President Trump’s recent tariffs on Kazakhstan are largely symbolic. Yet, the move underscores a deeper problem in US engagement in Central Asia.
When President Donald Trump announced a 25 percent blanket tariff on imports from Kazakhstan, it was billed as tough action to close a trade gap. In reality, this tariff is economically inconsequential for its ostensible target. More than 95 percent of Kazakhstan’s exports to the United States are exempt or otherwise shielded under existing agreements. In other words, the vast bulk of what Kazakhstan sends to America—oil for refineries, uranium for nuclear plants, metals for industry—will continue entering tariff-free.
What remains subject to the tariff is a sliver of niche products like phosphorus-based chemicals, ammonium nitrate fertilizers, ferrosilicon alloys, and even wheat gluten used in food processing. In 2024, Kazakhstan exported only about $95 million worth of such goods to the United States, roughly 4 percent of its total exports to the American market. Imposing a 25 percent duty on them will do little to dent Kazakhstan’s economy or force policy changes. These exports are simply too minor. It’s a policy with virtually no economic upside for either nation. And yet, the damage goes deeper, exposing a troubling inconsistency in US engagement with Kazakhstan and Central Asia.
This tariff episode exemplifies a longstanding inconsistency in US policy toward Central Asia’s leading economy. Kazakhstan is a regional linchpin rich in energy and critical minerals, and a nation that has repeatedly sought closer ties with Washington. Yet, US attention to Kazakhstan has been sporadic and often superficial. In 2019, the Trump administration unveiled a United States Strategy for Central Asia 2019–2025, promising a renewed commitment to sovereignty, connectivity, and economic prosperity in the “C5” nations. That strategy largely lacked follow-through, and momentum fizzled. By the mid-2020s, US engagement had drifted back into benign neglect, interrupted only by occasional events like a C5+1 summit.
America’s inconsistency in Central Asia has not occurred in a vacuum. Other powers have eagerly filled the void with robust diplomacy and investment. China stands foremost. Over the past two decades, Beijing has emerged as Central Asia’s leading trading partner and a significant investor in infrastructure and energy. China’s trade with the five republics surged to nearly $95 billion by 2024. Kazakhstan alone does over $40 billion a year in trade with China, dwarfing its $2–3 billion trade with the United States.
Other regional and global players have overtaken the United States as well. The European Union has deepened its economic footprint, becoming a leading destination for Kazakhstan’s oil, metals, and goods, and its biggest overall trading partner (€45 billion) and biggest foreign investor. While also having a substantial trade deficit with Kazakhstan, the EU regularly hosts high-level meetings and has invested in connectivity projects (like tying the Trans-Caspian transport route to the EU-funded Global Gateway Initiative) that link Central Asia to Western markets.
Turkey, leveraging cultural and linguistic bonds, has dramatically expanded its presence—from construction projects in Kazakhstan’s capital to growing trade and the institutional ties of the Organization of Turkic States. South Korea and Japan similarly run annual forums with Central Asian governments, providing technology investments, loans, and training programs that keep their relationships warm and growing. Even India and countries like the Gulf states have stepped up their presence in Central Asia.
In this competitive geopolitical neighborhood, Central Asian nations have options. The United States, however, risks marginalization if it cannot demonstrate consistent engagement. The occasional American project or summit, followed by long absences or abrupt policy shifts, leaves Washington lagging behind competitors who show up year in and year out.
Consistent engagement, even on a modest scale, could yield major strategic and economic returns for the United States in Central Asia. By simply being a steady partner, the United States could simultaneously counterbalance Russian and Chinese dominance and foster more secure, independent states in this pivotal region—outcomes very much in America’s strategic interest. Yet, Washington’s mixed signals squander the goodwill that does exist.
One clear example of how US policy has failed to adapt to new realities is the continued application of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to Kazakhstan. This provision, a relic of Cold War trade law from 1974, was meant to pressure the Soviet Union on Jewish emigration by denying normal trade relations to non-compliant countries. Three decades after the USSR’s collapse, Jackson-Vanik is still on the books for Kazakhstan and most of its neighbors.
In practice, since Kazakhstan’s independence, every US administration has annually waived Jackson-Vanik restrictions, allowing normal trade tariffs. But the failure to repeal this amendment for Kazakhstan is a symbolic and practical drag on the relationship. Kazakh officials bring it up incessantly in discussions with Americans. It is perceived as an insult that Washington still hasn’t bothered to grant Kazakhstan the same Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) status it extended to Russia in 2012 (revoked in 2022).
Encouragingly, there is bipartisan support to fix this. In recent years, lawmakers from both parties have introduced bills to graduate Kazakhstan from Jackson-Vanik and grant PNTR status, the most recent one being “H.R.1024 – US-Kazakhstan Trade Modernization Act.” Yet, to date, these efforts have stalled in Congress, never making it out of committee. The glacial progress on repealing Jackson-Vanik speaks volumes about Central Asia’s place in Washington’s priorities. It is a low-hanging fruit for goodwill that inexplicably remains unpicked.
For Kazakhstan, the lingering amendment is more than a bureaucratic detail; it’s a litmus test of American respect. If Washington cannot muster the support to remove an archaic trade restriction universally recognized as obsolete, it’s hard to convince Central Asian partners that the United States is truly committed to a forward-looking partnership.
With the current US Central Asia strategy expiring in 2025, now is the time for Washington to recalibrate its approach toward Kazakhstan and its neighbors. Instead of ad-hoc punitive measures that alienate partners, the United States needs a sustained, focused strategy that recognizes mutual interests. In the case of Kazakhstan, those interests are especially clear: the development of critical mineral supply chains and green energy partnerships. Kazakhstan sits atop vast reserves of materials vital to the twenty-first-century economy, from uranium (it is the world’s top producer) to rare earth elements, copper, lithium, and more.
These are exactly the areas where the United States and its allies are seeking to diversify supply chains away from over-reliance on China and to accelerate the clean energy transition. A strategic initiative to jointly develop mines, refineries, and renewable energy projects in Kazakhstan could pay dividends for both countries. It could provide Kazakhstan with investment and technology to move up the value chain, while giving the United States and global markets alternative sources for critical inputs like battery or microprocessor metals and rare earth magnets.
Seizing this window of opportunity will require US policymakers to make Central Asia more than an afterthought. The pieces are in place: Kazakhstan’s government wants diversified investment and has kept doors open to American firms. Regional attitudes toward Russia are in flux due to Moscow’s war in Ukraine, making Central Asian states more receptive than ever to balancing influences. Moreover, US allies like the EU, Japan, and South Korea are already engaged in complementary efforts.
What’s needed now is political will in Washington to turn plans into action and fund the modest programs that can have an outsized impact, send high-level officials regularly to Astana, reinvigorate the C5+1 platform with regular senior-level meetings, and follow through on the Critical Minerals Dialogue with actual investment projects. Even incremental, consistent US engagement can yield major strategic and economic returns over time by strengthening Kazakhstan’s sovereignty and prosperity. It would, in effect, shore up a front-line against authoritarian influence and create new linkages in global supply networks that benefit everyone.
About the Author: Miras Zhiyenbayev
Miras Zhiyenbayev is the Advisor to the Chairman of the Board for International Affairs and Initiatives at Maqsut Narikbayev University, Astana, Kazakhstan. He was previously Head of the Foreign Policy Analysis and International Studies Program at MIND, the Maqsut Narikbayev Institute for Networking and Development, a university-based think tank at Maqsut Narikbayev University, Astana, Kazakhstan.
Image: DT Phots1 / Shutterstock.com.
