More Gulf security cooperation could finally give Washington an opening to de-prioritize the Middle East.
Israel’s increasingly aggressive regional behavior, most recently highlighted by its decision to bomb the capital of Qatar on September 9, will push the Gulf states toward further pragmatic cooperation in their regional policies—particularly in the realms of security and diplomacy. That trend, which has been ongoing since at least the end of the Gulf’s blockade of Qatar in 2021, is a positive outcome for US foreign policy.
As such, the United States, rather than deepening its security commitments to the region, should seize the opportunity to encourage Gulf cooperation as it reduces its own military footprint and shifts its focus to other strategic priorities.
The decision to strike senior Hamas leaders in Doha should not be taken lightly within the broader geopolitical shifts long underway in the Middle East. Following the post-Arab Spring period of the 2010s, and more specifically, the end of the region’s rift with Qatar over its support for Islamist groups that participated in those protests, Arab leaders have gradually worked to repair state-to-state relationships in support of regional stability and economic diversification initiatives. Nowhere is that more prominent in recent years than in the Gulf monarchies.
The six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)—Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, and Bahrain—are to varying degrees petrostates. Some, like Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, have partially succeeded in diversifying their economies by promoting foreign direct investment (FDI) into their burgeoning private sectors. Nonetheless, these efforts remain incomplete.
Regional instability is one factor among many that inhibits greater FDI flows to the Gulf. While these countries are widely considered the most stable arenas for investment in the region outside of Israel, the ongoing Israel-Iran rivalry, violent extremism, and the risk of a renewed Arab Spring present potential obstacles to long-term economic diversification efforts. The Israeli decision to strike the heart of Qatar, amid its efforts to mediate an end to one of the worst conflicts in the region this century, certainly compounds investor fears.
That dynamic explains the angry responses to the strike at the joint Arab League-Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) summit in Qatar, just days after the strike. However, outside of strong statements in solidarity with Doha, Gulf leaders and the broader region largely failed to concoct any serious response to Israeli overreach. Real divides remain between these leaders on the subject, as Bahrain and the UAE are members of the Abraham Accords, having normalized diplomatic relations with Israel in 2020. They likely fear overstepping, particularly with a chaotic and pro-Israel administration in Washington under US President Donald Trump.
That US position matters significantly to Gulf leaders. Washington released tough rhetoric against the Israeli strikes and expressed support for its Gulf allies—particularly Qatar—in public and private messaging. However, it refused to hold Tel Aviv accountable for its actions, just as Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu—standing side-by-side with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio—proclaimed that every country has the right “to defend itself beyond its borders” while refusing to rule out additional strikes on Hamas’ senior leadership abroad.
Notwithstanding the absurdity of Washington’s inability to meaningfully push back on basic violations of state sovereignty or the litany of additional Israeli violations, the Trump administration’s failure to support basic international norms reflects an ironic upside in the region.
Gulf leaders, who have long hedged against a perceived US backtracking in the Middle East, could view the Israeli strike and subsequent US response as further reason to cooperate in the security and diplomatic realms. Sensing a lapse in US security arrangements—which are not guarantees, as many US reports incorrectly continue to claim—these states will seek out other partners. Saudi Arabia’s groundbreaking defense pact with Pakistan, which appears as a thinly veiled threat of nuclear proliferation given Israeli overreach, is one such example of Gulf hedging in the wake of the Qatar strike.
Given the gradual shift toward pragmatic cooperation across the region in recent years, Gulf leaders may decide to lean on one another to further their security. To be sure, there is still significant competition between these capitals, as well as distrust. These shortcomings have long prevented the formation of a regional security architecture, as the Middle East’s leaders have operated along zero-sum lines to achieve maximalist goals that sustain their autocratic governments.
However, today’s Middle East is different—or at least in the process of evolving. Still defined by autocracy, these leaders are undergoing a shift in mentality that has fostered pragmatism and cooperation out of necessity. Indeed, the region has naturally rebalanced over time, a process that the unwanted Israel-Iran rivalry and its spillover effects have only hastened. Even arch-enemies like Iran and Saudi Arabia have slowly recovered from the cutthroat competition of the past, re-establishing diplomatic relations through Chinese mediation in 2023.
The dynamic at play could be historic for US regional policy. The Middle East is no longer a top strategic priority for Washington, relative to other theaters such as East Asia and the Western Hemisphere. For too long, the United States has over-prioritized the Middle East at the expense of domestic needs and other pressing priorities—including China. In doing so, it has simultaneously created security dependencies across the Middle East that have only fostered poor decision-making and brutal competition between the states of the region that receive US backing.
By pulling back in real or perceived ways, Washington has induced a shift in security postures and relationships among the Gulf and the broader Middle East. In failing to reassure Qatar of the strength of its security relationship with the United States as a major non-NATO ally, Gulf states will advance their strategic autonomy in the security and diplomacy fields accordingly.
Ultimately, regional security structures will naturally rebalance over time in ways that meet the security needs of the states in that arena. Given the long-running and sweeping arms cooperation and sales between Washington and the Gulf, rebalancing—should the United States reduce its footprint—will not inherently support a major US rival like China, due to interoperability constraints that prevent Beijing from filling the void. Equally important, China does not have an interest or the capacity to fill a security void in a highly volatile region in the first place.
As such, the United States should take this opportunity to step back from its security commitments and overreach in the Middle East in support of a region-driven security approach that rejects the rogue actions of states like Israel and Iran. Doing so will naturally allow the region to resolve its security problems, especially in an age of increasingly pragmatic cooperation, allowing Washington to fry bigger fish now and in the future.
About the Author: Alexander Langlois
Alexander Langlois is a contributing fellow for Defense Priorities. Langlois holds a Master of Arts degree in International Affairs from American University, where he specialized in global governance, politics, and security. He is a foreign policy analyst and writer, with publications in various outlets, including The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Sada, the Atlantic Council’s MENASource, the Lowy Institute, the Gulf International Forum, The New Arab, The Nation, Inkstick, and The National Interest.
Image: Alexandros Michailidis / Shutterstock.com.
