Pakistan and China’s militaries are highly integrated and poised to continue threatening New Delhi’s position in multiple domains.
The China-Pakistan military partnership, driven primarily by shared competition with India, has found renewed geostrategic logic since August 2019. India’s recent Operation Sindoor and Pakistan’s military response reflect the depth and quality of its bilateral exchanges with China. These ties are maturing and could soon prove decisive. New Delhi’s window to escape from this trap is closing.
Following the logic of legendary Indian strategist Kautilya and his Mandala theory, China and Pakistan have emerged as natural strategic partners, seeking to counterbalance India. This alignment was visibly reinforced during Operation Sindoor. On May 6–7, 2025, the Indian military targeted terrorist infrastructure in response to a likely Pakistan-backed terrorist attack in the Pahalgam region of Jammu and Kashmir.
In retaliation, the Pakistani military launched Operation Bunyan-un-Marsoos to target India. During the crisis episode, the employment of Chinese-origin fighter jets, Chinese PL-15 missiles, and drones highlighted a significant level of convergence in operational capabilities.
Concurrently, the presence of the Chinese survey vessel Da Yang Yi Hao, equipped with advanced sensors in the Indian Ocean, signals a larger strategic coordination. Besides the use of Chinese military technology, Chinese air defense, and satellite-based ISR support in response to Operation Sindoor, the DG ISPR briefings highlight Pakistan’s efforts to emulate the multi-domain warfare of the Chinese military. The episode underscores the real-time materialization of the emergent China-Pakistan two-front military threat. The geostrategic alignment is rapidly translating into a functional military synergy with serious implications for India’s national security.
Old Wine in New Bottles
China-Pakistan geopolitical convergence and military cooperation date back to the 1960s, with the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962 serving as an inflection point for the China-Pakistan partnership. In 1963, Pakistan signed a border agreement with China, ceding 5,180 square kilometers of Indian territory in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (POK) to China, symbolizing mutual alignment for future cooperation. At present, India’s decades-old territorial conflicts with China and Pakistan—marked by protracted disputes and later exacerbated by the nuclear environment—highlight the structural condition of the two-front challenge.
In recent years, the strategic logic for the China-Pakistan military relationship has been cemented by various geopolitical developments. These include the territorial reconfiguration through domestic legislation in Jammu and Kashmir in August 2019; the poor state of India-China relations due to the Galwan crisis in Ladakh in May 2020; the American withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021; and finally, the US-China great power competition in the Indo-Pacific region. Amid these developments, China—and, to an extent, Pakistan—want to redefine their role and presence in the region.
In alignment with the historic plans of both China and Pakistan to deny New Delhi its rightful access to the territory of Jammu and Kashmir, both have contested India’s move to assert its sovereignty through the abrogation of Article 370 in August 2019, which revoked the special status of Jammu and Kashmir. This move by New Delhi resulted in the reconstitution and reintegration of the erstwhile state through domestic legislative reform, leading to the creation of two new union territories (UTs): Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) and Ladakh.
Geopolitically, the new UTs reaffirm India’s rightful territorial claims over areas unlawfully claimed or occupied by Pakistan and China, including Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir (PoJK), Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), Aksai Chin, and the Shaksgam valley. On the other hand, China has replaced the United States as Pakistan’s key strategic partner. A remarkable shift is evident in both the quality and quantity of military cooperation between China and Pakistan, alongside a reduced dependency on US military systems.
Owing to existing structural convergences, the China-Pakistan military relationship is described as a “threshold alliance”—one that falls short of a formal treaty but without any limits on cooperation. The arrangement aims to share the burden and advance the aggregation and pooling of capabilities against India. Three core themes of military cooperation are critical for India.
Three Pillars of Sino-Pakistan Military Cooperation
Pakistan’s former army chief, General Qamar Bajwa, characterized China and Pakistan as “brothers-in-arms.” The relationship is closely tied to the PLA’s goal of transforming itself into a “world-class military” force by 2049. To this end, the PLA is helping—through any and all means—to transform the Pakistani military’s organizational and capabilities base, thereby establishing its credibility as an effective balancer against India.
From Procurement to Co-Production to R&D
The post-August 2019 geostrategic alignment, along with other geopolitical developments, has created a new environment for China and Pakistan to enhance and build military capabilities and synergize their plans. The outcome is evident in the evolution from “procurement to co-production to joint R&D.” For procurements and military modernization, Pakistan has secured relatively cheaper systems with financial concessions on defense purchase-related bills from China.
According to SIPRI trends, between 2020 and 2024, China transferred almost 63 percent of its exported arms to Pakistan. This share comprises 81 percent of Pakistan’s arms imports from China. The Netherlands and Turkey follow China as the next largest arms providers to Pakistan. Arms shipments include variants of the Chinese JF-17 and JF-10 multi-role combat aircraft, compatible defense supply chains for artillery, and network-centric communications and information systems.
