How the UK Can Help the Himalayan Water Crisis

The UK’s Indo-Pacific Strategy cannot ignore China’s encroachments into the mountainous heart of Asia. 

As climate change reshapes the geopolitical landscape, the United Kingdom must recognize the Himalayan water crisis for what it is: a looming threat to global security. With its permanent seat on the UN Security Council and renewed Indo-Pacific ambitions, Britain is uniquely placed to elevate Himalayan ecological degradation from a local and regional concern to a global priority. 

Melting glaciers, climate-induced variability, and unregulated dam construction in the Himalayas are placing millions of lives at risk in South and Southeast Asia. This must not go unnoticed in Westminster, especially when it has been a traditional stakeholder and a historical player in the Himalayas.   

The Himalayan region holds the largest reserves of fresh water outside the Arctic and Antarctic. Its glaciers feed ten of the world’s most important river systems, which sustain nearly two billion people across South and Southeast Asia. Yet, this ecological marvel is under severe threat. Climate change is accelerating glacial melt in the mountain range at an alarming pace, altering monsoon patterns, and intensifying the frequency of extreme weather events. The result is a region gripped by water stress, food insecurity, and heightened geopolitical (including boundary dispute) tensions, particularly between India and China.   

Beijing has started building the world’s largest dam in Tibet, the Medog project on the Yarlung Tsangpo, a significant engineering feat if completed. But without any consultation or a water-sharing agreement, China now controls the lifeline of northeast India and parts of Bangladesh. This river flows downstream into India as the Brahmaputra and further into Bangladesh as the Jamuna, supporting millions of livelihoods.  

The potential repercussions of this dam are enormous. During the monsoon season, sudden water releases could trigger catastrophic floods in India’s northeast. In the dry season, upstream control could result in crippling droughts. Add to this the dam’s location in a highly seismic region and its proximity to Arunachal Pradesh (Indian territory claimed by China), and it becomes clear that this is not just an environmental issue, but a geopolitical flashpoint. However, despite frequent natural disasters, China’s “water-industrial complex” continues to push forward with plans for hydropower dams in ecologically and politically sensitive regions of the Tibetan plateau. 

Besides India and Bangladesh, a number of other downstream countries, including Nepal, Pakistan, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand, are also likely to be significantly affected by China’s growing control over the Tibetan Plateau and its aggressive dam-building activities in the region.

The Case for British Ecological Leadership

Why should Britain care? The simple case in point is that the British Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office (FCDO) ought to know that what happens in the Himalayas will not stay in the Himalayas for long. Water insecurity in this region directly threatens the stability of the Indo-Pacific, a zone the UK has repeatedly identified as central to its future economic and security interests. 

The 2021 Integrated Review and its subsequent refresh have explicitly recognized the importance of a “free and open Indo-Pacific.” Without stability in the Himalayas, that vision is compromised. Given the emphasis on climate cooperation and resilience building in the review, the issue of water insecurity in the Himalayas becomes all the more relevant to the UK.

Moreover, the UK has a long-standing commitment to upholding a rules-based international order. China’s opaque, unilateral approach to managing transboundary rivers in the Himalayas directly undermines that principle. The weaponization of water, as we are now witnessing, sets a dangerous precedent not only in Asia but also worldwide.  

The UK is not starting from zero. Through initiatives like the South Asia Water Initiative (SAWI), supported by the World Bank and other organizations, Britain has played a quiet yet meaningful role in fostering regional cooperation on water management. Though SAWI formally closed in 2021, it laid the groundwork for renewed engagement. What is now needed is the political will to scale up these efforts and bring Himalayan water governance into multilateral forums, starting with the UN Security Council.  

Navigating Himalayan Geopolitics 

The Himalayas mark the northern frontier of the Indo-Pacific. In fact, at the thirteenth Indo-Pacific Armies Chiefs’ Conference (IPACC) in New Delhi, India’s defense minister stated that “the Indo-Pacific was no longer a maritime construct but a full-fledged geostrategic construct,” implying that the Indo-Pacific cannot be stable if the Himalayas remain unstable.

In addition, General Randy George, chief of staff of the US Army, stated that “land power” contributes decisively to shared security. He noted that the IPAAC network is building “a security architecture that binds this region together,” connecting the stability of the Sino-Indian border along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with that of the South China Sea. Reportedly, this situation has led to increased intelligence sharing between the United States and India in the Himalayas. Therefore, the United States’ increasing focus on the Himalayan front is reshaping the Indo-Pacific’s security architecture.  

The Indo-Pacific lies at the heart of Britain’s strategic and economic future as well. From maritime trade routes to technology partnerships, developments in this region have a direct impact on the UK. The Integrated Review and recent statements by UK officials rightly identify China as a “systemic competitor,” but the UK must now apply that framing to ecological security. 

The weaponization of water by Beijing, particularly in seismically vulnerable, disputed areas, undermines not only environmental stability but also the rules-based international order that the UK strongly advocates for. To be sure, addressing the Himalayan crisis at the UN level will not be politically straightforward. While France and the United States would likely support such a move, Russia’s position remains ambiguous due to its strategic partnership with China. Yet, these very dynamics make Britain an ideal intermediary to raise and strike a debate both within and outside the UN forum.  

The UK has long followed a policy of equi-engagement with both India and China. But the COVID-19 pandemic, coupled with China’s increasing assertiveness in Hong Kong and its human rights abuses in Xinjiang and Tibet, has led to a reassessment. Britain’s Permanent Representative to the WTO and UN in Geneva, Simon Manley, has been vocal in calling out these violations and demanding access for independent observers.   

Furthermore, raising this issue at international forums could strengthen Britain’s ties with India and other key regional actors. As London seeks to deepen bilateral relations with New Delhi, including through enhanced trade, security cooperation, and participation in platforms like the Quad and AUKUS, it must take the security concerns in the Himalayan region, including those of Indian security concerns, much more seriously. 

The boundary dispute between India and China might be a bilateral matter, but treating China’s hydro-engineering activities as a bilateral India-China issue may be shortsighted. It is, in actuality, a multilateral challenge with cascading regional effects that would span beyond the Himalayas. If Britain is to remain consistent in its moral and strategic outlook, it needs to integrate ecological degradation in Tibet and water insecurity in the Himalayas into its broader foreign policy agenda. This is clearly a space where environmental advocacy, strategic foresight, and moral leadership intersect.  

Europe’s Stake in Asian Stability 

Britain is not alone in recognizing the strategic importance of the Indo-Pacific. The European Union and most EU member-states, including France, Germany, the Czech Republic, and a few others, are also pursuing their own Indo-Pacific strategies and visions, underscoring the region’s relevance to Europe’s economic and security future. The convergence of these strategies offers a unique moment for transatlantic and European coordination.