The line between persuading Tehran to denuclearize and provoking it toward rapid weaponization is dangerously thin.
Over the past eighteen months, tensions in the Middle East have escalated dramatically. The launch of hundreds of missiles from Iranian territory toward central Israel and F-35 jets striking near Tehran last year marked some of the most critical moments of the regional confrontation that began on October 7, 2023. Now, Tehran and Jerusalem are on a trajectory that risks further escalation in an already volatile regional conflict. At the center of this tension remains Iran’s nuclear program, seen as an existential threat by Israel and a major regime safeguard in Iran.
The debate is not over whether Iran should be prevented from acquiring nuclear weapons but over how. To assess the best path forward and its impact on Iran-Israel relations, three main scenarios should be considered.
The first and most probable is a partial nuclear agreement, which may temporarily curb escalation but risks renewed hostilities without additional leveraging. The second, a comprehensive nuclear resolution, could significantly reduce tensions but remains unlikely due to time constraints and the wide gap between U.S. desires and Iran’s willingness to compromise. The third, an Israeli military strike on Iran’s nuclear program, becomes increasingly probable in the absence of any agreement over the next months.
Could the strategies employed by global powers during the Cold War provide insights into alternative scenarios for reducing tensions in the Middle East? While détente between Israel and Iran would require fundamental shifts in perception and remains unlikely in the foreseeable future, certain measures can help reduce miscalculations and the sense of immediate threat. In a rapidly evolving Middle East, potential domestic and regional shifts may create better conditions for de-escalation.
At key moments of change, historic opportunities for Israel-Iran relations may arise. Preparing for such developments is crucial, as proactively engaging with them could also, in itself, foster more pragmatic approaches in current bilateral relations.
In the meantime, the primary focus should remain on preventing the threat posed by Iran’s nearing a nuclear weapons capability through both diplomatic and military means. The North Korean case should not set a precedent, and mistakes that led to its nuclearization must not be repeated.
The Israel-Iran Nuclear Rivalry
The deep-seated hostility between Iran and Israel stems from various causes. Some analysts emphasize the balance of power and the ambition for regional dominance and influence. Others point to the ideological and religious dimension since Iran’s Islamic Revolution, including Tehran’s calls for Israel’s destruction, or frame it as a clash between Eastern and Western cultures. Additionally, some argue that the rivalry serves as a crucial tool for diverting attention or gaining political capital in domestic and regional arenas for both Tehran and Jerusalem.
The combination of these elements and their development over the years has contributed to the entrenched rivalry. However, one critical factor stands out with unrivaled significance today: the Iranian nuclear program. For Iran, it is a vital regime survival insurance. For Israel, it represents an acute existential threat that cannot be tolerated. These are fundamentally opposite positions.
The central role of the Iranian nuclear program in the hostility has sharpened since the fighting in the Middle East post-October 7, as other points of friction have been reduced following the significant weakening of Hezbollah, the overthrow of the Assad regime, and Iran’s military withdrawal from Syria. Until recently, the scenario of hundreds of missiles being launched from Iranian territory towards central Israel or Israeli F-35 jet strikes on targets near Tehran seemed improbable. Yet, in the Middle East, reality often far outpaces imagination.
In recent months, there have been no additional direct confrontations between the sides, partly due to the administration change in the United States. However, amid unprecedented internal and economic challenges, Iran continues to threaten retaliation against the recent Israeli strike. At the same time, Israel, perceiving a limited window of opportunity, has escalated its threats of a large-scale assault on Iran’s nuclear facilities.
While some actors, such as Russia, might benefit from regional tensions, many more miss the limited and clandestine confrontations of recent years. Is it possible to change course and return to a state with restrictive rules and mutual restraint? The answer is yes, but challenges are waiting around the corner. To determine the preferred policy towards Tehran, various scenarios and their implications should be considered.
A Partial Agreement with Iran
If current trends in the international and domestic arenas persist, the most likely scenario over the following months is the achievement of partial or interim agreements. Such deals will provide limited nuclear constraints yet fall short of a comprehensive solution equivalent to the JCPOA, from which the United States withdrew in 2018. Despite Iran’s challenging internal predicament and regional setbacks and given its deep distrust of the United States, the regime has demonstrated resilience and shown little willingness to make significant concessions in the nuclear realm while making domestic modifications and accepting negotiations to ease pressures.
With the approval of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and domestic support for a new deal, it is likely Tehran will keep negotiating in a calculated manner, maintaining a mix of offers and threats. The main goal will be to mitigate the risks of a military assault while welcoming partial agreements that preserve its maneuverability and help stabilize both internal and external challenges to the regime.
