Chinese dominance in display technologies poses a critical national security threat, demanding urgent US action to secure supply chains.
Last month, US energy experts uncovered hidden cellular radios inside Chinese-made solar inverters—critical components that link solar panels, batteries, and electric vehicle chargers to the grid. These rogue devices bypass installed firewalls, potentially giving China a clandestine “kill switch” over slices of America’s energy infrastructure.
With China now producing over 70 percent of the world’s display panels and leading in OLED (organic light-emitting diodes) output, every Chinese console and cockpit screen—from fighter-jet helmet displays to submarine sonar monitors—risks a similar back-door shutdown.
Just as Chinese firms used massive state-backed financing to flood global defense markets with cheap drones and batteries, Beijing has poured billions into subsidies, tax breaks, and low-cost loans to build the world’s largest display fabs. These investments have cornered a $182 billion industry—one forecast to double by 2034—driving panel prices so low that no US or allied competitor can viably enter the market. Today, the Pentagon spends over $300 million a year on mission-critical displays—a figure set to surpass $600 million by 2034. With virtually no non-Chinese suppliers left, global display supply chains—including those underpinning our defense systems—risk being held hostage in the future to Beijing’s strategic whims.
Display Failures Could Cripple US Combat Readiness
The problem is that in modern warfare, displays are as vital as ammunition. Naval combat information centers, international air traffic control towers, field-deployable command posts, and trauma-center ICU monitors all depend on display panels, many of which are Chinese-made or sourced. Displays also form the backbone of next-generation night-vision goggles, helmet-mounted displays, and handheld mission planners, potentially putting individual operators at risk of a sudden blackout if we rely on Chinese-produced panels for our most critical systems.
It may be hard to imagine how far Beijing could take this, but Washington must plan for the worst. In a crisis or period of heightened tension, China could push over-the-air malicious firmware updates that brick internet-connected displays, freeze cockpit screens mid-flight, or disable mission-critical monitors in combat zones. Even sporadic failures could erode commanders’ trust in these systems, potentially deterring decisive action at critical moments. The same could be done to displays that are used to monitor and control our key critical infrastructures like power grids, water systems, rail systems, and airports. Though extreme, these scenarios underscore why display security cannot remain a secondary concern.
China’s Grip on Display Inputs Is a National Security Risk
Even absent backdoors, Beijing’s grip on the display market and its supply chains is a national security vulnerability. Chinese state-backed and controlled firms like BOE, CSOT, and HKC control display panel fabrication, and China dominates critical display inputs—from specialty glass and indium tin oxide to rare-earth phosphors and specialty gases. Beijing has weaponized similar dependencies before. In 2010, it abruptly cut exports of rare earths to Japan, sending global prices soaring and triggering a diplomatic crisis. This April, amidst its escalating trade war with Washington, Beijing announced export curbs on neodymium magnets—vital for America’s auto and other defense sectors, forcing US production lines to idle. In March, they prohibited gallium sales to the US, a mineral critical to the radars that track hypersonic missiles.
Lawmakers Urge Action on Chinese Display Risks
Some members of Congress have already been sounding the alarm. Last fall, Rep. John Moolenaar (R-MI), Chairman of the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party, wrote to then-Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin warning that Chinese domination of the global display industry poses a clear national-security risk. Moolenaar urged the Defense Department to investigate China’s leading panel makers for potential ties to the People’s Liberation Army and to consider designating them as “Chinese military companies” on the Pentagon’s 1260H list, which bars the Department from contracting with those firms. The new Defense Secretary, Pete Hegseth, should take overdue action on this letter.
Treat Displays as Strategic Assets, Not Consumer Commodities
More can be done. The Commerce Department should assess China’s top panel makers for placement on its Entity List, cutting off critical US technology transfers and equipment sales. At the same time, the US Trade Representative could launch a Section 301 unfair-trade practices probe—or Commerce could trigger a Section 232 national-security investigation—into Chinese display panels and parts, paving the way for targeted tariffs. These combined whole-of-government steps would send a clear message that the United States will no longer tolerate strategic dependencies masked as “cheap” consumer goods and would create vital breathing room for trusted defense suppliers.
Looking farther ahead, the United States must jump-start domestic and allied panel production to reclaim hardened defense supply chains. That means creating a level playing field. Congress can do this by extending targeted tax credits and other incentives to reindustrialize display manufacturing on US soil. It also requires mandating friend-shoring for defense and critical infrastructure screens, steering purchases to trusted partners whose industries have been undercut by Beijing’s state-backed practices. Done right, these steps would foster a resilient, diversified display ecosystem that outpaces China.
All told, in the era of great-power competition, it’s time to treat displays not as commodities but as strategic assets—because when the screens go dark, the fight may already be lost.
About the Authors: Mark Montgomery and Craig Singleton
RADM (Ret.) Mark Montgomery is the Director of the Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. He also leads CSC 2.0, implementing recommendations from the Cyberspace Solarium Commission, where he was executive director. A retired rear admiral, he served 32 years in the Navy and held senior roles at the US Pacific and European Commands. He also served as policy director for the Senate Armed Services Committee and holds graduate degrees from Penn and Oxford. Follow him on X: @MarkCMontgomery.
Craig Singleton serves as senior director for China and senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) and is a former US diplomat. He writes on China’s military strategy, tech threats, and influence operations, and frequently advises policymakers and testifies before Congress. His work appears in outlets like The New York Times and Foreign Policy. Singleton also teaches Chinese grand strategy at Stanford University. Follow him on X: @CraigMSingleton
Image: Shutterstock
