China’s nuclear modernization signals a recalibration of global strategy within which a new equilibrium must be formed.
In 1964, China shocked the world with the successful test of an atomic bomb at Lop Nur. The test, which vaulted China into the then-exclusive nuclear club, gave Mao Zedong’s government a buffer against perceived US and Soviet threats. Since Lop Nur, the Chinese nuclear weapons program has steadily expanded in scope and sophistication, from a relatively modest, mostly symbolic deterrent to a force capable of ensuring second-strike capability.
China’s Nuclear Force Has Steadily Expanded
Through the Cold War years, China maintained only a “minimum deterrent,” choosing not to pursue the nuclear stockpile or elaborate launch systems that the United States and Russia constructed. Instead, China deployed a small arsenal, maybe a few hundred warheads, along with a doctrine of no first use. The strategic purpose was straightforward enough—simply to guarantee that China could absorb a nuclear attack and retaliate, thereby deterring adversaries from launching a strike in the first place. The doctrine was restrained while still lending China the political clout of having nuclear capabilities.
The doctrine has shifted, however. Today, satellite imagery and US intelligence confirm that China is building new missile silos in its western deserts, expanding the number of warheads and the survivability of those warheads. The Pentagon believes China has over 600 nuclear warheads—a massive expansion over its traditionally modest stockpile. And it’s not just the quantity of Chinese warheads that has improved; the quality of delivery systems has improved, too. Advanced solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and hypersonic glide vehicles show that China’s technological leap extends beyond just air and sea forces. Further, Chinese warheads have been MIRVed, meaning they can carry multiple warheads, while command-and-control systems have been improved, making the entire nuclear force structure significantly more capable.
The shift in China’s nuclear strategy, presumably, stems first from a fear that US missile defenses could one day nullify China’s retaliatory strike capability. Expanding the number and diversity of nuclear delivery systems helps China guarantee its ability to penetrate any nation’s defensive systems. Second, China is evolving into a global force, with interests in protecting global trade routes, projecting power offshore, and competing with the United States. Accordingly, Xi Jinping’s government likely sees a robust nuclear force as a prerequisite for great power parity with the United States. And finally, China is deeply concerned with India, a bordering adversary with their own nuclear weapons—which raises the possibility of a two-front nuclear conflict. China wants more options.
The result of China’s nuclear rise is the destabilization of the Cold War nuclear bipolarity. Whereas the bipolar nuclear competition was relatively stable, the triangular nuclear competition that China has forced represents uncharted territory. Deterrence theory becomes less reliable when three states must calculate the risks of escalation with not one but two nuclear peers.
For Asia specifically, China’s growing nuclear arsenal adds volatility. Japan and South Korea are both under the US nuclear umbrella, but they must calibrate their defense policies differently now as China grows more confident and nuclear-capable. But the implications of course extend beyond Asia. China’s nuclear modernization signals a recalibration of global strategy within which a new equilibrium must be formed.
About the Author: Harrison Kass
Harrison Kass is a senior defense and national security writer at The National Interest. Kass is an attorney and former political candidate who joined the US Air Force as a pilot trainee before being medically discharged. He focuses on military strategy, aerospace, and global security affairs. He holds a JD from the University of Oregon and a master’s in Global Journalism and International Relations from NYU.
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