A few other factors might lead to a partial resolution. These include Western pressure to finalize an agreement before October 2025, when the international mechanism for reimposing UN Security Council sanctions on Iran expires. The distraction of other pressing global issues, such as the war in Ukraine and Russian involvement in negotiations, could benefit Tehran. Additionally, President Trump’s potential impatience with prolonged negotiations, highlighted by his two-month ultimatum to Supreme Leader Khamenei, his reluctance to initiate new wars, and his team’s split attention and limited experience in nuclear negotiations, might also push toward a partial deal.
Despite its flaws, such an agreement might bring temporary benefits, including a pause in direct escalation between Jerusalem and Tehran. The Israeli leadership is likely to avoid bluntly undermining what could be framed as a diplomatic win for Trump.
Nevertheless, leaving vague or unresolved issues within the nuclear framework creates a latent mechanism for the resumption of confrontation. Any Iranian activity perceived by Israel as advancing its nuclear ambitions could justify covert or overt responses. Moreover, Israel might act in nuclear areas that the agreement doesn’t cover—including Iran’s proxies, UAVs, missiles, terrorism, and regional expansionism—either out of genuine concern or to provoke a response. Over time, this dynamic and possible Iranian retaliation could lead back to the volatile relations we are witnessing today.
A Comprehensive Agreement with Iran
Achieving a comprehensive nuclear agreement, better than the JCPOA, is the least likely scenario in the coming few months. While time is limited, there is a substantial gap between U.S. demands and the compromises Iran is willing to accept, based on its current assessment of opportunity and threats. However, resolve, consistency, and coherence in President Trump’s approach to Iran may increase the likelihood of securing a more comprehensive agreement rather than a partial one.
Trump’s improved political flexibility in lifting “sensitive” sanctions or signing more binding treaties could enable providing Tehran with guarantees and positive incentives. His desire to end the war in Ukraine might help gain Russian support in pressuring Iran toward a new comprehensive deal.
Increased economic pressure through sanctions on Chinese refineries involved in processing Iranian oil and shadow fleet could reduce Tehran’s crude oil exports. Enhanced American military activity in the Middle East, the subsequent direct threat to Iran, and reinforcements, including Patriot missile defense systems, aircraft carriers, and B-2s, may also offer insight into Trump’s future options. The level of U.S.-Israel cooperation, whether renewed heavy bomb shipments or mutual airforce exercises, could further reinforce Trump’s message to the region.
Iran’s perception of these developments could influence Tehran’s decision-making and shape its cost-benefit calculations regarding the desired scope of an agreement. For instance, a perceived immediate risk to regime stability is more likely to alter the Iranian calculus toward an agreement rather than a future threat that could incentivize a rapid nuclear breakout as a means of neutralizing the danger.
Despite the limited chances, a new nuclear agreement that extends timelines for producing military-grade uranium, imposes new permanent restrictions on weaponization progress and returns international inspections would offer significant benefits from a global security perspective and reduce the risk of proliferation and nuclear-related conflicts.
Moreover, it would be the most effective means of easing heightened tensions between Israel and Iran. A comprehensive resolution of the nuclear issue might lead to a less hazardous status quo, restoring the more moderate rules of engagement that existed between the two nations just a few years ago.
At this level of potential de-escalation, both nations could agree to refrain from direct military attacks on each other’s sovereign territories and limit Iran’s independent military activities in Syria, as well as Israel’s in Iraq. The rules might also include Israel limiting its covert assaults to missile and UAV capabilities and avoiding nuclear targets.
In contrast, Iran limits its support to a few regional allies and proxies. By demonstrating mutual resolve, yet with self-discipline and control mechanisms to minimize miscalculations, hostilities could be confined to manageable realms and persist for years.
An Israeli Attack
In the absence of any resolution to the nuclear issue, the likelihood of an independent Israeli strike increases. Israel’s past attacks on advanced nuclear programs in Iraq (1981) and Syria (2007), though carried out against less sophisticated nuclear projects, demonstrate its uncompromising stance and high-risk tolerance, irrespective of the prime minister in office at the time.
President Trump seems to favor a diplomatic resolution to the nuclear crisis while maintaining military options, including a future Israeli attack, as a viable plan B. In Jerusalem, the official line accepts pursuing a substantial agreement dismantling Iran’s nuclear program. However, driven by Iran’s unprecedented nuclear progress, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and other factions are advocating for a military strike if negotiations stall.
