While the recent executive orders on nuclear energy is a good start, US-South Korea nuclear cooperation would help it revive even more.
Note: This interview was conducted in Gyeongju, South Korea, on June 24, 2025.
Paul Saunders (PS): Thank you very much, everyone, for joining us today. This is Paul Saunders, president of the Center for the National Interest. I’m delighted to be interviewing Dr. Joo-Ho Whang, the CEO of Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power. Dr. Whang is a nuclear engineer with a long career at Kyung Hee University in Korea and has had a number of other distinguished roles, including as president of the Korea Institute for Energy Research, as chairman of the Korea Energy Society, and as president of the Korean Nuclear Society, among many other distinguished roles. So, Dr. Whang, thank you very much for joining us today for this conversation.
I have been in Korea now for a couple of days participating in a really terrific conference focused on U.S.-Korea cooperation in the nuclear sector, and I’d like to ask: what do you see as the future of U.S.-Korea nuclear cooperation? How would you like to see it evolve?
Dr. Joo-Ho Whang (JW): The executive orders recently signed by President Trump show that the U.S. has the commitment to revive its nuclear industry. But to actually turn that commitment into reality, there need to be partners like strong allies. The reason behind that is that for the past three decades, nuclear power projects in the U.S. have been kind of halted. So, there is an inadequate level of supply chain domestically. There are also not many constructors.
Korea has a great track record of timely delivery, project control capabilities, and rich experience in construction and operation. And I believe Korea is the most realistic partner to support President Trump’s executive orders to restore the U.S. nuclear industry.
If the strengths of both countries can be combined, we can present a very powerful nuclear partnership model—not only in the U.S., but also across the globe.
PS: For those of us in the nuclear energy sector, it’s a really exciting time. There’s soaring electricity demand, creating a lot of new demand for nuclear energy. And at the same time, there are all kinds of really exciting technological changes that are underway. What do you see as the most important and promising technological advances in nuclear energy?
JW: I would say the most promising trend is the development of SMRs, particularly Generation IV reactors in the U.S. These types of reactors can provide not only electricity, but also hydrogen or heat which are needed for industry. With that kind of effort, nuclear power can now provide electricity and other industrial needs. Those kinds of opportunities are coming, and I believe we can expand our cooperation with US companies in that regard. I’m looking forward to it. I’m very excited.
PS: If I could ask a follow-up question: what do you see as the biggest technical challenges that we still have to address?
JW: I would say two challenges, mainly.
First, we need to establish more robust supply chains. But rushing the process doesn’t guarantee success. To achieve our goals, there should be a balanced partnership in terms of technology policy and execution capabilities. That way, we can continue our construction in the U.S. while the U.S. figures out the best ways to optimize their domestic supply chains.
Second, we need to harmonize regulations between our two countries. And this is actually mentioned in President Trump’s executive orders, which will, of course, make efforts to streamline and improve U.S. regulations. However, we need harmonization of the certification process both for reactor designs and for individual components so that we can achieve timely deployment.
I believe these are the two primary challenges that we face, and in this regard, there can be stronger cooperation between our two countries.
PS: So let me pivot now to another topic. There are, in the United States, some people who are very interested in nuclear energy as a source of reliable clean power. There are others who see it, in part, as an energy security contribution or as a part of our geopolitical competition with Russia and with China. When you look from Korea out at the global nuclear energy market, how do you see Russia’s role? How do you see China’s role?
JW: While those two countries pursue nuclear business—particularly through their state-owned enterprises—they also leverage sovereign wealth funds or offer highly attractive loans to win over countries looking to host nuclear reactors. As a result, the majority of reactors being built abroad by foreign exporters are constructed by Russian companies.
Russia also offers a business model in which it takes back the spent fuel from the host country. This helps ease concerns in the host nation. I believe that’s one of the attractive services Russia provides.
After the war in Ukraine, we don’t know how Russia’s role and influence in the global nuclear sector will change. However, if Russia’s influence declines, I believe that vacuum is likely to be filled by China. What’s missing from the export initiatives of both countries, though, is serious consideration or investment in the nuclear non-proliferation regime.
To maintain a strong and robust global non-proliferation framework, Korea has long cooperated with the U.S. and upheld the philosophy of non-proliferation in nuclear energy operations. If the two countries can cooperate, then we can strengthen the global non-proliferation regime.
PS: One of our big challenges in the United States is that we’ve relied heavily on Russia for nuclear fuel. But now, because of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the U.S. and a number of others are transitioning away from that. So, it creates challenges for America, which hasn’t been doing a lot of domestic enrichment. Obviously, some allies rely on the U.S. for enriched uranium. You mentioned earlier the SMRs, and they have in many cases new fuel requirements for the so-called HALEU (High-Assay Low-Enriched Uranium) which the U.S. is producing now in only very small quantities. So, what opportunities do you see for the U.S., possibly together with Korea or other allies, to try to strengthen these nuclear fuel supply chains so that we can really ensure long-term independence from Russia?
JW: Russia’s enrichment services are highly competitive in terms of pricing. That’s why many Western countries have come to rely heavily on them—perhaps for too long. Russia’s actual supply rate is reaching fifty percent globally, and that is never a balanced way of supplying nuclear fuel. Down the road, I believe, to rebalance the supply of uranium enrichment services, Western companies like Orano or Urenco will need to scale up their enrichment capacities.
