India is not a rich country—and America’s equipment, like its French counterpart, is far too expensive for far too limited a gain.
The recently concluded—though inconclusive—Indo-Pakistani War was chock full of surprises for Western analysts. Going in, it was assumed that the Indians, with their vast arsenal of French and Russian warplanes and missiles, would simply break Pakistani resistance. That turned out not to be the case. A decisive element for why Pakistan was able to hold its own, at least in the first half of the four-day conflict, was the large arsenal of Chinese-made warplanes and missiles that Islamabad deployed into the fight.
These Chinese systems performed better than almost anyone in the West or in India’s defense community had assumed they would. By contrast, the Western systems underperformed. Still, of the defense systems India sent into the war, its Russian-made systems fared much better than the more complex and far more expensive French-made warplanes and missiles.
Understanding India’s Relationship With Russia
Since their earliest days as a power freed of imperial control from Britain, India has enjoyed close relations with Moscow. As a result, Indian and Russian defense industries and overall diplomatic relations have always been close.
This has been a perennial annoyance for American policymakers, who have long desired to bring India into their geostrategic camp. Washington has made progress toward this goal over the past decade; both nations are now partnered in the “Quad” alliance along with Australia and Japan, the two countries oversaw a substantial increase in their defense partnership under the Biden administration, and the Trump administration appears well-positioned to continue this trend. It is notable that both India and the US are threatened by China, creating an external motivator for stronger relations.
Despite this, Indian defense officials have decried Americans meddling in New Delhi’s defense architecture—trying to force the country to abandon their decades-long use of Russian systems and instead move over to American industry standards and gear.
India Can’t Afford the F-35 Lightning II
India is not a rich country—and America’s equipment, like its French counterpart, is far too expensive for far too limited a gain. India needs a fifth-generation warplane to counter both China’s systems and fifth-generation birds they are supposedly giving to Pakistan, the J-35.
India has neither the time nor money to waste on pursuing Lockheed Martin’s F-35 Lightning II.
Think about the cost comparison between the F-35 and the Su-57. The F-35 per-unit cost ranges from $110 million to $135 million, depending on the variant. Additionally, the F-35’s lifecycle costs are staggering, with maintenance and operational expenses estimated at $428 billion over the program’s lifetime for the US alone. These costs are hardly sustainable even for the Pentagon’s gargantuan trillion-dollar defense budget. And India’s budget is roughly $80 billion—less than one–tenth that size, even though its population is four times larger.
For India, which operates a diverse fleet of warplanes, the F-35’s complex logistics and reliance on US-controlled supply chains would drive costs even higher. The Indian Air Force (IAF) would need to invest heavily in entirely new infrastructure, training, and spare parts, all of which are subject to US approval and pricing.
Russia’s Su-57 Is a Better Option for India
On the other hand, the Russian Su-57 is significantly cheaper—with an estimated unit cost of $35 million to $50 million. While lifecycle costs for the Su-57 are not as well documented, Russia’s track record of providing cost-effective maintenance and spares for its platforms, such as the Su-30MKI, suggests lower long-term expenses. And India’s existing infrastructure for Russian aircraft, including maintenance and facilities and trained personnel, would further reduce the cost of integrating the Su-57.
What’s more, Russia’s willingness to engage in offset agreements and local production could allow India to manufacture components domestically, creating jobs and reducing foreign exchange expenditure. Russia has so far met with little success in selling the Su-57 abroad; the Kremlin would likely offer New Delhi extremely generous terms for its acquisition, reasoning that India’s successful use of the warplane would then motivate other developing countries to follow suit.
There’s also the matter of the F-35 program’s stringent export controls, maintenance agreements, and operational restrictions under the US Foreign Military Sales framework. These conditions could limit India’s ability to use the aircraft independently, especially in scenarios where US interests diverged from those of India’s.
Finally, the United States has a long history of imposing sanctions or withholding support for foreign nations when it comes to using its weapons and systems in ways the Americans disapprove. This explains why NATO member Turkey was excluded from the F-35 program over its purchase of Russian S-400 systems. India already operates a vast web of Russian S-400 air defese systems, making the F-35 a geopolitically risky choice.
By contrast, the Su-57 aligns with India’s long-standing defense partnership with Russia, which has been a reliable supplier of military hardware, from MiG fighters to T-90 tanks. Russia has shown flexibility in technology transfers and co-production, as evidenced by the BrahMos missile program. The Su-57 was initially developed in collaboration with India under the Fifth-Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) program, giving India insight into its design and potential for customization.
Although India withdrew from the FGFA in 2018 due to concerns over stealth and engine performance, Russia has since addressed many of these problems, and renewed cooperation could allow India to quickly co-develop a tailored variant to counter the rising threat from both Pakistan and China’s fifth-generation warplanes. This partnership with Russia over the Su-57 could further reinforce the country’s strategic autonomy by diversifying its defense ecosystem and reducing dependence on Western suppliers.
America Needs a Strong India—Not a Client State
Ultimately, the most important thing for both India and America is capabilities.
The Indians recently saw firsthand that Western-made weapons and warplanes were not performing as well as their vendors had promised. Their Russian-made systems seem to have performed somewhat better. And the fact that these systems are cheaper and easier to maintain means that, even if the Russian also overhype their equipment, it does not matter quite as much.
Should New Delhi switch over to the F-35 program to please their American friends, it would likely be catastrophic for the IAF. The F-35 has encountered persistent service issues, meaning that it would likely be nowhere near as effective in a shooting war as Lockheed Martin proclaims. And incorporating the plane into India’s defense paradigm essentially opens India to a multifaceted problem set it would not have been anticipating.
For the time being, India should stick with its Russian gear to stay competitive with the Chinese and Pakistanis—while working to strengthen its geopolitical bonds with the United States.
About the Author: Brandon J. Weichert
Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a contributor at Popular Mechanics, who consults regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, the Asia Times, and countless others. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.
Image: Shutterstock / BeAvPhoto.
