The region’s powers worry that an Israeli victory over Iran may come at the cost of stability. A negotiated solution to Iran’s nuclear program remains the best bet.
Pandora’s box has been cast wide open with Israel’s air campaign against Iran—an escalation that will reshape strategic alliances and the balance of power in the Middle East. By targeting senior IRGC leadership and nuclear infrastructure deep inside Iranian territory, “Operation Rising Lion” has forcefully challenged assumptions about Iran’s deterrence posture.
A coordinated blend of Israeli HUMINT, SIGINT, and cyber operations has left Iran boxed in, with fewer viable options. Iran’s retaliatory strikes on Israel have inflicted tactical damage but fell short of the scale Tehran has long threatened. For a state that has spent years constructing a deterrence architecture built on the doctrine of forward defense via regional proxy networks and missile threats, the limited response is telling. It signals one of two things: either Iran is exercising calculated restraint, or it is running up against the limits of its military reach relative to Israeli air dominance and potential US escalation in the Gulf.
Either way, and if only through indirect back-channels, in the span of a few short days, Iran has signaled that it wants to talk. The question has been whether Tehran is prepared to make deep concessions on its nuclear program to deter further Israeli strikes and prevent direct US intervention.
There was always a risk that the maximalist US demands for complete dismantling of the enrichment program would derail the pursuit of an agreement. Tehran appears to have overestimated American flexibility in negotiations and underestimated Israel’s military preparedness and risk appetite. Until the final hours before the operation launched on June 13, Tehran likely continued to view the US military buildup and threats of force as psychological pressure tactics.
That assessment wasn’t entirely unfounded—former President Trump appeared intent on using the specter of a “worst-case scenario” to coerce Iran back to the negotiating table on US terms. However, the window for diplomacy now appears razor-thin. Any agreement Iran could secure at this stage would likely be far less favorable than what was achievable before the Israeli operation.
Regional Peacemakers Face the Ultimate Test
In the early aftermath of Israel’s military offensive on Tehran, regional states issued condemnations and mobilized to clear a path to de-escalation and a possible ceasefire. Tehran reportedly lobbied Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Oman to urge the Trump administration to pressure Israel to agree to an immediate ceasefire. The foreign minister of the United Arab Emirates, Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed, cautioned against “uncalculated and reckless steps” in the event of escalation.
Seeking to mediate the conflict, Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan held calls with Iranian president Masoud Pezeshkian and Trump. On Tuesday, Egyptian foreign minister Abdelatty held separate phone calls with US Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff and Iranian foreign minister Abbas Araghchi to restate the Egyptian calls for a ceasefire. Araghchi visited Cairo on June 2, potentially in the early stages of a nascent normalization effort, a step that would have been less forthcoming absent a recalibration in regional dynamics since the attacks of October 7, 2023.
In recent years, the Gulf states, along with other Middle Eastern heavyweights, have sought to bolster their prestige as conduits for diplomacy, de-escalation, and conflict resolution. Qatar and Egypt’s attempted mediation of the Israel-Hamas conflict and Turkey and Saudi Arabia’s role in hosting Ukraine-Russia talks are examples of this strategy. However, the results have been mixed, with no negotiated settlement in either theater of conflict. This is not due to the lack of diplomatic ambidexterity or commitment to peace on the part of the arbitrators. Conflicts, once they are locked into a trajectory of escalation, are not easy to change course.
As Israeli military and intelligence penetration has successfully exposed Iran’s vulnerabilities, diminished its munitions stockpiles, and pounded its strategic military and nuclear sites, it has become difficult to design an off-ramp that Israeli planners would consider sufficiently incentivizing. Any regional pressure on Iran to step back from its “red line” on uranium enrichment—at levels beyond what is required for civilian purposes—has clearly backfired.
Some reports stated that Arab intermediaries did not see an indication that Iran is ready to make new concessions in nuclear talks. While likely intended by Tehran to salvage its bargaining power, this would have been seen as a non-starter by the US and Israel.
Attempting to shore up its regional alliances, Iranian foreign policy makers have made a progress in recent years in normalizing ties with Gulf states: In March 2023, China brokered a normalization deal between Iran and Saudi Arabia; and ties with the United Arab Emirates thawed in recent years, while along with Bahrain, Abu Dhabi normalized relations with Israel, signing the Abraham Accords in 2020.
Iran’s overtures to GCC states improved the status quo defined by fraught histories. Still, it should not be considered a reversal of the deep structural mistrust over Iran’s ballistic missile program, its regional adventurism exercised through its proxy network (Hezbollah, Houthis, Iraqi militias), and its nuclear ambitions.
Much like Iran is motivated by survival instincts, Gulf foreign policy posturing regarding Tehran has been guided by self-preservation and diplomatic deterrence against Iranian adventurism. Since 1979, Iran’s proxy network has entrenched its influence by drawing fragile or post-conflict states—such as Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, and Syria—into persistent instability.
