Dhaka’s drift toward Beijing isn’t inevitable. Strategic steadiness, not coercion, is the best way to keep Washington in the game.
Bangladesh today stands at an inflection point—one that could redefine South Asia’s geopolitical balance. The ouster of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in August of 2024 left a vacuum at the heart of the country’s foreign policy. What has followed is a rapid shift away from Hasina’s “India-first” approach to one that embraces China and Pakistan as new security partners. Yet, for all the headlines about Beijing’s growing clout, the real story is more nuanced—and Washington still has time to shape Dhaka’s choices, if it chooses the right approach.
From India-First to a New Triangle
For more than a decade under Hasina, Bangladesh followed close security cooperation with New Delhi, a quiet understanding with the Quad, and a freeze on defense relations with Pakistan. The student-led uprising in 2024 swept this approach aside. Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus, heading the interim government, moved quickly to diversify Bangladesh’s foreign ties. The new directions appear to be more pragmatic and transactional: open as many doors as possible.
The most vivid sign of this shift came on 8 October 2025, when the interim cabinet approved a $2.2 billion purchase of 20 Chinese J-10CE fighter jets. This was no isolated move: just days before, Pakistan’s Director-General Joint Staff, Lt. Gen. Tabassum Habib, visited Dhaka, marking the renewal of high-level military contacts. Bangladesh has also joined China and Pakistan in a new trilateral forum and opened fresh military training pipelines with Islamabad. Bangladesh, once firmly anchored to India, now looks equally comfortable with China and Pakistan.
China’s approach has been both material and symbolic. The J-10 sale comes alongside promises of defense industrial cooperation, port upgrades, and symbolic gestures—President Xi’s March 2025 meeting with Yunus reaffirmed Bangladesh’s importance to China’s South Asia strategy. Pakistan’s parallel outreach—offering co-production and training—further embeds Dhaka in an emerging Sino-Pak defense ecosystem.
Washington Is on the Sidelines
While Beijing and Islamabad have wasted no time, Washington has appeared slow-footed and lacking in strategic focus. The biggest recent US-Bangladesh deals have been commercial, not military. In July 2025, Bangladesh ordered 25 Boeing passenger planes in addition to increased wheat and cotton imports as part of a package to lower the US trade deficit. These moves helped Bangladesh lobby against looming US tariffs but did little to advance American strategic interests in the region.
In the security arena, the results are much less impressive. Negotiations on a long-promised US-Bangladesh defense cooperation agreement have languished. Talks on crucial frameworks for intelligence and logistics sharing—the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) and Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)—did not see any progress. Bangladesh’s leaders, wary of domestic backlash, Indian sensitivity, and Chinese reprisal, see little incentive to move forward, especially as Washington has not offered an attractive, targeted package.
Military engagement remains limited to joint exercises—annual air and humanitarian drills like Tiger Lightning and Pacific Angel—and a few equipment deliveries (patrol boats, unmanned aerial systems) tied to peacekeeping or counter-piracy. These gestures, while positive, pale in comparison to Beijing’s sweeping offer: high-end hardware, massive economic aid, and a steady strategic partnership. As a result, the prevailing perception in Dhaka is that Washington is more of a “secondary partner.”
Bangladesh’s Strategic Importance
Bangladesh occupies the strategic hinge of the Bay of Bengal, a corridor that carries 30 percent of global maritime trade and links Gulf energy routes to East Asian manufacturing hubs. For the United States, this coastline represents the missing link in Indo-Pacific logistics—a stretch of sea where few friendly ports exist between Diego Garcia and Singapore. Dhaka’s growing port and aviation infrastructure in Chittagong and Payra could provide contingency access, maintenance depth, and humanitarian reach without formal basing—exactly the low-visibility presence the US Indo-Pacific Command increasingly relies on.
Politically, Bangladesh has emerged as a major non-aligned actor in the region. Its orientation will shape whether the Bay of Bengal remains an open transit zone or becomes a patchwork of transactional security ties. For Washington, partnership with Dhaka is less about alliance and more about strategic insurance—a way to preserve maneuver space, diversify access, and demonstrate that US engagement in South Asia can be steady, technical, and useful rather than episodic or moralizing.
A Four-Pillar US Bangladesh Strategy
A realistic deal could revolve around four pillars that would sustain Dhaka’s alignment with the US Indo-Pacific Strategy:
1. Make military exercises useful, not just symbolic: Bangladesh already takes part in several US-run drills, but these are often ceremonial. The next phase should turn these into real problem-solving workshops: bringing Bangladeshi air force crews to US bases for hands-on sessions in maintenance and battle-damage repair, running joint drills that fuse Coast Guard, radar, and drone feeds for disaster response, border and maritime surveillance, and field-training logistics teams on the nuts and bolts of fuel, munitions, and medevac. These are the building blocks of real capability and trust.
2. Train the backbone, not just the generals: US military training is still prized in Bangladesh, but it’s often reserved for senior officers on short visits. The focus should shift to the technical and middle ranks —the engineers and junior officers who keep the air force and army running day to day. Expanded slots for longer-term technical training, a curriculum refocused on sustainment and data management, and professional exchanges with US partner schools can generate “sticky” influence that endures beyond any single government.
3. Build a targeted security assistance portfolio: A modest $20 million-a-year Section 333 package focused on ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) and coastal security would punch far above its weight. For instance, they may include spare parts and technical support for radar stations, hand-launched drones for disaster zones, and secure comms kits for linking up border posts, all delivered with transparency and human rights safeguards. These investments will do more than just fill hardware gaps; they show that the United States can be a reliable, day-to-day partner, not just a vendor of shiny weapons.
4. Offer controlled high-tech access: The United States should also be more open to providing Bangladesh controlled, phased access to high-end military technology—such as secure communications, integrated air-defense, and dual-use maritime surveillance platforms paired with embedded training and strict safeguards.
As Bangladesh’s defense needs evolve, blocking access risks driving Dhaka further into China’s military-industrial orbit, weakening US influence, and compromising interoperability. Carefully managed technology transfer would foster habits and standards aligned with the United States, creating lasting strategic alignment as Bangladesh’s future procurement and training become rooted in American systems and doctrine.
Strategic Steadiness on Bangladesh
For Washington, the lesson is clear. South Asia’s security landscape cannot be left to regional powers alone, nor can it be managed through episodic attention. What is needed is a steady, pragmatic approach: rewarding positive change, supporting capacity-building, and focusing on practical cooperation—always respectful of countries like Bangladesh’s policy autonomy in this era of intense great power competition.
Crucially, this means “flying under the radar.” Deepening defense ties on a drastic scale is off the table for now—such actions would only spark domestic backlash and play into Beijing’s hands. Instead, the United States must keep its offers narrow, targeted, and valuable—meeting Bangladesh where its needs are most acute.
The US’ Narrowing Window
Bangladesh’s pivot eastward remains a negotiation, not a verdict. Dhaka’s interim leadership, and any elected government that follows, will seek balance if given viable choices. The United States still holds cards that matter: education, technology, legitimacy, and long-term access to global institutions.
What it lacks is presence with purpose. By focusing on training, sustainment, and trust, the United States can still anchor Bangladesh as a sovereign, balanced actor in the Indo-Pacific. The alternative—a slow drift into a Chinese-built security ecosystem—would erode not just regional balance but the very notion of strategic pluralism in South Asia.
About the Author: Muhib Rahman
Dr. Muhib Rahman is a Perry World House Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of Pennsylvania. He was a former Research Fellow at the Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies, the think tank of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bangladesh.
Image: Sk Hasan Ali / Shutterstock.com.
