Capturing the Kharg, Qeshm, Abu Musa, and Tunb Islands would untangle Tehran’s stranglehold on the Persian Gulf.
The ongoing US-Israeli operations against Iran, while so far tactically successful, will not achieve Iran’s capitulation unless Tehran loses its most potent weapon: control over the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s hold over the strait is buffered by two islands. Kharg Island, located toward the western end of the Persian Gulf, serves as its oil export hub and economic lifeline. Indeed, President Donald Trump ordered airstrikes on Kharg’s military bases on March 15. Qeshm Island lies closer to the mouth of the strait and is home to a number of Iranian missile bases.
The Strait of Hormuz is the world’s most critical energy chokepoint. Roughly one-fifth of global oil consumption, around 21 million barrels per day, transits this narrow 21-mile-wide passage, alongside a fifth of the liquefied natural gas trade, primarily from Qatar. From there, energy exports from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Qatar, Bahrain, the UAE, and Iran can reach markets in Europe, India, China, and Japan.
The disruption caused by the war has already sent oil prices into the triple digits, with cascading effects across global supply chains, felt from Tokyo to Berlin. Iran’s attacks on vessels in the strait amid the escalating conflict underscore its centrality to Tehran’s strategy. Asymmetric tactics such as fast-attack boats, mines, drones, and island-based missiles are tailored to this corridor.
Yet, the strait is both a lever and a lifeline for Iran. It relies on Hormuz for its oil sales to China, its sole major remaining customer, while closing the strait for its foes, a playbook refined since the 1980s Tanker War and echoed in 2019 sanctions-era warnings. Even partial uncertainty drives up insurance premiums and reroutes tankers, as seen in past Israel-Iran flare-ups.
Alternatives exist but falter: Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline to the Red Sea can transport only 5–7 million barrels per day, far short of Hormuz’s volume. Similarly, the UAE’s pipelines offer limited bypass capacity. And while prolonged threats amplify economic pain on all Gulf producers, Iran will feel it the deepest, as its isolation amplifies vulnerability.
Iran’s Kharg and Qeshm islands could be the missing force multiplier element in forcing Tehran’s hand. With Kharg Island hosting 90 percent of its oil-loading terminals, processing exports are vital for regime survival. Qeshm bolsters naval and surveillance operations at the strait’s entrance. Neutralizing both, or, better yet, making them a forward operating base, would be the best way to put pressure on Tehran.
Yet conquest without conviction is hollow. Iran would double down on guerrilla maritime harassment unless robbed of other bases in the Persian Gulf. The islands of Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb, located between Iran and the UAE, would be the next logical target. Occupied by Iran since 1971 despite long-standing Emirati claims, these islands straddle Hormuz’s mouth, enabling surveillance, missile deployments, and rapid interdiction. From here, Tehran can also project power. A bold US or GCC move to liberate and garrison them would flip the script.
Defensive batteries and patrols would secure shipping, defang Iranian fast boats, and deter mine-laying. Critics may decry the associated risks, but inaction invites worse: a prolonged strait closure, oil prices at $150 per barrel, and a cratering global economy.
If the United States seized Kharg and Qeshm, and a GCC coalition took the Tunbs and Abu Musa, Tehran would come closer to the conclusion that capitulation is unavoidable. The freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf will not be achieved by sanctions alone, but by forcing Tehran’s hand from the world economy’s jugular vein. At the same time, they have no choice but to negotiate sovereignty through arbitration, perhaps under UN auspices, mirroring historical Gulf disputes.
About the Author: Abdulla Al Junaid
Abdulla Al Junaid is a geopolitical columnist and commentator in Middle Eastern and international media. He is the former department head for analysis and policies at the National Unity Party in Bahrain, the former deputy director of MENA2050, an advisory board member of the German-Arab Friendship Association (DAFG), and a permanent committee member of the Germany-GCC Annual Conference on Security and Cooperation. He was a guest speaker at the German-GCC Annual Conference on Security & Cooperation, the Herzliya Conference, and the Abu Dhabi Strategic Forum. He is also an executive partner at INTERMID Consultancy (Bahrain).
