Russia’s method of grouping its soldiers into “battalion tactical groups” assumed that those soldiers would be better-trained than a potential adversary—an assumption that is clearly no longer the case.
In February, the Kremlin’s “special military operation” in Ukraine entered its fifth year. During that time, the Russian forces have undergone significant changes to adapt to the operational realities of the battlefield.
The most significant change with regard to the structural organization of ground formations is the gradual move from the battalion tactical group concept to the divisional approach.
Why Russia Abandoned Its “Battalion Tactical Groups”
The Russian forces that invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022, were organized around the battalion tactical group. These semi-permanent task forces were composed of approximately 1,000 troops and had the mechanized and artillery assets to perform semi-independent combined arms combat operations. In theory, each battalion tactical group would be able to pin down, outflank, or envelop larger enemy formations.
This doctrine can be highly effective under the right circumstances, but it assumes that Russia’s battalion tactical groups are more effective than their adversaries—presumably because they are better-trained and equipped and are therefore able to move faster than them and defeat them in local engagements. If Russian troops are equal or inferior to the larger force, the model becomes far less useful.
The initial Russian invasion force numbered approximately 190,000 regular and reserve troops. Moscow threw most of its best units against Ukraine, including VDV paratroopers and marine infantry formations. Four years later, those units—the majority of the professional Russian military—no longer exist. The cadre of professional troops at the core of the Russian ground forces has long since been killed or maimed in the fields and cities of Ukraine, leading Russia to seek troops of lower quality for whom the battalion tactical group is no longer an effective method of organization.
The Divisional Model Is a Simpler Way of War
The heavy attrition on the Russian ground units and materiel forced the Russian military to abandon the battalion tactical group model and rely on far cruder methods of attack—often involving smaller units or mass infantry (or “human wave”) attacks against fortified Ukrainian positions.
The Russian forces have lost nearly 1.3 million troops killed and wounded in the conflict thus far. This has led to a vicious circle, in which the lack of well-trained troops has forced the Kremlin to seek low-quality conscripts in greater and greater numbers, leading to higher battlefield deaths and therefore making the manpower demands even higher.
As part of this transition to mass warfare, the Russian military is restructuring its ground units back to a division force concept. The division force concept focuses on the division as the main battle formation and ensures that its division has the necessary organic assets to fight independently or in coordination with other such units.
In many ways, the divisional approach encourages tactical flexibility and independence on the battlefield. As German General Ernst Rommel showed during the invasion of France in 1940 with his Panzer tank division, which repeatedly outflanked and defeated larger French formations, a gifted divisional commander can achieve wonders on the battlefield and enable an operational breakthrough.
To be sure—in spite of their similarly broad interpretation of the notion of national borders—the Wehrmacht of World War II is not the Russian military of 2026. They have wholly different military cultures.
Moreover, the Kremlin’s strategy of constant pressure on the Ukrainian forces means that the Russian military does not have the necessary space and time to properly form or reconstitute new and existing units according to the new divisional model. Russian forces on the frontline continue to suffer very heavy casualty rates on a daily basis.
About the Author: Stavros Atlamazoglou
Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from the Johns Hopkins University and an MA from the Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.
