Donald Trump’s recent executive order is the right approach to diminishing the Muslim Brotherhood’s influence in the Middle East, but further measures should target its broader financial support networks.
Washington has argued for years about how to deal with the Muslim Brotherhood. President Donald Trump just upended a decade of debate by choosing precision to surgically target the Brotherhood branches that meet the terrorism threshold under US law.
To most people, the Muslim Brotherhood is an abstract idea. It is a patchwork of national branches that share an ideological lineage but often diverge in practice. Some branches are political parties, some have become armed movements, and others have stuck to charity work.
The evolving nature of the different branches has made it difficult for the United States to designate the entirety of the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization. The Brotherhood lacks a single headquarters, a unified command, or an organizational structure that demonstrates control over multiple branches.
When it was founded in 1928 by Egyptian teacher Hassan al-Banna, it had a centralized authority with a supreme guide and maintained close relations with branches across the Middle East. Over time, that structure fragmented. National branches and affiliates continued to share the original branch’s ideology but operated independently, adapting to their own political environments.
It appears that Washington recognized this landscape and is adopting a more effective approach, one that does not treat the “Muslim Brotherhood” as a single entity but instead, per President Trump’s executive order, focuses on its most violent branches under existing counterterrorism authorities. This branch-based strategy gives policymakers a more straightforward pathway to build designations case by case, and pursue a sustained campaign to “eliminate the designated chapters’ capabilities and operations.”
The EO explicitly identifies three branches as probable designation targets: the Lebanese Islamic Group, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, and the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood. According to the order, the Lebanese branch’s military wing “helped terror groups launch multiple rocket attacks against Israel,” the Egyptian branch “encouraged violent attacks against US partners,” and the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood has “provided material support to the militant wing of Hamas.”
After the Hamas-led October 7 attack, the Islamic Group claimed seven attacks on Israel from Lebanese territory. Mohammed Takkoush, the secretary general, declared that “Cooperating with a group like Hamas, the most honorable liberation movement, is an honor.” The group’s support for Hamas continued. In June 2024, the group’s political leader, Bassam Hammoud, described the group’s relationship with Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad as “a long history of jihad, political, social, and proselytizing work.”
Analysts trace the group’s deeper alignment with Hamas to its 2022 leadership elections, which empowered a faction closely tied to Hamas. A report by the Saudi magazine al-Majalla stated that Hamas-funded factions operating under the umbrella of al-Qassam Brigades carried out several of the attacks that the Islamic Group claimed.
Cooperation between Hamas and the Islamic Group goes deeper than rhetoric. A senior Islamic Group official acknowledged that the organization had conducted joint operations with Hamas and that two Lebanese Brotherhood members were serving as bodyguards to Hamas deputy leader Saleh al-Arouri when an Israeli airstrike killed him in Beirut. The political bureau chief of the Islamic Group, Ali Abu Yassin, has openly said that “all forces that operate in South Lebanon coordinate their actions.”
When Israel killed Abu Mahmud Muhammad Jabara, a commander in the Islamic Group’s military wing in an airstrike, the al-Qassam Brigades mourned him as one of their own. Hamas did the same after the April 2025 assassination of Mohammad Atwi, a leader in the Islamic Group, stating that he worked directly with them to facilitate attacks on Israel.
The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood shows a similar pattern of intimacy with Hamas. Over the past decade, Hamas has steadily increased its influence within the Jordanian branch. A 2017 assessment concluded that “Hamas worked in an organized fashion with the Jordanian Brotherhood…injecting huge amounts of money to recruit members,” building up a Hamas-aligned faction that now dominates the Brotherhood’s Shura Council.
In recent years, the Jordanian Brotherhood has been explicit in calling for Hamas to reopen its offices in Jordan, two decades after authorities closed them in 1999. After October 7, Brotherhood-affiliated protesters often wore Hamas headbands and shouted, “All of Jordan is Hamas!” or, “We are your men, Mohammed Deif,” referring to the late Hamas military commander.
While the Jordanian Brotherhood long emphasized political activism, its posture shifted after October 7. In October 2024, two Jordanians affiliated with the Brotherhood crossed into Israel and wounded two Israelis. Brotherhood spokesman Moath al-Khawaldeh confirmed that the attackers were “members of the group” who regularly participated in pro-Hamas activities.
By April 2025, Jordan’s Intelligence Directorate reported that individuals linked to the Muslim Brotherhood were involved in “manufacturing rockets and drones, possession of explosives and firearms, and recruiting operatives in Jordan and abroad.” Captured members said their commander operated from Lebanon, where trainees received funding and instruction likely from Hamas and the Lebanese branch of the Brotherhood.
The strength of President Trump’s EO lies in its activation of existing US counterterrorism authorities rather than in the creation of entirely new structures. Providing “material support” for a sanctioned entity is already grounds for being sanctioned oneself. Joint operations and facilitation of attacks with Hamas, as well as fundraising ties, likely count as material support on the part of the Lebanese Islamic Group and Jordanian Brotherhood.
The two branches can also be designated outright as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) for “engaging in terrorist activity.” In addition, the administration can rely on Executive Order 13224, which allows the Treasury Department to sanction groups that assist or support terrorism, enabling Washington to list these Brotherhood branches and their leadership as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGT), a designation that complements FTO status by authorizing broader asset freezes.
However, the process should not stop with the designation of the Brotherhood branches themselves. Washington should also consider targeting the networks that enable these groups’ activities. The focus should be on the charities that facilitate fundraising and on the broader umbrella of non-governmental organizations, media outlets, and financial institutions that sustain their operations. The Brotherhood seeks to anchor itself deeply in host societies, requiring a response that is no less comprehensive.
About the Author: Ahmad Sharawi
Ahmad Sharawi is a research analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, focusing on Middle East affairs and the Levant. Previously, Sharawi worked at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, where he focused mainly on Hezbollah. Ahmad previously worked at the International Finance Corporation and S&P Global. He holds a BA in international relations from King’s College London and an MA from Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service.
Image: Lena Ha / Shutterstock.com.
