Despite some speculation among Western defense analysts, no evidence of damaged ships or submarines in Russia’s Pacific Fleet has yet emerged.
A tsunami hit Russia’s far east Rybachiy naval base on July 30, damaging port facilities and raising questions about potential harm to the country’s nuclear submarine fleet. Waves as high as five meters (16.5 feet) lashed the base on the Kamchatka Peninsula’s east coast, triggered by a monstrous 8.8 magnitude earthquake, the sixth-largest in recorded history. Rybachiy is home to most of Russia’s Pacific Fleet nuclear boats.
The earthquake’s epicenter was in the Pacific Ocean off the coast of Russia, some 75 miles east of the base. The massive tsunami wave hit the shore of Kamchatka some 15 minutes later. In the days since the incident, satellite imagery has been sketchy thanks to persistent cloud cover, with only an Umbra Space satellite, whose synthetic aperture radar imagery can penetrate the clouds, providing fuzzy photos. Rybachiy is located in Avacha Bay, which is also home to the Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky naval base. Other shipyard and missile-loading facilities dot the area.
The base houses modern Russian Borei-class ballistic missile submarines, as well as older Soviet era Delta-class missile boats. Rybachiy is the closest Russian submarine base to the United States, located roughly 1,460 miles from Wales, Alaska.
How Much Damage Did the Tsunami Do to Russia’s Submarine Fleet?
Ground based footage from the civilian port of Severo-Kurilsk, roughly 150 miles from the quake’s epicenter, shows heavy damage to port installations. The quake also triggered an eruption of Kamchatka’s Klyuchevskaya Sopka volcano and resulted in tsunami warnings as far away as California and Chile. Areas of Japan’s eastern seaboard and parts of Hawaii were evacuated.
The only visible damage at Rybachiy, thus far, is what appears to be a floating pier knocked loose from its moorings. Satellites photographed that same pier on July 17, when it had a surface ship moored alongside. Those same photos also appear to show a moored submarine in the immediate vicinity. The 15 minutes between the earthquake and the waves would not have been sufficient time for a submarine, or any other ship, to power up and move away from a potentially damaging battering when the waves hit the shoreline.
However, despite some speculation among Western defense analysts, no evidence of damaged ships or submarines has yet emerged. Separate photos show two submarines still moored at other piers, apparently without significant damage, after the tsunami had passed.
Kremlin Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov stated that Russia’s earthquake alert system had prevented any casualties in Kamchatka. He also stressed that the region’s buildings are constructed specifically to resist earthquakes, given Kamchatka’s position near the edge of the Pacific tectonic plate. Likewise, the heavy concrete Russian submarine piers are designed to withstand seismic events. A retired Russian naval officer told The War Zone that Russian base facilities were “designed and built with the possibility of a nuclear attack by the enemy in mind”—making a tsunami wave a relatively trivial occurrence.
Friendly geography may have contributed to the Russian submarine fleet’s survival as well. The nearly enclosed Avacha Bay itself would have shielded Rybachiy to a certain degree. Conversely, the civilian port of Severo-Kurilsk enjoys less protection from the open sea, which may account for the heavier damage there.
Still, the unmoored pier does indicate some damage to Rybachiy, sparking questions about what else may have been affected. The pier is seemingly being tended by a tug boat, suggesting initial repairs have begun. Critics have questioned whether Russia’s decision to concentrate its Pacific Fleet submarines at one base is wise, especially considering the region’s history of seismic activity and tsunamis.
Retired Royal Navy Commander Tom Sharpe told The Telegraph that multiple submarine bases would be “a good idea” for the Kremlin’s Pacific Fleet. Geographic dispersion helps mitigate risk that a single unexpected event could catastrophically harm fleet assets—whether that event be an enemy attack or an act of nature.
About the Author: William Lawson
William Lawson is a military historian focusing on World War II and 20th century conflicts and the American Civil War. His specialty is operational level warfare, especially American amphibious doctrine. He writes on history, politics, and firearms for multiple publications and historical journals. He serves on the editorial advisory board for the Saber & Scroll Journal and Military History Chronicles and is a member of the Society for Military History and the American Historical Association. Lawson is based in Virginia.
Image: Shutterstock / Zacarias da Mata.
