Tehran will face enormous pressure to meaningfully respond to US strikes on its nuclear facilities.
As of Saturday evening, June 21, Donald Trump is now a wartime president. This is a far cry from how Trump began his presidency five months ago, with promises to wind down existing conflicts and refrain from starting new ones. But despite his fondness for calling himself a peacemaker, Trump can no longer persist with this charade. For better or worse, he has taken the United States to war with Iran.
To be sure, Trump has expressed hope that Iran will be restrained in its response to US airstrikes against three key nuclear sites. Perhaps he will get his way. After all, the president ordered the assassination of the top Iranian general Qasem Soleimani in January 2020 without provoking a massive retaliation.
The case for Iran exercising restraint is simple. America has what scholars of International Relations call “escalation dominance.” This means that Iran stands to lose more than it can gain by climbing rungs on the escalation ladder. Consequently, Iran would be irrational to launch a significant counterattack against US forces in the Persian Gulf. Fighting back would only make things worse.
Will this be enough to keep a lid on Trump’s war of choice with Iran? Maybe. However, there are at least three conflicting reasons to expect that Iran will not allow these airstrikes to pass off without serious repercussions.
First, Iran has powerful incentives to retaliate against the United States because passivity would risk giving a green light to more US attacks on Iranian soil. What message would Tehran be sending if it allowed nuclear sites to be bombed with impunity? To discourage leaders in Washington from attacking Iran again, the regime might conclude that a large-scale military response is essential, no matter the short-term costs to Iranians.
Second, Iran’s top brass have reasonable fears that their enemies abroad want to bring about regime change. Trump denies that this is a war aim, but the president has a “credible commitment problem” to overcome—that is, he probably cannot convince Iran that he means what he says.
Both Israeli and US officials have suggested in recent days that the Supreme Leader of Iran could be assassinated. Some have openly called for the Islamic Republic to be toppled. If Iran’s government concludes that a wider campaign is afoot, it might choose to preemptively strike US forces in the region before it is too late.
Third, Iran’s leaders will be under enormous pressure at home to stand up to foreign aggressors. It is a fundamental duty of every government to provide security for its people, or at least appear to be doing so. Iran has failed in this regard. The regime might feel compelled to take actions that signal strength and resilience to ordinary citizens, or else its legitimacy will collapse—perhaps irreparably.
Which logic will prevail? Will Iran’s leaders conclude that retaliation is too risky, or that war with the United States cannot be stopped now that it has been forced upon them? It is impossible to say for sure.
But let there be no doubt: it will be decisionmakers in Tehran, not Washington, who decide what happens next. The stakes are enormously high. More than 40,000 US soldiers, sailors, and airmen are stationed in the region—all of whom are within range of Iranian forces.
Some of Iran’s missiles and drones could be intercepted before they had a chance to kill or maim American personnel, but others will assuredly get through. Just as neighborhoods in Tel Aviv and a hospital in Beersheba have been hit by Iranian rockets, so too will US bases in Syria, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates burn if enough Iranian firepower is turned against them.
Then there is the possibility that Iran will close the Strait of Hormuz, a move that would send energy prices sky high. Iran’s parliament has already authorized this measure, and it is not clear how the United States could reverse it without resorting to overwhelming force. As Trump’s war against the Houthis in Yemen has shown, airstrikes alone may not be enough to beat Iran into submission.
How would Trump respond to large-scale attacks on US assets in the Gulf or the wider region? Could he withstand pressure to put “boots on the ground” if airstrikes failed to compel an Iranian surrender? While there is little appetite for a ground invasion of Iran today, it is impossible to say where political opinion could go in the event of devastating attacks on US troops, military installations, civilians, and commercial shipping.
“We will measure our success not only by the battles we win but also by the wars that we end,” said Trump upon becoming president for the second time. “And perhaps most importantly, the wars we never get into,” he went on.
Less than half a year into his term, the president has yet to win or end any wars. But now he has gotten into one, and there is no telling where it will go.
About the Author: Peter Harris
Peter Harris is Associate Professor of Political Science at Colorado State University and a Non-Resident Fellow with Defense Priorities. He is the author of Why America Can’t Retrench (And How It Might).
Image: Alex Izeman / Shutterstock.com.
