An Abraham Accords-centric approach tailors the Cold War-era “containment” strategy that George F. Kennan formulated to the Middle East, with Iran standing in for the Soviet Union.
With more rumors of war swirling around the Greater Middle East between Iran and Israel, and with President Donald Trump seemingly totally committed to America’s longtime alliance with Israel, it must be noted yet again that the United States cannot afford, let alone sustain, a major regional war in the Middle East.
Nevertheless, the United States must figure out a way to preserve whatever status it still retains in the region. The best way—and indeed, the only logical way—to accomplish this is through the formalization and expansion of the Abraham Accords across the region.
Understanding Trump’s “Abraham Accords”—and October 7
Crafted during Donald Trump’s first term in office, the Abraham Accords was the attempt by the first Trump administration to bring the Middle East closer together geopolitically by aligning the security and economic interests of the Sunni Arab states of the Persian Gulf together with those of the Jewish democracy of Israel.
The accords were heralded at that time as a major success, and have had remarkable staying power. Indeed, even during the Biden administration, when there was much tension between Washington and those Arab states, the Israelis and Sunni Arabs were quietly moving closer together, as per the outline of the Abraham Accords. Israel and Sunni Arab states grew so close by mid-2023 that Prime Minister Netanayhu went to the United Nations and showed a map entitled “The New Middle East,” diagramming how Israel and the Sunni Arab states were moving closer to each other.
Implied in the Abraham Accords was a shared security concern: the rise of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Indeed, the map that Netanyahu displayed to the world’s leaders at the UN showed that both Israel and the Sunni Arabs—notably Saudi Arabia, the largest and wealthiest of the Gulf states—were working to contain the rise of nuclear-arming Iran.
A month or so later, however, the Iranian-backed Hamas terrorist group in the Gaza Strip launched a vicious terrorist attack out of Gaza, killing roughly 1,200 Israeli civilians. The original goal of Hamas was to spark a wider uprising from the West Bank to Hezbollah-controlled Lebanon in the north. Fortunately for Israel, that wider uprising did not materialize. But a crucial secondary goal of the attack was to provoke a massive Israeli retaliation in Gaza, once again bringing the Palestinian issue to the forefront of Middle East politics and throwing a wrench into Israel’s plans to normalize with the Sunni Arab states. All of this came at least partly at the urging of Tehran, which correctly feared that it was being isolated by the growing Israeli-Arab alliance.
Israel’s Retaliation Was Exactly What Hamas Wanted
The subsequent Israeli military response in Gaza—as well as elsewhere in the region—had precisely the effect that Hamas and Tehran had hoped it would. Aided by the ubiquity of smartphone-recorded war videos and the ease of sharing them via social media, the Arab world became enraged at the gruesome violence the Israeli military inflicted on its Palestinian neighbors. Of course, this was in keeping with Hamas’ design for the war; that terror group has long perfected the art of hiding among the civilian population, meaning that Israel must kill many civilians to successfully target Hamas militants. Hamas leaders made the cynical calculation that astronomical civilian casualties would reflect more poorly on Israel than on Hamas in global public opionion—a calculation that has so far paid off.
It didn’t help that Israeli forces were looking for revenge after the humiliating 10/7 attacks. While understandable, in the age of mass social media, this is rarely a good attitude to take during close-quarters military operations.
What’s more, the Israeli forces proved unable to fully accomplish their objectives in Gaza. From there, Israel opened up new fronts against Hezbollah to the north, dealing an impressive tactical blow to Hezbollah’s top leadership in the so-called “Pager Operation.” Yet even there, the Israelis ultimately did not truly achieve their strategic aims of neutering Hezbollah. Israel soon pivoted and exploited weakness in the Bashar al-Assad regime of neighboring Syria, ultimately helping to topple him and claim a chunk of territory in Syria.
At that point, Israeli forces created an air corridor linking their airspace to Iran’s via Syria and Iraq. It was that air corridor that allowed for Israeli forces to wage the recently concluded 12-Day War against Iran. But even that campaign was inconclusive; it degraded Iran’s nuclear program, but did not destroy it, and failed to lead to a national uprising against the clerical regime (a goal reflected in the name “Operation Rising Lion,” a reference to pre-1979 Iran).
Of course, the US-Israeli alliance, with the nominal help of the Arab states, have managed to complicate Iranian plans for regional dominance. But there are real limits that both Israel and the United States are running into. Neither Washington nor Jerusalem can produce enough weapons to sustain another round of fighting with Iran and its proxies. Even so, Israeli leaders sound like they want to give it a go—and Trump appears sanguine about the prospects of restarting hostilities soon.
Trump Must Return to the Principles of the Abraham Accords
There is a way out of this mess, though—one that will allow for Washington to get out of the Middle East and return the US military to its traditional role of offshore balancer, all while avoiding the disgrace of defeat. That way is to finalize and totally embrace the Abraham Accords.
In May, Trump ventured to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, and broke new ground, signing trade deals with multiple Arab states in order to bring them more closely to America’s side. This move by Trump could be the linchpin for securing total buy-in from the Arab states to finalize the Abraham Accords. The fusion of trade with security is needed to make the Abraham Accords rock-solid.
The key thing with the Abraham Accords, though, is that they were designed to avoid a direct war with Iran. Instead, the Abraham Accords were meant to be the basis for a non-kinetic, long-term confrontation with the Islamic Republic that used containment and deterrence to defeat that regime rather than compellence and kinetic military action. Essentially, it tailors the Cold War-era “containment” strategy that George F. Kennan formulated to the Middle East, with Iran standing in for the Soviet Union. And, like the Cold War, the Americans were to take a backseat in the region of conflict—and instead have their local partners, notably the Saudi-led Arab states and Israel, provide security while US forces returned to a secondary role.
This, not another war with Iran, is the best path forward for the United States. One must hope that the Trump administration can return to this modality, as opposed to following Israel’s lead in seeking greater confrontation with Iran.
About the Author: Brandon J. Weichert
Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a contributor at Popular Mechanics, who consults regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, the Asia Times, and countless others. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.
Image: Shutterstock / noamgalai.
