The drones are typically attached to RPG-7 shaped charges or fragmentation grenades, capable of inflicting serious damage to armored vehicles, aircraft, and infrastructure.
Now that Russia’s “Pearl Harbor” is over—and the dust is settling from the Ukrainian surprise attack against several key airbases deep within Russia’s interior—it’s important to understand that the Ukrainian attack, while successful, will not have major effects on the overall warfighting capabilities of Russia.
Put simply, Ukraine did not destroy anywhere near as many bombers as initial claims suggested. Kyiv has claimed that 40 bombers were damaged or destroyed in the attack, but a US official told Fox News that the number was probably closer to a dozen. What’s more, the Russians have other bombers in cold storage that could be refurbished to take the place of the lost aircraft. In any case, long-range strategic bombers are not Russia’s primary capability for long-range strikes anymore.
Nevertheless, the Ukrainian attack was historic in its breadth, reach, and audacity. Of course, Ukraine may come to regret it, in that it will now force the Russians to try to reassert some semblance of nuclear deterrence by massively retaliating against Ukraine—and perhaps even the NATO nations that the Kremlin suspects were involved in planning the attack.
“Operation Spiderweb” Was an Innovative Attack
The attack itself was unlike anything seen before. It exploited key security gaps deep inside Russia, where clearly the Russian military assumed the Ukrainians could never reach. While there is still much about the Ukrainian side of the attack that remains hard to discern, we now know that the Ukrainians employed First Person View (FPV) drones to target the Russian bombers.
It is believed that the Ukrainians employed an “Osa” Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) platform that was developed by the Ukrainian company First Contact. Again, this is speculative, as confirmation on the specific systems remains relatively unavailable.
The Osa UAV can carry a two pound explosive warhead, which is more than sufficient for targeting aircraft and infrastructure. Osa’s payload and speed align with the requirements for striking high-value targets, like the Russian Tu-95 and Tu-22 bombers.
These relatively small drones have around 15 minutes of flight time, and can reach speeds of around 94 miles per hour, enabling rapid strikes. As for the control of these systems, FPVs are piloted via live video feed to goggles, offering real-time precision targeting with latency as low as a few milliseconds.
Beyond the Osa, specific models like the “Queen Hornet” (developed by Wild Hornets) or “Nomad” (a larger FPV with a heavier payload) could have also been used.
Understanding Ukraine’s Osa Drones
While the Osa is the likeliest candidate for the Ukrainian attacks on Russia’s Siberian airbases, other FPV drones used by Ukraine share similar characteristics. The attack is believed to have relied on a mix of UAV models. Let’s look at the general capabilities exhibited by the drones involved in the attack.
FPV drones cost as little as $500 to $700, making them economical for large-scale operations. They were smuggled into Russia inside trucks with concealed compartments, allowing for covert deployment. The front-facing cameras of the drones allowed them to stream live video to their controllers.
The drones are typically attached to RPG-7 shaped charges or fragmentation grenades, capable of inflicting serious damage to armored vehicles, aircraft, and infrastructure.
In this attack, Ukrainian drones targeted Russian long-range nuclear-capable strategic bombers and Ukrainian sources claim they caused $7 billion in damages, disabling roughly one-third of Russia’s cruise missile carriers. Still, the Russians are saying that while significant, the damage does not comport with the claims.
Some Ukrainian FPV drones use frequency-hopping or fiber-optic cables to evade Russian electronic warfare (EW). While fiber-optic drones are less common (under 5 percent of Ukraine’s fleet), these are immune to electronic jamming.
There is no confirmation as to whether these drones were used—though such drones are usually controlled by a human on the other end, making deployment deep inside Russia exceptionally risky compared to a remotely piloted conventional drone. But, as evidenced by the overall Ukraine War, both the Ukrainian and Russian militaries are increasingly valuing these drones because of their lethality and inability to be electronically disrupted.
Ukraine produces 200,000 FPV drones monthly, with plans for 4.5 million by the year’s end. Companies like TAF Drones and crowdfunding groups, like the aforementioned Wild Hornets, are key players in Ukraine’s ever-growing drone arsenal. The scale of the arsenal allowed for Ukraine to successfully launch the coordinated attack with 117 drones.
About the Author: Brandon J. Weichert
Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a contributor at Popular Mechanics, who consults regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, the Asia Times, and countless others. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.
Image: Shutterstock / sergey kolesnikov.