It’s also important for the US to expand and scale up its own enrichment capacity through Centrus to some adequate level. At the same time, we need to recognize that Southeast Asian countries are increasingly showing interest in developing both large and small nuclear power plants. And in these situations, there could be some limitations on the US’s ability to balance the supply of nuclear fuel. In this context, I believe there’s an opportunity for cooperation between Korea and the U.S.—and even including Japan—to create a joint framework for providing enrichment services.
PS: Now, in the US, we have a number of our new reactor developers, at least some of them, who are interested in reprocessing as a way to develop the material that they need to power their reactors. In his executive orders, President Trump has directed the US government to look into that option. It has a long history in the United States of exploration—not yet successful—and also long periods when the US decided on a moratorium on reprocessing. Do you view that as a possible part of the solution for the US or others?
JW: In the nuclear industry, there is no perfect solution for these issues. However, there are several advantages to making effective use of spent fuel. Currently, countries like France and Japan use wet reprocessing methods—but the wet reprocessing method is vulnerable to declaration.
What I would like to stress is that the joint nuclear fuel cycle research that Korea and the United States have carried out over the past fifteen to twenty years—this research includes work on pyroprocessing technology—this research has proven to some degree that the technology is more resistant to proliferation concerns. So, I believe if we can utilize this kind of technology, it will support the development of reactors that use that type of fuel.
PS: We talked for a minute there about the fuel cycle. I want to come back now to the topic of nuclear reactors. One issue that has been discussed for many years now in the U.S.-Korea bilateral relationship is working together to build reactors in third countries. What’s your vision for how Korean and American companies can work together in global markets?
JW: As I mentioned earlier, if we can combine US technological prowess with Korea’s supply chain and construction capabilities, then I believe there will be abundant opportunities out there in the global market.
I would say in the immediate term, Europe is the most promising market. If we can cooperate in that region, then I believe there will be success stories.
For medium- and small-sized reactors, I believe Africa will be the next market. If countries on the African continent look ahead ten or twenty years from now, they will realize that nuclear power is a must in their power grids. Based on these prospects in Africa and Southeast Asia, if the US and Korea can cooperate, there will be a lot of advantages—not to mention the advantages in terms of the non-proliferation regime.
PS: As you think about this kind of cooperation, what do you see as the biggest challenges or obstacles for the US and Korea in pursuing that kind of collaboration?
JW: That actually depends on the perspective. It depends on what kind of objectives we aim to achieve in our businesses. If we aim correctly, then I believe that there won’t be any challenges or obstacles to cooperation between our two countries.
If we set our objectives based on our countries’ founding spirit and a commitment to serving humanity—expanding the number of people who can enjoy the benefits of electricity—if we can adopt this “common good” philosophy, then I believe there won’t be big challenges in the way. But if we argue over maximizing individual profit, it will be very difficult to reach a consensus.
However, I strongly believe we’ve already passed that stage. We already have this strong cooperation foundation. And again, if we combine the technological prowess of the US and Korea’s supply chain and construction capabilities, then I believe there won’t be challenges or obstacles to expanding our footprint in the global market. In fact, as you know, at the end of last year, we reached an agreement with the big US suppliers, and we are currently maintaining a very good relationship with them. And we are willing to improve our relationship with the companies.
PS: I want to ask you two final questions to reflect on your career. You’ve been involved in Korea’s nuclear sector over a period of decades that really has been transformative for the sector. What’s been the most exciting thing for you as you think back on your career in the Korean nuclear sector? And looking ahead, what lessons would you take from your past experience as you think about the decades ahead?
JW: As a nuclear engineering major, I’ve been in this field for four decades. And one of the most touching moments in my career came in 2005, when Korea finally secured an intermediate and low-level waste management facility. For nearly twenty years leading up to that, there were repeated efforts to secure such a facility. When the failures kept coming during that period, I was kind of skeptical as a nuclear engineering major: is our nation really qualified to host a nuclear power program? That was my concern and skepticism. That doubt was cleared in 2005 when we secured the management facility. And that is the moment that I consider most touching.
The second most touching moment in my career would be, of course, our recent selection for the Czech contract. KHNP devoted eight years of effort to this. We closely cooperated with the Czech authorities and [the Czech utility] CEZ. We put our best effort in providing the best version of the permitting documents. And we also maintained a very strong, close relationship with the residents around the community hosting the nuclear reactor.
From an outsider’s viewpoint, it may appear that Korea won the project because of our advantages in scheduling and cost effectiveness. However, I believe that it was a result of our continuous efforts, particularly in maintaining a close relationship with the host community, and we were able to demonstrate our capabilities in a clear way. After the bidding process, this is what CEZ actually mentioned—they said they went through a very transparent, fair, and detailed process of evaluation for selecting their providers, and they were proud of their decision. I was so satisfied and happy about receiving that kind of compliment.
What I’ve learned from these two experiences is that business success in the nuclear industry takes perseverance and patience. Based on that patience and perseverance, we need to provide our work in a very detailed, thoughtful, and meticulous way. I believe that is the key.
PS: Dr. Whang, thank you. You’ve been very generous with your time this afternoon. Again, for our listeners, this is Paul Saunders with the Center for the National Interest interviewing Dr. Joo-Ho Whang, the CEO of Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power. Thank you, sir.
JW: Thank you.
Image: Shutterstock/Andy.LIU