Recent Israeli successes against Hezbollah and Hamas might also play a role in pushing for such an assault alongside domestic politics. The current Israeli right-wing government, facing significant public disapproval, may favor actions that prolong the security crisis and help mobilize national unity as a means to bolster its hold on power.
A few considerations might limit the perceived Israeli time frame for action. Those include concerns about a fast, covert nuclear breakout, the potential installation of new underground enrichment facilities, the re-establishment of Iran’s air defense systems, which were severely degraded during the last Israeli attack, and a possible American veto against military action due to changes in political, international, and regional dynamics, even if negotiations between Iran and the United States fail.
The rationale behind a preemptive military strike suggests that an attack might heighten regime fears of collapse, leading Iran to halt its weapons program, as it did after the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. Should Iran try to rebuild its facilities, the Israeli policy might include repeated assaults in the coming years. Conversely, should Tehran react with a nuclear weapon breakout, it could open the door to broader international military responses targeting Iran’s strategic infrastructure or regime symbols and leaders.
This could be a high-stakes gamble, with the line between persuading Tehran to denuclearize and provoking it toward rapid weaponization dangerously thin, especially given the supreme leaders’ increasing tendency towards risk-prone conduct. Such an offensive strategy must depend on several critical factors. Timely intelligence and political backing are vulnerable to disruption by unexpected developments and shifting geopolitical dynamics. Operational preparedness and precise execution are subject to time constraints and human error.
While the physical impact of the strike will depend on its scope and target selection, its broader consequences for regional and global security will also be shaped by Tehran’s reassessment of its revised strategic position. In scenarios where Iran faces limited external support, constrained operational alternatives, and heightened vulnerability, its calculus may shift toward more restrained behavior.
In any case, without complementary political processes, hostility between Israel and Iran is likely to endure, given the deep and diverse sources of animosity. Still, historical precedents suggest that even deep-seated hostilities can be managed.
Is De-escalation Possible?
The Cold War era of détente, though only partially applicable to Iran-Israel relations, offers relevant insights into how adversaries with deep ideological divides might adopt mutual restraint, even in a volatile environment like the Middle East.
A fundamental requirement for détente is the mutual recognition that unilateral actions alone are insufficient to eliminate all threats or are too costly and risky. Additionally, both sides must internalize the interdependence necessary for maintaining aspects of national security. Acceptance of mutual vulnerability serves as another key foundation for de-escalation.
This kind of perception is unlikely to take root in Israel soon and is even less likely under the current Iranian regime. The instability in both nations does not favor the advancement of de-escalation as well. However, limited measures can be pursued to reduce miscalculations and the sense of immediate threat without necessarily requiring fundamental shifts in perception.
Building indirect communication mechanisms or refraining from actively plotting to overthrow one another would be a significant starting point. Establishing clear rules on permissible and prohibited forms of violent action could also help reduce volatility. Although some of these measures may seem complex, potential shifts in the regional and international landscape, along with a sense of growing costs on both sides, could help facilitate their implementation.
Change is Coming
In the near future, the primary focus should remain on preventing the threat posed by Iranian military nuclearization. This entails Israel and the United States maintaining vigilant intelligence, fostering robust international and regional cooperation, prioritizing the nuclear issue over any other conflict with Iran, pursuing diplomatic efforts for a viable agreement, and, if necessary, intensifying economic pressure or reliable military threats and actions.
However, change is approaching and may come suddenly, triggered by regional escalation, internal upheaval, or leadership shifts. Though a diplomatic breakthrough between Israel and Iran seems far-fetched today, in the Middle East, reality often exceeds our limited imagination. A meeting between an Israeli prime minister and an Iranian president may seem implausible now, yet it has historical precedents. Israel and Iran have no territorial disputes and no legacy of direct war. Indeed, the two have collaborated before, even after the Iranian Revolution in 1979.
This reality demands strategic foresight. Israel and the United States must prepare not only for the prospect of conflict but also for alternative outcomes. Flexible scenario planning, the creation of contingency plans for a range of developments, and the rejection of a zero-sum mindset can enhance readiness for future change and facilitate the necessary shifts in perception. Proactive engagement with the possibility of transformation may help reduce hostility today and lay the groundwork for a more stable tomorrow.
About the Author: Assaf Zoran
Assaf Zoran is a research fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center’s Managing the Atom project. He has dedicated the past twenty-five years to research, policy shaping, operational planning, and strategic dialogue with decision-makers in the government of Israel and abroad.
Image: Davidi Vardi / Shutterstock.com.
