Movies about military issues have an impact on the public’s imagination, which can then itself shape the way those issues are dealt with.
Last month, Russia claimed to have carried out a test of its Status-6 Oceanic Multipurpose System (NATO reporting name “Kanyon”). Also known as the Poseidon nuclear-powered underwater nuclear-capable torpedo, it was developed to operate at depths of up to 1,000 meters, or 3,300 feet, while traveling at speeds of up to 100 knots. This could make it challenging to detect and even more difficult to intercept.
With a potential yield of up to 100 megatons, the Poseidon—named for the Greek god of the sea, earthquakes, and horses—could be employed against coastal targets, naval bases, and even aircraft carrier strike groups.
As Brandon J. Weichert wrote for The National Interest, “Even if Poseidon’s capabilities are overstated by the Russians, this system represents an entirely new form of strategic weapon in that it is both nuclear-powered and a drone. Therefore, Poseidon purposely complicates naval defenses and arms control agreements.”
Weichert’s point that its capabilities could be “overstated” is noteworthy—as it was a key plot point in the third season of the Netflix original series The Diplomat.
In the streaming show, the Poseidon torpedo is even stated to be thought of as a myth or Russian propaganda due to its devastating capabilities. The Kremlin, however, claims it is real and announced it had carried out a test just after the series was released.
That test followed the release of the Netflix original movie “A House of Dynamite,” which sparked a discussion over the threat of nuclear war.
Life Imitating Art, or Art Just Having a Lucky Guess?
This isn’t the first time that life has imitated art. Many of Tom Clancy’s novels seemed to foreshadow events to come. Likewise, instead of fantastical James Bond plots that are entirely nonsensical, Netflix has presented entertainment offerings that are closer to reality.
“A House of Dynamite and The Diplomat were designed as entertainment but have now been pulled into the vortex of international politics. The films’ detailed depiction of covert operations, nuclear brinkmanship, and diplomatic tension blurs boundaries between narrative and news,” explained geopolitical analyst Irina Tsukerman, president of threat assessment firm Scarab Rising.
Russia’s announcement that it had tested the Poseidon came just after millions of viewers were primed to instinctively associate real events with the fictional crisis they had just watched. That may have been done intentionally.
“The Kremlin understands this psychological reflex,” Tsukerman told The National Interest. “By mirroring a storyline that captured the global imagination, it allowed the Russian state to appear both menacing and relevant. What was supposed to be a television thriller became an extension of Russian soft power, a viral reminder that Moscow still commands attention even when it cannot command respect.”
The Pentagon Responded to a New Film… By Complaining
The reaction from the Pentagon to A House of Dynamite, famed director Kathryn Bigelow’s newest film, is almost more surprising. Rarely does the Department of Defense (DoD) offer unprompted commentary on modern movies or TV series. Yet it swiftly questioned the accuracy of elements of A House of Dynamite.
“The Pentagon’s reaction has been unusually emotional, revealing how cultural influence can unsettle strategic institutions. Officials condemned A House of Dynamite for ‘irresponsibly dramatizing classified material’ and ‘fueling misinformation during a sensitive time,’” noted Tsukerman.
She suggested that the anger reflects genuine frustration: a film intended as an allegory has complicated the Pentagon’s messaging. Moreover, the Pentagon claimed that this was not realistic and did not accurately reflect how it typically handled such situations.
“American defense leaders have spent months trying to project calm and control in the nuclear sphere, but the movie ran the risk of making audiences question the system’s integrity and readiness,” said Tsukerman. “Fiction can give shape to anxiety that officials would rather suppress. The Pentagon’s lashing out only amplified the controversy, giving the impression that Hollywood had touched a nerve, especially after other ex-government officials praised the realistic quality of the film.”
Different Reactions to Different Media Presentations
During the Cold War, the Kremlin was highly critical of how it was presented in Western media, and Soviet filmmakers were also instructed to paint the West in a disparaging light. However, in the 21st century, the responses from the Kremlin and the Pentagon to recent media portrayals are vastly different.
“For Moscow, this situation fits perfectly into its long tradition of hybrid information warfare,” said Tsukerman. “Since Soviet times, the Russian state has understood that global perception can be shaped through rhythm, coincidence, and spectacle as much as through overt aggression.”
Its recent nuclear torpedo test, synchronized with a pop culture event, accomplishes what no press release can: it can turn global anxiety into performance.
“Every headline that links the two enhances the aura of Russian mystique and unpredictability. The Kremlin thrives on the world’s inability to distinguish between theater and threat,” Tsukerman continued. “This confusion is part of the power play. It creates a world in which Russia appears omnipresent, even when its material capabilities are diminishing.”
The psychological impact also reaches beyond Western audiences. For Russia’s domestic public, the juxtaposition of the test and Western outrage reinforces the image of a besieged nation confronting a decadent, panicking West.
“State television has already portrayed the timing as proof that Russia is unshaken by Western narratives,” Tsukerman told The National Interest. “In this interpretation, Hollywood dramatizes fear, while Moscow demonstrates strength. Even if the Kremlin never planned the overlap, it benefits from the illusion of synchronization. The result is a propaganda windfall that requires no investment, only patience and opportunism.”
It also reveals the new frontier of global influence: the interplay between entertainment and power. States no longer need to produce propaganda directly when mass culture performs it inadvertently.
By contrast, the Pentagon’s discomfort highlights how vulnerable even powerful institutions can be to cultural contagion.
“By attacking filmmakers rather than managing perception, defense officials have revealed insecurity about their ability to shape public understanding,” warned Tsukerman. “Their reaction suggests that soft power, once America’s greatest advantage, now acts unpredictably. Art that once reinforced national myth now questions it. This inversion leaves space for adversaries like Russia to step in and exploit uncertainty. The Kremlin does not need to convince Americans that its power is limitless; it only needs to persuade them that their leaders have lost control of the story.”
Movies Can Impact Decision-Makers
Ronald Reagan was reportedly very moved after watching a private screening of the TV movie The Day After, which presented a realistic look at nuclear war, and it changed his stance on nuclear weapons. His administration eventually shifted from a “peace through strength” approach to playing an active role in nuclear disarmament.
The situation may be different now. Shortly after A House of Dynamite was released, President Donald Trump declared that the United States would resume nuclear testing.
“This decision was not reactive hysteria but a calculated statement of deterrence,” Tsukerman suggested. “Trump’s message was clear: America would no longer allow adversaries to define the boundaries of escalation. By demonstrating readiness to test, Washington reasserted its technological credibility and psychological dominance. In one move, Trump turned Russia’s theatrical provocation into an opportunity to reclaim strategic initiative. The Kremlin’s timing had been perfect for spectacle; Trump’s response was perfect for power politics.”
Yet, Tsukerman also warned that when a movie and a missile test become indistinguishable in public discourse, rational deterrence weakens.
“Policy loses coherence when perception dictates strategy,” she continued. “The Kremlin has long practiced this kind of psychological aikido, using the West’s own imagination against it. The more the Pentagon protests, the more it validates Moscow’s manipulation. The Kremlin did not need to write A House of Dynamite; it only needed to watch as the West wrote it for them.”
About the Author: Peter Suciu
Peter Suciu has contributed over 3,200 published pieces to more than four dozen magazines and websites over a 30-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a contributing writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. He is based in Michigan. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: [email protected].
Image: Shutterstock / Mijansk786.
