Editor’s Note: This article is part of the symposium “President Lee and North Korea.” The full symposium can be found here.
In his inaugural speech, new South Korean President Lee Jae-Myung only mentioned North Korea once, noting the immense size of South Korea’s defense budget relative to North Korea’s, and that he wanted to “deter nuclear threats and military provocations while keeping open channels of dialogue to establish peace on the Korean Peninsula.”
No mention of denuclearization or plans for significant diplomatic engagement with North Korea was absent.
How Is President Lee’s Foreign Policy Different from Past Korean Presidents?
Lee stated that his inter-Korean policy has the same broad strokes as all centre-left South Korean presidents: a call for cooperation and understanding and a focus on dialogue rather than military confrontation. And indeed, Lee’s administration has already taken measures to lower the temperature on the inter-Korean border, ordering the end of propaganda broadcasts across the DMZ, and searching for a legal means to stop South Korean groups from launching leaflets into North Korea. He will also likely attempt to revive the 2018 agreement with North Korea on military confidence-building measures, which the Yoon administration halted.
There are limits: South Korean troops are still on the DMZ, Lee himself mentioned the “strong deterrence” of the US-South Korea alliance in his inaugural speech, he ordered the South Korean military to continue to monitor North Korea, and South Korea’s defense industry is going full steam ahead in remaking itself into the arsenal of choice for many countries. While not as enthusiastic as Yoon was about building a relationship with Japan, Lee had already met with the Japanese Prime Minister and signaled continued cooperation in dealing with the North Korean threat.
However, the world and North Korea have changed since Lee’s predecessor, Yoon Suk-yeol, came into office, and Lee faces constraints on what he can accomplish and whether North Korea will respond. The Russian invasion of Ukraine, and North Korea’s enthusiastic support of, and alignment with Russia, up to and including ballistic missiles, millions of artillery shells, thousands of North Korean combat troops fighting Ukraine in Russia, and potentially tens of thousands of workers making drones in Russian factories, have put North Korea into a stronger strategic position than it has been in decades.
North Korea’s Russian Allies Are Making Them Stronger
Aside from injecting income into North Korea (to the point that North Korean cities involved in supplying Russia are noticeably more developed), and presumably providing North Korea with a wide variety of weapons technology, the Russian partnership has presaged the effective collapse of UN sanctions enforcement, allowing North Korea to get what it needs without fewer constraints.
North Korea has steadily improved the capability and variety of delivery systems for its weapons. It has also shifted its policy to abandon unification as a strategic goal and to treat South Korea effectively as a foreign country. Lee’s plans are expected to lower the temperature across the DMZ, and there are signs that the North Korean government is hopeful of better relations with the South: the North Korean state news agency’s announcement of Lee’s election was matter-of-fact and devoid of editorializing.
In this environment, the relationship with South Korea is almost a sideshow for the DPRK: what does North Korea need from South Korea? North Korea may find it helpful for South Korea to press for concessions from the US, but North Korea has not been interested in talking with the US for several years.
With North Korea uninterested in major diplomatic initiatives aside from some confidence-building measures, South Korea may find itself in a holding pattern with North Korea as it deals with other challenges. With events in the Middle East and Eastern Europe competing for geopolitical attention, a slowing economy, South Korea’s continuing economic, military, and technological inroads into other parts of Asia, a complicated relationship with China, and a delicate tightrope to walk with the US on trade, Lee certainly has his hands full.
About the Author: Justin Hastings
Justin Hastings is a Professor of International Relations and Comparative Politics at the University of Sydney, where he is also the Regional Security Program Leader for the Centre of International Security Studies. He has authored several books and journal articles, including A Most Enterprising Country: North Korea in the Global Economy (Cornell University Press, 2016).
Image Credit: Shutterstock/Goga Shutter .