The Chinese-origin HQ-9/P (long-range), LY-80 (medium-range), and FM-90 (short-range) surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) constitute Pakistan’s layered air defense. For naval modernization, the C-802 anti-ship cruise missiles and anti-access and area denial (A2AD)-supported Type 039A attack submarines with air-independent propulsion are aimed at countering India’s naval dominance in the Arabian Sea.
In terms of technology transfers, Pakistan ensured China’s access to a US Black Hawk helicopter and possibly unexploded Tomahawk missiles in Afghanistan to perform reverse engineering for developing KD-20 and DH-10 cruise missiles. This technological development led to the maturation of Babur missiles for a secure second-strike capability. Despite Pakistan’s minimal role, the JF-17, a fourth-generation multi-role aircraft, is a major example of a joint R&D venture with its Chinese counterparts. It establishes an ecosystem with precedents for future R&D and co-production of major defense platforms.
Embracing Multi-domain Warfare Concept
China has embraced the multi-domain warfare (MDW) concept to boost conventional capabilities by integrating the information, cyber, and space domains for warfighting purposes. It involves the integrated operations by all forces and components of the military in coordination with each other. To emulate a greater level of effectiveness in warfare, Pakistan has made efforts to embrace the MDW. China has provided Pakistan with BeiDou satellite navigation access since 2013, enabling better ISR capabilities along with 5G communications networks to enhance non-contact warfare capabilities.
The PLASSF, now the PLA Information Support Force (PLAISF), also operates in close coordination with the Pakistani military to increase its technical know-how of multi-domain battlespace operations. This cooperation will enhance Pakistan’s capabilities to perform agile, high-intensity kinetic and non-kinetic offensive operations targeting India’s military and civilian infrastructure.
Interoperability on Two Fronts
The idea of interoperability rests on the materialization of two key elements: the standardization of processes like logistics, training, and aspects of network-centric warfare and the compatibility of personnel and environment meant to achieve joint activities in case of a military contingency as part of a joint operational plan. To this end, China and Pakistan already conduct joint army, air force, and naval exercises—a series of “Warrior,” “Shaheen,” and “Sea Guardians” exercises, respectively.
These joint military exercises help foster a mutual understanding of the operational environment, in line with plans to execute interoperability, which may occur in part in the land, aerospace, or maritime domains or, in sum, a multi-domain-based battlespace. Thus, the interoperability element in the military domain helps cement aligned procedures and interdependence to the extent of interchangeability in the long term. Furthermore, the PLAN’s likely gaining basing access to the Gwadar port will have implications for power projection and accessibility for India and its Indo-Pacific partners, including the United States and France, in the Western Indian Ocean region.
Implications for India
China-Pakistan military cooperation has materialized far beyond the logic of geopolitical signaling in the post-Cold War era. The threat is imminent, grave, and real-time for India. Pakistan derives not just capabilities but also the will to challenge India’s military might from China’s backing. Despite debates about the effectiveness of Chinese military technology and systems, the Pahalgam-Operation Sindoor episode serves as a serious wake-up call. It is further exacerbated by the interoperability of capabilities and joint operational plans on the battlefield. India needs to observe the maturing details of the China-Pakistan military partnership closely.
The nature of military-to-military and dual-use domains is likely to lead to patterns of joint production and R&D. In terms of training and doctrine, the end outcome may validate the proposition that “common military systems, supporting ISR capabilities, and production result in a common operational plans” against India.
New Delhi needs to be aware of mirror imaging against a China-supported Pakistan and make a balanced assessment of its overall capabilities, as well as the degree and extent of support in coordination with the PLA. Drones and non-contact warfare capabilities should become a priority, as these can function independently and simultaneously to support multi-domain operations. For training, planning, and decision-making purposes, the Indian military requires a more robust red-teaming process to anticipate adversaries in a more realistic manner and to factor in real-time, unknown variables.
The Indian military needs to engage with partners like the United States to derive deeper operational-level insights into the PLA’s doctrine and capabilities to enhance its plans and overall readiness. This cooperation can manifest in the form of more structured training and joint planning to develop insights for more focused and enhanced cooperation. The ultimate goal should be to develop a more comprehensive toolkit of capabilities and contingency plans for effective countermeasures, thereby strengthening New Delhi’s strategic posture.
About the Authors: Harsh Pant and Rahul Rawat
Harsh V Pant is Vice President of the Observer Research Foundation (ORF), New Delhi.
Rahul Rawat is a Research Assistant with the Strategic Studies Programme at ORF.
Image: Falcons Spotters / Shutterstock.com.
