well-founded.
Some non-Western states with close ties to Moscow may eventually follow Russia’s lead in recognizing the Taliban. Among them, Iran is an interesting case to consider. Given Tehran and Kabul’s overlapping interests, particularly in fighting certain extremist groups as common enemies, whether and when Iran might eventually follow suit in recognizing the Taliban is a question worth exploring.
It is reasonable to suggest that Russia’s recognition of the Taliban may increase the likelihood of Iran following suit. Yet, it is equally important to recognize the limits of the Iran-Russia relationship. Although Tehran and Moscow have grown closer—evidenced by Iranian drone support for Russia during the Ukraine war—it remains a partnership rooted in pragmatism rather than a formal alliance.
Iranian and Russian strategic interests do not always converge, and this divergence is particularly relevant when considering the question of Taliban recognition and geopolitical priorities. Russia’s decision to recognize the Taliban was driven by its own calculations regarding post-occupation Afghanistan. Should Iran choose to take a similar step, it would do so based on its unique national interests and geopolitical priorities.
Iran’s Uneasy Dance with the Taliban
Tehran’s relationship with the Taliban has seen many ups and downs—from nearly going to war in 1998 to later inviting them to Tehran while they were still fighting Afghanistan’s then-government. With the emergence of Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) in 2014–15, a group considered far more violent than the Taliban, and the growing realization that the former central Afghan government was too weak to defeat it, Iran began to turn toward the Taliban.
Since the Taliban’s return to power in 2021, it has not engaged in overt antagonism toward Iran—nor has Tehran taken steps to undermine the Islamic Emirate’s authority in post-US Afghanistan. Nonetheless, underlying tensions persist, suggesting that Tehran may prefer to maintain a cautious, non-ideological engagement largely confined to informal channels and interactions between security and intelligence apparatuses, rather than extending formal diplomatic recognition. This deliberate restraint reflects a careful balancing act that prioritizes stability and influence without rushing into official endorsement.
Shared Borders, Shared Burdens: Iran’s Dilemma Next Door
Iran faces a number of challenges when it comes to its eastern neighbor. ISKP poses a serious menace to both regimes. With over two million drug addicts, Iran also struggles with the flow of narcotics from Afghanistan, as it remains a primary transit route for opium headed to Europe and beyond. Another key issue is the dispute over shared transboundary waters between the two countries.
ISKP’s cross-border threat has been central to Iran’s rationale for engaging with the Taliban, despite deep-rooted mistrust and ideological divergence. Iranian policymakers appear to view stability in post-occupation Afghanistan, even under Taliban rule, as preferable to the chaos that could follow state collapse, which is a scenario that could empower ISKP. For Tehran, engagement with the Islamic Emirate is less an endorsement than a calculated effort to contain threats and preserve regional stability.
Afghanistan remains a pivotal ground for various Sunni extremist groups, each with distinct ideological agendas and operational capabilities. Chief among them is ISKP. Despite territorial setbacks and leadership losses, the group has proven resilient, executing high-profile attacks within Afghanistan and beyond. Notably, ISKP claimed responsibility for the deadly Moscow concert hall bombing in March 2024 and has carried out multiple attacks inside Iran.
It has also intensified its recruitment efforts, particularly among Tajiks and other Central Asian populations, using social media and global networks to broaden its influence well beyond Afghanistan. The country has become an increasingly significant nexus for various extremist factions. The Haqqani Network, deeply embedded within the Taliban’s governing structure, operates with its own agenda, and long-standing Salafist insurgents remain active in peripheral areas.
The overlapping presence of ISKP, the Haqqani Network, and violent Salafist factions creates a volatile landscape that hinders regional counterterrorism efforts. The Taliban’s return to power has significantly altered the security landscape. While the group claims to oppose ISKP, its governance has inadvertently allowed space for such organizations to regroup and adapt. International scrutiny has declined since the US withdrawal, enabling extremist actors to operate with fewer constraints. Tehran views informal ties with the Taliban as a tool for border management, intelligence-gathering, and containing extremist infiltration. For Iran, the stakes are high.
A destabilized Afghanistan overrun by unchecked jihadist groups poses not only a security risk but also a challenge to its broader regional influence. Maintaining dialogue with the Taliban, despite fundamental differences, should be seen as part of a strategy rooted in containment rather than alliance. Iran’s approach underscores a broader regional trend: the prioritization of national security over ideological alignment in an increasingly unstable and multipolar environment.
