As Western media sources spike the football in the endzone in the aftermath of Ukraine’s remarkable surprise attack on Russia’s long-range nuclear-capable strategic bomber fleet, it is important to get a better appraisal of the damage.
Thus far, most reporting—typically citing the Ukrainians themselves—has simply highlighted the loss of Russia’s active long-range bomber capacity. To be sure, there will be real, lasting damage from the strike. But few have pointed out that Russia’s remaining long-range bomber capacity is still remarkably dangerous—and that the Kremlin has robust land-and-sea-launched long-range strike capabilities to fill out its nuclear triad.
Understanding Ukraine’s “Operation Spiderweb”
In the case of the attack itself, Ukraine estimates they damaged upwards of 30 percent of Russia’s active long-range, nuclear-capable bomber fleet. The long-term effects of the strike remain to be seen. But it is worth noting that Russia still has many similar systems in cold storage left over from the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Sure, these airframes are antiques by today’s standards. But with the T-72 and T-90 Main Battle Tanks (MBTs), for example, Moscow has already proven itself more than capable at upgrading old systems and making them effective on the modern battlefield. Why assume any differently of their long-range bombers in cold storage?
Recall also that Russia’s defense industrial base is operating at levels of efficiency not seen since the height of the Soviet Union during the heady Cold War era. If it wishes to restore the mothballed bombers to service, it will likely be able to do so in short order.
NATO must understand the realities it faces when it comes to Russian capabilities. If the alliance unthinkingly believes whatever the Ukrainian wartime government is saying, it will make grave strategic miscalculations.
Russia’s Losses Are Significant—but Not Catastrophic
The surprise Ukrainian drone attacks on key Russian strategic military bases deep inside Siberia targeted mostly Tu-95 and Tu-22M bombers. Videographic evidence of the attacks and their aftermath clearly show multiple bombers ablaze on the tarmacs of the two bases. Compared to the height of the Soviet Air Force during the Cold War, today’s Russian operational bomber fleet is relatively small. Thus, the Ukrainian attacks did do damage—at least in the near-term.
Russia’s loss of active bombers reduces the country’s operational capacity for long-range strikes, especially against Ukraine, where Tu-95s and Tu-22Ms have been used to launch Kh-101/102 cruise missiles.
As of 2025, Russia’s active strategic bomber fleet (consisting of the Tu-95, Tu-160, and Tu-22M) likely totals between 130-150 warplanes, making Ukraine’s claims of targeting roughly one-third of its fleet plausible. But what about stored aircraft? Going into the old Soviet Union’s storage centers and plucking airframes from there might add an additional 70-140 airframes. Of course, US Air Force intelligence sources assess that perhaps only 20 to 30 percent of those airframes in reserve could be made operational in a year or less. Let’s run down these numbers.
Tu-95 “Bear” Bomber Losses
Before Ukraine’s attack on Russia, the Russians were believed to have anywhere between 50 and 60 Tu-95s in active service, with additional airframes in reserve or storage. The Tu-95 fleet has been modernized over the years, such as the Tu-95MSM variant.
Older variants, though, like the Tu-95K and Tu-95M are likely kept in storage as a strategic reserve. Some estimates even suggest Russia may have an additional 20-30 Tu-95s in storage, although their airworthiness varies.
Tu-160 “Blackjack” Bomber Losses
The Tu-160 Blackjack bomber is one of Russia’s most iconic bombers. According to an article in The War Zone, Ukrainian journalist Alexander Kovalenko claims that two Tu-160s were destroyed at the Belaya airfield.
However, no independent confirmation of this has yet been made. In fact, Kovalenko later altered his statement, saying the two Tu-160s in question were not destroyed altogether but “were unlikely to be repaired by the Russian military-industrial complex in its current state in the near future.”
Is Kovalenko right? Perhaps, perhaps not. But it is worth noting that Kyiv has made a string of similar outlandish claims since the outset of the war. For the time being, Ukraine should operate as if those systems can be repaired within the year. And, even if they cannot, the Russians still have anywhere between five and ten Tu-160s in deep storage that could be refurbished within the year. Plus, the Kremlin is committed to building the upgraded Tu-160M variant—and plans to have at least ten of these units available no later than 2030.
Tu-22M Bomber Losses
As for the Tu-22M bomber (NATO designation “Backfire”), these systems were named as being among the most common bombers damaged or destroyed in the Ukrainian attack. In the Soviet era, an astonishing 500 units of these planes were produced. After the USSR’s collapse, Russia inherited a significant portion of the birds.
Before the Ukrainian attack on June 1, the Russians had around 60 to 70 Tu-22Ms in active service. It is believed that Russia has an additional 50 to 100 Tu-22M airframes in storage.
Unconfirmed reporting indicates that a significant portion of these stored aircraft are not airworthy in their present form. Still, given the proficiencies of Russia’s defense industrial base (as NATO leaders have grudgingly admitted), Moscow could likely make a sizable portion of these planes ready for combat in a relatively compressed timeline, if needed.
Like the United States, the Russian military has maintained aircraft “boneyards,” notably at its inner airbases such as Chebenki and Engels. These boneyards house the models of bombers spoken about in this article. They are not in active service, but are kept at the airbases in order to serve as a strategic reserve—a hedge—against sudden escalation, of the sort that Moscow today is experiencing.
Russia Has a Big Electronics Problem
Despite the success that Russia has had in making their defense industrial base ready for modern great power conflict, it is experiencing one significant bottleneck in dual-use electronic systems. Put simply, Russia is not good at manufacturing electronics—of the sort needed for the short-range defense systems that might have protected its airbases from Ukraine’s drone attacks. What’s more, these dual-use electronic systems are required for components intended for enhanced warplane and bomber systems.
Interestingly, the bottleneck in dual-use electronics that still complicates the otherwise reliable mass production capabilities of the Russian defense industrial base is not a new problem for the Kremlin. It goes back to the Cold War—when the Soviet Union lost that conflict in large part because it was simply unable to keep up with the United States in this critical domain.
Whereas China, as a global hub of advanced manufacturing, has been able to learn how to produce such critical systems, the Russians still lag well behind both the United States and China, in spite of its competent engineering and scientific base. The Russian defense industrial base, however, is well-suited for a long-duration war of attrition of the kind it is currently waging upon Ukraine.
NATO Shouldn’t Get Cocky About Russia’s Losses
The dual-use electronics problem will no doubt prove to be a complicating factor in the restoration of Russia’s bomber fleet. Nevertheless, its military is certainly nowhere near as damaged by the attack as some pro-Ukraine commentators are suggesting. In fact, the probability that they will recover in short order from this assault is high.
The fundamentals of the conflict remain against Ukraine and NATO. Russia is far larger; it has a far more sophisticated defense industrial base; and whatever problems its military faced in the opening weeks of the conflict has been worked out. A strike on Russia’s bomber fleet, however audacious, does little to alter these basic facts.
A negotiated settlement remains the best pathway out of this war. Otherwise, sooner or later, Russia will almost certainly win.
About the Author: Brandon J. Weichert
Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a contributor at Popular Mechanics, who consults regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, the Asia Times, and countless others. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.
Image: Shutterstock / miss.cabul.