This has advanced Tehran’s regional ambitions, often at the cost of political, social, and economic development in those countries. The Gulf has played a necessary hedging strategy between the US and Iran. Bahrain hosts the headquarters of the US Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) and the Fifth Fleet. The largest US military base in the Middle East is located in Qatar. The UAE also hosts the Al Dhafra Air Base and the US Air Force’s 380th Air Expeditionary Wing.
Regional states, particularly those in the Gulf, viewed the US-Iran nuclear talks facilitated by Oman as the only viable path to stability. Even a limited, “quick” deal that fell short of addressing the totality of their security concerns about Iran’s regional posture was seen as a superior alternative to the worst-case scenario of a direct Iran-Israel war in which the United States enters the fray. This would exponentially raise the probability of prolonged instability in Iran and across its borders.
An Arms Race?
The embryonic US-Iran nuclear negotiations were fragile from the start, given mutual mistrust on both sides. Yet, there was a belief that enough incentives existed to reach an agreement, if only to freeze their core disputes for a limited period.
The pace and scale of the Israeli offensive have shocked states in the Middle East, raising alarm bells about a future Israeli threat to their own national security. At the forefront of those raising this speculation, Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced on June 16 that production plans would be underway to increase Turkey’s medium- and long-range missile stockpiles to a deterrent level “in light of recent developments.”
While Ankara has long promoted the advances of its indigenous defense industry, this latest statement reflects deeper concerns—namely, a more militarized Israel, unrestrained by Washington and intent on reshaping the regional order. Turkey’s status as a NATO member state means the balance of power dynamics vis-à-vis Israel are different. Beyond Ankara, there is a growing sense of regional vulnerability as Iran’s deterrence architecture collapses.
Predictions of arms race scenarios are linked to how the aftermath of a possible strike against Fordow, the fortified nuclear enrichment site described as a “hard and deeply buried target” (HDBT), could play out. Such an operation would trigger several risks, including radiation leakage or chemical contamination, which could pose environmental and humanitarian dangers. Sensitive nuclear enrichment and weaponization facilities would require full ground clearance and physical security measures to neutralize the risk of exploitation by armed non-state actors or terrorist groups seeking access to unsecured nuclear materials.
Israel cannot achieve this objective through airstrikes alone and would need to deploy specialized experts to implement site control, containment, and safeguarding protocols on the ground. Airstrikes can destroy infrastructure but not secure it. Moreover, the risk of future Iranian reconstitution of nuclear enrichment and weaponization would remain a high-risk scenario.
It would be preferable for the US administration to favor a last-minute negotiated agreement that locks Iran into meeting lower enrichment benchmarks, verifiable international monitoring, and non-proliferation commitments. This would strip Iran of the deterrence potential of becoming a nuclear breakout state. Accordingly, Tehran has instead shifted focus toward mobilizing anti-Israel sentiment across the region, seeking to frame Israel as the aggressor and push it into diplomatic and strategic isolation.
The Long Game
If regime survival is truly at stake in Iran, the best outcome may be one Tehran has long resisted: accepting painful trade-offs, spinning them as national and necessary sacrifice, and selling them to a war-weary public as a strategic victory.
In the aftermath of this war, nothing in the region will be the same. Israel, too, will emerge as a changed power. Israel has demonstrated an unmistakable display of technological and operational superiority. This will not go unnoticed in Gulf capitals. Yet, in the long term, Israel and US interests may be exposed to a new constellation of threats, as Iran-linked asymmetric and cross-border retaliatory challenges evolve. Extremist actors, disempowered but not extinguished, may recalibrate their tactics, expanding the theater of their activities.
Israel’s security and political establishment appears to have prioritized neutralizing Iran’s nuclear program over future risks, which it likely assesses that it can mitigate, seemingly because regional alliances are expected to tilt towards Israel as Iran is exposed as a paper tiger. For many within Israel’s strategic community, a non-nuclear and militarily defanged Iran will augur a more peaceful Middle East, with an expanded Abraham Accords.
This is far from a foregone conclusion. Regional states are already highly agitated due to the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. Coupled with the risk of conflict spillover in Iran, Israel faces severe challenges with its regional allies, present and future. The perennial question in the Middle East will remain: will military victory—at once elusive and risky—come at the price of stability?
About the Author: Burcu Ozcelik
Burcu Ozcelik is a Senior Research Fellow in Middle East Security at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in London. Prior to joining RUSI, Burcu worked as an Associate Director at a London-based consultancy firm, leading the MENA practice. She previously worked with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). She holds a PhD in Politics and International Studies from the University of Cambridge. Follow her on X: @burcuozcelik.
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