Dried Rivers, Rising Tensions: Afghanistan’s Helmand River
The water dispute between Iran and Afghanistan centers on the Helmand River, a vital resource for both countries. A 1973 treaty guarantees Iran a fixed annual share, but implementation has been inconsistent, especially during periods of political instability in Afghanistan. Climate change, prolonged droughts, and upstream infrastructure projects have intensified tensions. Meanwhile, Iran suffers from disastrous water management and growing water scarcity, described as “water bankruptcy,” partly due to its inadequate investment in water infrastructure.
Iran, as the downstream country, has long found itself in a weaker position when it comes to securing a reliable share of transboundary waters. Afghanistan controls the river’s headwaters and key dams, giving it the ability to regulate, or block, the flow into Iran almost unilaterally. This geographical asymmetry has profoundly shaped Tehran’s policy toward Kabul, including its decision to engage with the Taliban even before their 2021 return to power.
For years, Iran pursued a dual-track approach toward Afghanistan, maintaining relations with the Western-backed government while also building channels of communication with the Taliban. Tehran hosted Taliban delegations and attempted to mediate between them and various Afghan political factions. While these efforts were often framed as part of Iran’s regional influence and security strategy, they were also driven by the urgent need to protect its water interests, particularly as the Helmand River sustains the arid Sistan and Baluchistan province.
By cultivating ties with all Afghan power centers, especially those in control of territory along the Helmand, Iran aimed to avoid being shut out of future water negotiations. The goal was not only to hedge against political risks but also to build goodwill and leverage to ensure continued water access. Despite these efforts, Iran’s structural disadvantage remains. With limited ability to enforce the 1973 water treaty or retaliate effectively, Tehran has few options when water is withheld.
The Taliban’s decision in recent years to block the Helmand’s flow, after seizing control of critical infrastructure, underscored the limits of Iran’s strategy. The fact that Tehran had already invested diplomatic capital in engaging with the Taliban did little to soften their stance on water rights. Even though it was ineffective, Iran’s engagement strategy reflects a hard-learned reality: influence in Afghanistan depends on talking to whomever holds power.
Whose Afghanistan? Power, Exclusion, and the Fraying Social Fabric
Inclusivity remains one of Afghanistan’s most critical and unresolved challenges. Despite promises of forming a representative government following their return to power in 2021, the Taliban have consolidated authority in ways that exclude key segments of Afghan society, including ethnic minorities, political factions, and women. The absence of meaningful inclusion threatens not only Afghanistan’s internal cohesion but also its prospects for long-term stability and international engagement.
Ethnic diversity has always been a defining feature of Afghanistan, but it has rarely been reflected equitably in power structures. Under the Taliban, this imbalance has worsened. The movement is overwhelmingly Pashtun in leadership and ideology, and although some non-Pashtuns, particularly Uzbeks, hold symbolic positions, major communities like the Hazaras and Tajiks remain marginalized. Hazaras, a predominantly Shia minority long subject to persecution, have been systematically targeted by both ISKP and, in some cases, the Taliban. Attacks on Hazara schools, mosques, and neighborhoods continue with little protection or justice, reinforcing fears of state-sanctioned discrimination.
Tajiks, the second-largest ethnic group in the country, have also seen their political influence eroded. Former Northern Alliance strongholds in the northeast, such as Panjshir, have been subject to Taliban crackdowns. Political and military leaders from the Tajik community have either been sidelined or forced into exile, cutting off avenues for peaceful power-sharing and fostering simmering resistance in certain areas.
Women face the most sweeping and systematic exclusion. Since the Taliban’s return, girls’ education beyond primary school has been banned in most provinces, and women have been pushed out of public life, barred from most jobs, and restricted in their movement. These policies have drawn global condemnation but reflect the Taliban’s ideological commitment rather than short-term political calculation.
The erasure of women from social, political, and economic life undermines any claim the Taliban might make to legitimate and inclusive governance. Without the meaningful inclusion of all ethnic, religious, and gender groups, Afghanistan cannot achieve lasting peace. A truly stable and secure Afghanistan must be one where all citizens, regardless of ethnicity or gender, have a stake in the country’s future and a voice in its direction. Until then, exclusivity will continue to be a source of fragility, resistance, and unrest.
