In accordance with Trump’s wishes, NATO is indeed spending more on defense—but much of that spending has been in Europe rather than the United States.
Throughout his entire business and political career, President Donald Trump has been incredibly transparent in one key aspect: his desire for transactionality. From The Art of the Deal onwards, Trump has espoused the view that one should never do something without getting something else in return. (Whether the other party in one of Trump’s transactions actually gets what they bargained for has on occasion been a point of dispute in his business career.)
Trump’s similar approach to foreign policy has alienated key US allies in Europe, who tend to regard alliances as based on shared interests rather than transactions. Yet Trump often suggests other allied countries are “unfair” in their trade practices with the United States. In addition, since his first successful presidential campaign in 2016, Trump has consistently and repeatedly criticized NATO allies for not paying their “fair share,” and even suggested that the United States was somehow disproportionately burdened with the defense costs. It was also during his first term that Trump took credit for pushing allies to their target goal of spending 2 percent of their respective gross domestic products (GDP) on defense.
Trump Pushed for NATO’s Current 5 Percent Benchmark
Ahead of this past June’s 2025 NATO summit in The Hague, Trump pressured US allies to further increase defense and security spending to five percent of GDP. Of that, 3.5 percent, a portion would be allocated to “core defense requirements,” would include the acquisition of new weapons and military platforms, as well as the payment of troops and military personnel. The remaining 1.5 percent falls into a broader “security and defense-related spending” category, which includes civic resilience, cybersecurity, and, notably, updates to critical infrastructure.
The latter inclusion has caused some controversy, as there is concern that some members could employ “opportunistic accounting” to label non-defense projects as defense spending. For instance, Italy initially sought to position its construction of a bridge across the Strait of Messina, connecting southern Italy with Sicily, as a “strategic logistics corridor for rapid troop and equipment deployment to NATO’s southern flank.” Rome later backpedalled after this attempt was widely mocked by the public.
NATO has already established guidelines on how funds can be allocated towards such domestic infrastructure programs.
Trump Wants NATO Countries to Buy American Weapons
In July, Secretary of State and US National Security Adviser Marco Rubio wrote an opinion piece praising efforts to increase defense spending. Rubio suggested the new pledge would “add more than $1 trillion per year in defense spending to the alliance’s annual total, making NATO substantially stronger and more capable of defending against threats.”
Rubio also took the opportunity to make a “Buy American” sales pitch.
“The United States is the only country in the world with companies fully capable of adequately supplying Europe’s defense needs,” the Secretary of State added. “Accordingly, NATO allies must allow American firms to compete for defense contracts.”
The op-ed was clearly intended primarily for American readers, but also for foreign ministers, ambassadors, presidents, and prime ministers. The subtext of the message was that the Trump administration would look favorably on European nations that sought to purchase defense goods from the United States.
Europe Is Rethinking American Systems—and Building Up Capacity
However, the unforeseen consequence of Trump’s policies, including the imposition of tariffs on close trading partners, is that the “Buy American” pitch is likely not to work. In March, the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) was launched, aiming to facilitate joint investment, procurement, and increased production capacity across the bloc.
In accordance with Trump’s wishes, NATO is indeed spending more—but some alliance countries are reconsidering acquisitions from the United States. Earlier this year, Portugal opted not to buy the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II, while Spain ejected from a similar deal last month. Other nations have sought to purchase European-produced hardware over that made in America.
On Wednesday, Denmark announced it would purchase an estimated $9 billion in new military systems, the most significant weapons purchase ever made by Copenhagen. The majority of that money is set to remain in Europe, and Denmark won’t be the last country to pivot away from American military hardware.
Another potential winner in NATO’s spending bonanza could be South Korea, which has seen Poland adopt the K2 Black Panther tank alongside the American M1 Abrams, while Norway has been adopting Seoul’s K9 self-propelled howitzer. Warsaw and Seoul also concluded a licensing deal that could see Poland produce South Korean military hardware for the European market.
Of course, the United States will likely continue to be the world’s largest defense exporter. Still, the days of America being the dominant supplier to Europe may be coming to an end—even as NATO pays its fair share and more.
About the Author: Peter Suciu
Peter Suciu has contributed over 3,200 published pieces to more than four dozen magazines and websites over a 30-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a contributing writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. He is based in Michigan. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: [email protected].
Image: Shutterstock / Brian Jason.
