India is leaning away from Israel and toward Iran just at the moment that its ties with the United States are coming under strain.
On June 13, Israel struck Iran in an effort to incapacitate military leadership and cripple the country’s nuclear sites, preempting negotiations scheduled for the following Sunday. The two countries began exchanging missile attacks until June 22, when President Donald Trump authorized “Operation Midnight Hammer,” striking Iran’s Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan nuclear complexes. While the US claims that this direct engagement will be the last of this kind, the strike rippled throughout regional geopolitical undercurrents.
For India, regional alliances and competition strain its traditionally neutral foreign policy in the Middle East. Nonetheless, it will do what it can to safeguard energy security and avoid being drawn into military rivalries. Although the strikes expose fragility within the anti-Western axis, they also risk disrupting India’s diplomatic and security balancing between the United States, Israel, Iran, and Gulf states.
In a complex and costly world order, Prime Minister Modi has elevated India’s balancing strategy, preserving non-alignment while transforming the country into a pivotal swing state and active shaper of global affairs. India remained steadfast in its original statement, issued on June 13, which encouraged de-escalation and emphasized India’s “close and friendly relations with both the countries.” A restrained response to the Iranian strikes could signal multiple perspectives from New Delhi: either a secure confidence in its ability to manage the fallout of regional instability or a lack of confidence in its defense readiness.
Regarding the former, maintaining neutrality means that India demonstrates trust in its military capabilities, diplomatic leverage, and strategic partnerships to shield its interests while avoiding entanglement in volatile great-power rivalries. Examining the DRDO’s June and July newsletters reveals several innovations that could mark significant leaps in India’s defense sector, thereby justifying such confidence.
With the successful long-duration testing of the Scramjet Subscale Combustor, India is poised to establish a significant foothold in hypersonic weapon technology. Furthermore, India’s maritime capabilities have grown with combat trials of the Multi-Influence Ground Mine (MIGM), which offers greater target discrimination and operational flexibility than many legacy mines deployed by other navies globally.
However, the Scramjets and MIGMs lack operational maturity; user evaluation trials are not comparable to deployment and combat validation. Moreover, the Indian defense sector is structurally inhibited by an over-reliance on specific companies. Hindustan Aeronautics Limited has limited Indian combat readiness with production delays on the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft program, among other structural gaps. Under these military constraints, equal attention must be paid to India’s balance of interactions and investments in the Middle East.
India and Iran are pressing ahead with expanding Chabahar port’s capacity and connecting it to the Iranian railway network, aiming to transform it into a key gateway for the International North-South Transport Corridor. Their cooperation, marked by a 10-year agreement and significant Indian investment, reflects a shared commitment to enhancing regional connectivity and access to Central Asian and Eurasian markets.
The 20th India-Iran Joint Commission Meeting saw India’s External Minister and Iran’s Foreign Minister reciprocate the desire to “overcome [sanctions] in the future” and maintain economic cooperation. But such statements belie the reality of bilateral ties.
A report by Dr. Sandeep Bhardwaj analyzed how India’s ties with Iran have eroded under mounting US pressure. Washington’s maximum pressure campaign and the withdrawal of sanctions waivers have forced New Delhi to reduce oil imports drastically and stall key projects. While India once viewed Iran as vital for energy security, connectivity, and regional strategy, its space to balance relations has shrunk.
Meanwhile, India-Israel ties have only grown tighter. Over the past decade, India has deepened its defense and technology ties with Israel, acquiring systems like the Barak 8 missiles, UAVs, loitering munitions, and advanced radars. This partnership’s significance was highlighted in the India-Pakistan conflict, where New Delhi reportedly deployed several Israeli-origin weapons.
Iran may not be able to respond proactively, but the perceived shift toward Israel may present risks for India’s access to regional geopolitical chokepoints. Iran still holds key geopolitical levers over India, notably its control over access routes via Chabahar port and the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC).
Given India’s reduced reliance on Iranian oil, Chabahar and transit connectivity now represent Iran’s most efficient lever, offering New Delhi vital alternatives to routes dominated by Pakistan and China. For instance, India’s 10-year Shahid Behesti Port arrangement at Chabahar enables it to bypass Pakistani ports on the Arabian Sea coast, facilitating increased trade with Afghanistan, Central Asia, and Russia.
Looking through this case, there are significant vulnerabilities to “strategic autonomy,” where the short-term outlook of neutrality could cave to pressures from foreign actors bearing the costs of a prolonged conflict. This is coupled with recent developments made by the Indian military in direct response to said conflict.
Most recently, India has begun developing a new class of high-powered bunker-buster missiles based on its Agni-5 platform, featuring massive conventional warheads of up to eight tons, capable of penetrating 80–100 meters underground to destroy deeply buried targets, inspired by the American use of GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrators (MOPs) against Iran. This advancement not only boosts India’s ability to neutralize hardened enemy infrastructure but also opens avenues for enhanced US-India defense cooperation in precision strike technologies.
Especially in the context of the land-based nuclear force advantage that Pakistan holds, one must consider whether India’s recent steps toward bunker-buster development signify proactive decision-making against Islamabad. Prime Minister Modi’s response to April’s terrorist attack in Pahalgam was assertive, suggesting that there will be significant latitude in future responses to Pakistan-backed terror.
Signaling a departure from restraint, Prime Minister Modi vowed to target cross-border infrastructure in the future. Although these posturing efforts have concentrated on shaking off Pakistan’s “nuclear blackmail,” these choices must also consider the prospect of a “two-front” war with Pakistan and China. While China has largely remained aloof from the Israel-Iran conflict, does Beijing’s strategic calculus hold more intrinsic value to Iran, which has been the focal point of the “Belt” in the Belt and Road Initiative?
Ultimately, sustaining credible deterrence and autonomy will require careful defense modernization and clear policy direction. India must weigh its choices against both opportunity and danger, balancing values, interests, and practical security needs. The concept of “strategic autonomy” can propel India forward in this way, where further alignment with the United States does not imply a formal partnership, but rather a shared assessment of mutual threats and interests.
However, whether US-India trade negotiations can transform the defense-industrial base is now an open question. On the morning of July 30, President Trump announced a 25 percent tariff on India. The following Wednesday, August 6, he issued an executive order imposing an additional 25 percent tariff as a penalty for India’s purchase of Russian oil, set to take effect 21 days from the order’s date.
Both tariff actions will likely strain the defense-industrial connection by undermining trust and complicating high-tech transfers that rely on a stable diplomatic understanding. The defense relationship has already suffered as India quietly rejected proposals to buy US F-35 jet fighters. This underscores the complexity of India’s strategic judgment, as it seeks deeper cooperation without compromising its autonomy or becoming entangled in rigid alliances.
About the Author: Tyler Lissy
Tyler Lissy is a Motwani-Jadeja US-India Fellow at the Pacific Forum, researching India’s defense modernization and US-India strategic cooperation. A Dickinson College graduate and 2025 class commencement speaker, he has worked with the US Army War College, Diamond6 Leadership, and Congressman Ryan Mackenzie’s (R-PA) office. He will pursue a Global Policy MA at the University of Maine.
Image: Pradeep Gaurs / Shutterstock.com.
