Russia sees much to gain from engaging with the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.
Earlier this month, in a move that surprised some, Russia formally recognized the Taliban government in Afghanistan. The decision reflected a calculated geopolitical strategy rather than an ideological endorsement. By engaging with the Taliban, Russia aims to secure its interests in Central and South Asia, counter Western influence, and stabilize a region long plagued by extremism and instability.
Since the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, Russia has sought to fill the geopolitical vacuum, positioning itself as a key player in regional security. In fact, recognizing the Taliban’s staying power in Afghan society, Moscow began engaging with the movement as early as 2016. In April, Russia lifted the Taliban’s terrorist designation, paving the way for deeper ties. The formal recognition was a logical next step—now, the new white and black flag of the Islamic Emirate flies over Afghanistan’s embassy in Moscow.
The implications of this move extend far beyond symbolism. By recognizing the Taliban as Afghanistan’s legitimate government, Russia has shifted from informal dealings to formal state-to-state relations. This step, long overdue in the eyes of some in Moscow, brings several strategic advantages.
Security remains Russia’s paramount concern. Unlike ISIS and Al Qaeda, the Taliban have not engaged in terrorist activity against Russia, leading Moscow to view them as a distinct entity. However, the Kremlin fears the spillover of extremism from Afghanistan into Central Asia, particularly in former Soviet republics like Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, where groups such as Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISIS-K) remain active.
The threat extends beyond Central Asia. ISIS-K has made inroads among impoverished Central Asian migrant workers in Russia, many of whom come from Tajikistan, a community numbering roughly 1.3 million. Radicalized Tajiks were behind the 2024 terrorist attack on Moscow’s Crocus City Hall, a stark reminder of the dangers posed by unchecked extremism.
For their part, the Taliban see ISIS-K as the primary threat to their rule. They have been relatively successful in denying the group a territorial foothold, which it briefly secured in 2021. Yet ISIS-K’s evolution into a global terrorist franchise makes it no less dangerous, as seen in the 2024 attacks from Moscow to Kerman, Iran.
Eager for international legitimacy, the Taliban may prove willing partners in counterterrorism. Diplomatic recognition could institutionalize cooperation in this field, and Moscow—including its typically skeptical security apparatus—has concluded that working with the Taliban is feasible. Russia could even spearhead regional counterterrorism initiatives, with Afghanistan playing a central role. While the Central Asian states—except Tajikistan—have yet to recognize the Taliban formally, most have pragmatically accepted the new reality in Kabul, sharing concerns over terrorism and extremism.
Beyond security, economic and strategic interests drive Russian engagement. Afghanistan sits at the crossroads of Central and South Asia, offering potential as a hub for trade and energy corridors. Alongside China, Russia sees opportunities in infrastructure, mining, energy, agriculture, transport, and logistics, such as railroads linking Russia to Pakistan and the Indian Ocean via Central Asia and Afghanistan. Formal recognition could unlock these opportunities, provided the Taliban can guarantee security. By acting first, Moscow hopes to secure concrete economic benefits, aligning with Kabul’s own focus on development.
Western critics may dismiss Russia’s move as a cynical ploy to bolster an anti-Western authoritarian bloc while ignoring human rights, particularly those of women. Yet the decision is better understood through the lens of great power politics and national interest rather than ideology. Recognizing the Taliban allows Moscow to undermine Western narratives of isolation and demonstrate that diplomatic frameworks exist outside US-led alliances. This fosters a parallel international order where American disapproval does not dictate policy—another step toward the multipolar world Russia seeks, with itself as a dominant player in Central Asia.
Values-based criticisms of Russia’s engagement ring hollow when contrasted with the West’s rapid normalization of relations with Syria’s post-war regime, led by former Al Qaeda militant Ahmed al-Shara. While the Taliban were never designated a terrorist group by the UN Security Council, Al-Qaeda was—and remains—on the list.
Yet the bar for acceptance was set far lower for Shara, who met with US President Donald Trump, French President Emmanuel Macron, and other Western leaders shortly after Damascus’s conquest. This, despite ongoing attacks on churches and credible reports of horrific violence against Alawite women by Sunni extremist militias—atrocities the Syrian government has either failed or refused to stop. However deplorable the Taliban’s treatment of women, they have at least restored a degree of public order.
The West’s contrasting treatment of Syria and Afghanistan bolsters Moscow’s portrayal of itself as a pragmatic and level-headed actor. Still, Russia’s relationship with Kabul is not without risks. The Taliban, fiercely nationalist and rooted in Pashtun identity, will not easily submit to any external power, including Russia. They view ties with Moscow as one strand in a diversified foreign policy, balanced by relations with China, Iran, Central Asia, the Persian Gulf, and even the United States and EU should engagement become possible.
For now, however, the strategic benefits outweigh the risks for the Kremlin. By recognizing the Taliban, Russia strengthens its foothold in Central and South Asia, challenges Western diplomatic dominance, and positions itself as a power broker in a region where America has retreated.
About the Author: Eldar Mamedov
Eldar Mamedov is a Brussels-based foreign policy expert. He has degrees from the University of Latvia and the Diplomatic School in Madrid, Spain. He has worked in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia and as a diplomat in Latvian embassies in Washington and Madrid. Since 2009, Mamedov has served as a political advisor for the Social Democrats in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament (EP) and is in charge of the EP delegations for inter-parliamentary relations with Iran, Iraq, and the Arabian Peninsula. Find him on X: @EldarMamedov4.
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