While Iran has occasionally voiced concern over the plight of Afghanistan’s Shia Hazara community, especially during periods of heightened violence, it has rarely treated their protection as a top foreign policy priority. “The Taliban’s treatment of Shia, Hazara, Tajiks, and other groups, along with imposed restrictions, has drawn criticism from Iran. However, geopolitical interests prevent Iran from overemphasizing these differences, maintaining relatively low-tension relations,” Dr. Javad Heiran-Nia, the director of the Persian Gulf Studies Group at the Center for Scientific Research and Middle East Strategic Studies in Iran, told these authors.
Forced Returns: Afghanistan’s Deportation Fallout
Iran has long hosted millions of Afghans, many of whom work as day laborers or use Iran as a transit country while en route to Turkey and Europe. However, in the wake of the 12-day Iran-Israel conflict in June 2025, Tehran has initiated a large-scale deportation of Afghan nationals. Iranian authorities have justified the move by citing allegations that some Afghan migrants collaborated with Israeli intelligence in the lead-up to the conflict.
While there appears to be validity to specific cases, the sweeping nature of the deportation campaign has affected large numbers of Afghans with no ties to foreign intelligence, and the treatment of many returnees has raised serious concerns about the erosion of their dignity and human rights.
This mass expulsion risks undermining the broader trajectory of Iran-Taliban relations. While the Taliban have long urged Afghan migrants in Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, and beyond to return home, officials in Kabul emphasize that such repatriation should occur gradually and under controlled conditions. This stance is sensible, given Afghanistan’s fragile institutions and deep economic distress. As one of the poorest countries in the world, Afghanistan lacks the capacity to absorb large waves of returnees without significant strain.
“We’ve seen the Taliban Prime Minister issue a statement asking Iran to be more lenient and to respect the rights of Afghans who are being deported. There’s a level of frustration between the two, with Iran trying to speed up the repatriations and Afghans saying that you need to respect the rights of these returnees. There are allegations that they’re deprived of their property and everything and just thrown in a bus and pushed across the border,” said Ibraheem Bahiss, an analyst with the International Crisis Group focusing on Afghanistan.
The scale of deportations has raised significant concerns, particularly given Afghanistan’s limited capacity to absorb returnees. Both the humanitarian sector and governing authorities are under considerable strain, underscoring Kabul’s preference for a more gradual and managed repatriation process. In this context, while both Tehran and Kabul may align in principle on the long-term return of Afghan migrants, the scale and manner of Iran’s deportations threaten to generate friction between the two governments.
“The deportations definitely have a negative influence on the nature of the bilateral ties as the returnees from Iran put further burden on national resources and on the Afghan economy which has already been struggling. Taliban understand that it’s a tool of leverage against their government, which neighboring countries use whenever they need to pressurize the Taliban,” Dr. Umer Karim, Associate Fellow with the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies, told these authors.
Where Does Tehran Go from Here?
Formal recognition of the Taliban by Tehran remains a plausible—but far from imminent —possibility. Iran will likely wait for countries like China and Uzbekistan to act first, seeking diplomatic cover to minimize reputational risk. Until then, quiet cooperation on border security, trade, and counterterrorism will continue beneath the radar. This informal engagement allows Tehran to safeguard its strategic interests without prematurely granting legitimacy to a Sunni Islamist regime known for its intolerance and hardline ideology.
Moreover, Iran is likely to closely monitor how Russia navigates its newly formalized ties with the Taliban, using those developments as a litmus test for its own eventual policy shift. Until then, Tehran’s cautious and deliberately unofficial relationship with the Islamic Emirate will continue to be shaped by interest-based cooperation—an arrangement that offers flexibility without full endorsement.
About the Authors: Giorgio Cafiero and Fatemeh Aman
Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics, an Adjunct Assistant Professor at Georgetown University, and an Adjunct Fellow at the American Security Project. He is a frequent contributor to Al Jazeera, Gulf International Forum, The New Arab, Responsible Statecraft, Stimson Center, and Amwaj.Media. Throughout Mr. Cafiero’s career, he has consulted many public and private sector entities, briefed diplomats of various countries on Gulf affairs, and worked as a subject matter expert for multinational law firms. Mr. Cafiero holds an M.A. in International Relations from the University of San Diego. Find him on X: @GiorgioCafiero.
Fatemeh Aman is a nonresident senior fellow at the Middle East Institute in Washington, D.C. She has written on Iranian, Afghan, and broader Middle Eastern affairs for over 20 years. Aman has worked as a journalist, analyst, and previously as an Atlantic Council nonresident senior fellow. She has advised the US government and nongovernmental organizations on Iranian regional policies. Follow her on X: @FatemehAman.
Image: Iranian Government / Public Domain.
