If the backwards rebel group in Yemen can disrupt U.S. air operations so easily, how can America conduct effective air operations against a more sophisticated adversary?
According to new reporting from the New York Times, a Houthi surface-to-air (SAM) missile barely missed an American F-35 fifth-generation fighter, the crown jewel of the U.S. fighter inventory. The F-35, participating in Operation Rough Rider against the Houthis, was forced to take evasive action to avoid the missile.
The incident raises questions about the survivability of one of America’s most advanced fighters, and raises concerns over how effective the relatively unsophisticated Houthi air defense system has been at hampering U.S. action.
“Several American F-16s and an F-35 fighter jet were nearly struck by Houthi air defenses, making real the possibility of American casualties,” military analyst Gregory Brew posted on X, adding that the Houthis were successful in shooting down “seven American MQ-9 drones (around $30 million each), hampering Central Command’s ability to track and strike the militant group.”
So, just how vulnerable are American fighters to the Houthis’s air defense system?
Houthi Missile Defenses Are Simple but Effective
The Houthi air defense system is rudimentary. However, it is highly mobile—meaning the defense systems can pop up just about anywhere, making them unpredictable and hard to plan around. Moreover, the simplistic nature of the systems also helps them to avoid earlier detection by America’s advanced equipment. “Many of the [SAMs] are also improvised, leveraging non-traditional passive infrared sensors and jury-rigged air-to-air missiles that provide little to no early warning of a threat, let alone an incoming attack,” The War Zone reported.
The Houthis also possess some modern systems, courtesy of Iran, like the Barq-1 and Barq-2 SAMs. The exact capabilities of the Iranian SAMs are unclear, but the Houthis claim that the Barq-1 and Barq-2 have maximum ranges of 31 miles and 44 miles and can engage targets at altitudes of 49,000 feet and 65,000 feet, respectively. The Barq systems are understood to be based on the Iranian Taer family of missiles, which themselves are derivative of the Soviet-era SA-6 and SA-11 air defense systems.
“How the Houthis employ Barq-1 and Barq-2 is not entirely clear, but Taer missiles in Iranian service are fired from various wheeled launchers, some of which have their own integrated fire control radars,” The War Zone reported. “Some of Iran’s air defense systems capable of firing Taer variants also reportedly have electro-optical and/or infrared camera to aid in target acquisition, identification, and tracking.”
The Near-Miss Is a Bad Omen for Great Power Conflict
The near miss between the U.S. F-35 and the Houthi SAM raises bigger questions about bigger conflicts. Namely, if a backwards rebel group is successfully disrupting U.S. air operations in the air space above Yemen, how can the U.S. expect to conduct effective air operations in air space where a more sophisticated adversary is present? And if the F-35, a fifth-generation stealth fighter with an ultra-low radar cross section (RCS), is vulnerable to Cold War-era SAM defenses, how will the F-35 (or the rest of the U.S. fleet) fare against modern air defense systems?
What seems certain is that in the air, as on the ground, possessing more expensive, more advanced systems does not guarantee free-access or uninterrupted success. Low-tech systems can reliably hinder the efficacy of high-tech systems.
About the Author: Harrison Kass
Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the U.S. Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.
Image: Shutterstock / Mohammed al-wafi.
