With President Trump’s agenda to quadruple US civil nuclear energy, the United States has reentered the global nuclear energy race. However, this winning strategy may not be possible without strategic cooperation from the United States’ key industry partner, South Korea.
Note: This article is part of the Center’s symposium on nuclear energy. To read other articles in the symposium, go here.
Earlier this year, US President Donald Trump announced high-hitting goals to quadruple US civil nuclear energy production—aiming to add 300 gigawatts of new nuclear capacity domestically—by 2050.
Through a series of executive orders, the Trump administration launched a robust agenda to reinvigorate the US nuclear industrial base through the “development, demonstration, deployment, and export of United States-designed advanced nuclear technologies.” Domestically, the US administration aims to streamline licensing, expand pilot programs for advanced reactors, and accelerate R&D initiatives for fuel recycling and production.
Globally, the Trump administration has called for amping up US-led nuclear energy exports, targeting at least twenty new bilateral peaceful nuclear cooperation partnerships, also known as 123 Agreements, within the next five years.
To reach this goal, South Korea—a strategic US security and energy partner in the Indo-Pacific—should be a likely collaborator in not only supporting US domestic infrastructure growth but also in establishing a competitive nuclear export package against Russia and China’s growing influence in the advanced nuclear reactor market.
Global Nuclear Landscape: Risks & Rewards
Alongside the domestic buildup, Trump’s push for global “energy dominance” requires a realistic assessment of today’s competitive international market for advanced nuclear reactor exports. While US nuclear regulation and technology are globally recognized, nuclear export projects in recent decades have been dominated primarily by Russia’s state-owned Rosatom—currently leading the construction of nuclear facilities in seven countries—and, increasingly, China’s rapidly expanding state-backed nuclear industry.
Today, Beijing is aggressively moving to dominate the future of civil nuclear energy. Boasting a domestic nuclear fleet of 58 operable reactors and an additional 33 reactors under construction, China’s nuclear industry is on track to develop and demonstrate advanced nuclear technology at scale. Moreover, both Moscow and Beijing offer competitive financing to drive reactor exports abroad, further strengthening their respective geopolitical influence in developing regions.
At this expansive rate, China will surpass US civil nuclear equivalency by 2035 unless the United States acts swiftly to reverse the lethargic state of its domestic nuclear industry and bolsters Washington’s international relations with nuclear newcomer nations. Increasing domestic investments, while important, do little to counter China’s global ambitions. More must be done—and quickly—on the international front if the United States is to maintain its historic leadership in civil nuclear energy.
If successful, there is the potential for decisive geopolitical and financial rewards for Washington and US civil nuclear industry companies. The global nuclear export market’s value ranges from low-end estimates of $500-740 billion by 2030 to upwards of $1 trillion USD when considering both equipment and technology sales.
Beyond profitability, however, the predicted rise in global demand for diversified civil nuclear technologies risks the hasty diffusion of dual-use nuclear knowledge. It is an utmost US national security interest that newly embarking civil nuclear nations agree to and abide by the highest standards for safety, security, IAEA-monitored safeguards, and nonproliferation policies.
Seizing this moment to advance allied nuclear cooperation will be critical to preventing competitors from setting the rules—and reaping the benefits—of the global market for advanced reactors. For Washington and its allies, forwarding nuclear cooperation is a strategic imperative to prevent ceding this critical market to authoritarian competitors.
South Korea’s Rising Nuclear Leadership
Increasingly, South Korea—ranked as the fifth largest nuclear energy producer globally—continues to prove its growing civil nuclear prowess on the international stage. South Korea’s atomic-energy industry leaders—Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI), Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power (KHNP), Doosan Enerbility, and Hyundai E&C, among others—are well positioned to lead international reactor exports in both traditional and emerging regions, including Europe, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia.
Though unlikely to embrace nuclear energy as strongly as his predecessor, South Korean President Lee Jae-myung undoubtedly recognizes the strategic value of leveraging one of South Korea’s most successful industries. In the last decade alone, South Korea has completed four large-scale APR-1400 nuclear reactors in the United Arab Emirates while simultaneously juggling the buildout of five new reactors domestically. Most recently, Seoul’s successful acquisition of the Czech Republic’s nuclear deal further demonstrates this South Korean industry’s leadership internationally.
Importantly, South Korea even now stands as a key US civil nuclear energy partner and recently reaffirmed its aim to capitalize on “expanding civil nuclear power in third countries.” With powerhouse Korean companies, such as KHNP, Doosan Enerbility, and POSCO International, concluding memorandums of understanding (MOUs) for greater collaboration in developing US domestic nuclear infrastructure and R&D for fuel production and SMR technology, clearly South Korea could be a strong partner in Trump’s ambitious push to grow US nuclear leadership at home and abroad.
Advancing US-Led Civil Nuclear Partnerships
Challenging China’s rising civil nuclear leadership will require a strong US domestic industry base and a “whole-of-government” approach to building international reactor projects. As Washington pursues new partnerships with emerging civil nuclear countries, leveraging US reactor designs, equipment, and national laboratory R&D will be critical to sustaining its strategic leadership.
Moving forward, demonstrating first-of-a-kind advanced nuclear technologies foremost at home will be key to winning the long-term global nuclear energy race. The United States and South Korea have the opportunity to shape the direction of advanced nuclear reactor development, and the US nuclear industry is well positioned to do so with the right investment pipelines and regulatory frameworks. Of more than 90 SMR designs under consideration, US firms account for roughly 35 percent, and recent regulatory approvals highlight both American and South Korean technologies, including NuScale’s VOYGR, Kairos Power’s Hermes, and KAERI’s SMART and i-SMR reactors.
While the United States and South Korea are targeting the earliest deployments of SMR designs by the 2030s, Russia and China, in contrast, are currently leading the charge, fielding new SMR technology at home and for nuclear deals internationally. So, Washington and allies must act swiftly and decisively.
Only by deepening cooperation in reactor exports, nuclear supply chains, and strategic energy partnerships can Washington and Seoul meet surging global energy demands, securing US leadership in shaping the future of global nuclear markets.
About the Author: Kayla T. Orta
Kayla T. Orta is a Nonresident Fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. A former US Department of Defense NSEP Boren Scholar to South Korea, her expertise lies in US-Indo-Pacific and US-Korean foreign relations, especially at the intersection of security and technology policy, including nonproliferation, nuclear diplomacy, and civil nuclear energy markets. Most recently, she worked as the Senior Associate at the Wilson Center’s Hyundai Motor-Korea Foundation Center for Korean History and Public Policy. Her most recent book, titled “Avoiding Meltdowns & Blackouts: Confidence-building in Inter-Korean Engagement on Nuclear Safety and Energy Development” (Wilson Center, 2023), features insights from US and South Korean nuclear policy experts.
Image: Shutterstock/Sunshine Seeds
