A recent spate of firings from the IDF is a welcome step towards accountability for October 7—but ignores the role the Netanyahu administration played in the disaster.
The terrorist attack in Israel on October 7, 2023—in which Hamas militants broke out of Gaza, fell on surrounding Israeli towns and villages, and indiscriminately slaughtered their inhabitants—resulted in some 1,200 Israelis killed and around 250 abducted. The chief of staff for the Israeli Defense Force (IDF), Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir, recently dismissed a handful of senior Israeli military officers, claiming that under their watch, the IDF had “failed in its primary mission” to protect its citizens.
For many Israelis, the dismissals represent a long-awaited signal that accountability for the terror attack would not only be political, but military. At the same time, critics have noted that no full-scale public commission has yet been instituted to investigate security failures in the run-up to the attack, despite various calls.
The disciplinary measures appear to include removal from reserve duty—which means the individuals are already nominally retired, but can no longer be called upon in the future—formal reprimands, and in some cases dismissal from active service.
Top Israeli Generals Reprimanded for October 7 Failures
A recent story in Reuters highlights that three senior IDF leaders either were sacked or resigned as a result of the security failures that allowed Hamas to carry out the October 7 attack.
On January 21, General Herzi Halevi, then Chief of the General Staff for the IDF, announced his resignation (effective March 6), accepting personal responsibility for the security failures. As IDF chief of staff, Halevi was the highest-ranking military official when the attack occurred. His stepping down was a major sign of institutional accountability.
General Yaron Finkelman was the commander of IDF Southern Command which oversees the Gaza border region. Following the October 7 attacks, Finkelman, too, announced his resignation in January. Earlier this month, Finkelman was dismissed from reserve duty by Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir for his role in the failure.
Finally, General Aharon Haliva was the head of the Military Intelligence Directorate (Aman) for the IDF. In April 2024, he resigned from his post, citing that his directorate had “not lived up to its mission” on October 7. Earlier this month, Haliva was dismissed from the Israeli Reserve.
The IDF also took disciplinary actions against several other lower-level officers for their “systemic failure” on 10/7. Several service branch heads, including those of the Israeli Navy and Air Force, were formally censured for their failures related to the seaborne and air aspects of October 7.
IDF Stresses Need for Accountability
When a major security breach occurs in any nation, even top generals may be replaced or disciplined. This affects force readiness, credibility, and deterrence. The IDF’s review process and how it handles failures can offer lessons for other militaries. Its internal leadership shakeups send signals externally.
For example, if a military appears to lack accountability or readiness, it may affect alliance calculations as it relates to the sharing of intelligence, the selling of advanced weapons, and the granting of foreign aid and diplomatic cover in international bodies, like the United Nations, that are usually afforded.
Even without a public investigation, it is painfully clear to most Israelis that the October 7 attacks revealed significant operational deficiencies within the IDF. These included intelligence gaps, border-defense failures, and hybrid seaborne/air/ground assault problems. Militaries operating in border regions, such as the one that separates southern Israel from the blighted Gaza Strip, must be able to anticipate complex surprise attacks that come from multiple domains. As such, how the IDF responds to these threats will inform doctrine in other nations.
Here’s the problem, though. While there is little doubt that the Iranians played a role in the 10/7 attack, there are serious questions about the Israeli understanding of the threat that remain unanswered. How did the Israeli security apparatus, which is plugged into places like Gaza in ways that the public will never understand, miss the threat? How were units charged with border security—along a significant stretch of territory abutting a very unstable and dangerous region (Gaza)—unable to respond effectively on October 7?
What Did Netanyahu’s Government Know?
Indeed, reports suggest that Israeli intelligence did detect the unusual Hamas buildup just across from the IDF border control stations in Southern Israel. Yet, for some odd reason, those IDF units were not put on higher alert. Questions remain as to what, precisely, Israeli leadership under prime minister Benjamin Netanayhu knew, and when they knew it.
Many experts have suggested that the Israeli government had enough actionable intelligence ahead of the October 7 massacre to adequately place their security services on alert. It is not at all clear why the Israeli government under Netanyahu would not have elevated the alert status along Israel’s border in response to that intelligence, and conspiracy theories surrounding Netanyahu’s actions have flourished. Their merits aside, there are plenty of Israeli citizens who are rightly demanding answers over the obvious security failures—and are incensed by Netanyahu’s refusal to establish a commission to study the attack.
Accountability for October 7 Must Reach the Highest Levels
The IDF’s moves to institute accountability for the failures on October 7 are laudable, but none of them address the larger question hanging over the attacks: what did Netanyahu and his senior advisers know, and when did they know it? With Israel’s deep intelligence penetration of its Palestinian opponents, there is simply no way that such the preparations for October 7 could have occurred without Netanyahu and his top people knowing that something was coming. And if they did know—and, for whatever reasons, ignored the threat—that would be one compelling explanation for why they are so reluctant, even three years after the attacks, to open official public investigations into the matter.
Instead, Jerusalem is sacking the lower-level people in the chain of command and keeping the focus on them rather than addressing the wider failures at the highest political levels. That is a problem when it comes to accountability and not allowing a similar crisis to occur in the future.
About the Author: Brandon J. Weichert
Brandon J. Weichert is a senior national security editor at The National Interest. Recently, Weichert became the host of The National Security Hour on America Outloud News and iHeartRadio, where he discusses national security policy every Wednesday at 8pm Eastern. Weichert hosts a companion book talk series on Rumble entitled “National Security Talk.” He is also a contributor at Popular Mechanics and has consulted regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including The Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, and the Asia Times. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.
Image: Shutterstock / noamgalai.
