If the Gulf states want to help decide Iran’s post-war future, they will have to court the Trump administration and demonstrate their value yet again.
The outcome of the war in Iran is still hard to predict, but some of the consequences for the Arab Gulf states are already starting to come into focus. In our latest policy brief, CFTNI Senior Fellow Joshua Yaphe examines some of the decisions that Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Oman will face as a result of the war.
In particular, they are likely to:
1. Hold the United States accountable for enforcing any deal with Tehran.
2. Demand a multilateral security agreement ensuring access through the Strait of Hormuz.
3. Suspend any further discussion of expanding the Abraham Accords.
4. Diversify their high-tech defense acquisitions away from America.
5. Increase their participation in the Board of Peace.
The Arab Gulf states will insist that the United States maintain troops and equipment on ready alert for the long term, replenish their stocks of Patriot interceptors, provide them with additional systems like the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), and include them in any next-generation counter-drone and laser weapons systems. They will also expect some sort of US-led effort to coordinate a multinational force to patrol the Strait of Hormuz.
At the same time, they may diversify their high-tech defense partnerships away from American providers like Palantir and Anduril toward European companies like Helsing, out of concern that they will have no way of removing American AI systems embedded in their data networks the next time the United States launches a war against a regional neighbor.
Governments that are not already part of the Abraham Accords will likely shun the forum, though Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu probably anticipated that response and made a cost-benefit analysis before the war that dismantling the Islamic Republic was more valuable.
The Arab Gulf states want to influence Iran’s post-war relationship with America and the West. However, the Trump administration has already determined the parameters of a deal with Tehran in the form of a 15-point plan. And there does not appear to be any vision for translating battlefield success into a new regional order, the way the George HW Bush Administration pivoted from the Gulf War to the Middle East multilaterals.
Nevertheless, there will be opportunities for the Arab Gulf states to contribute to the verification and compliance mechanisms required in any settlement. The slow and steady path toward the disintegration of the regime that is likely to come in the months of chaos that follow the war will also provide new opportunities for the Arab Gulf states to shape the evolving relationship between America and Iran.
The full text of the report is available here.
For more CFTNI publications, see the website.
About the Author: Joshua Yaphe
Joshua Yaphe is a senior fellow at the Center for the National Interest. He was previously a senior analyst for the Arabian Peninsula at the US State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research and visiting faculty at the National Intelligence University. He has a PhD in History from American University in Washington, DC, and is the author of two books. Saudi Arabia and Iraq as Friends and Enemies: Borders, Tribes and a History Shared is available in paperback from the University of Liverpool Press, and Time and Narrative in Intelligence Analysis: A New Framework for the Production of Meaning is available in a free, open-access digital version at the Routledge website.
