Relations between Israel and Türkiye have progressively worsened and may be on the path to armed confrontation.
The relationship between Türkiye and Israel has entered its most perilous phase in decades, with both nations now openly acknowledging the possibility of military confrontation. What began as diplomatic tensions over Gaza has evolved into a broader strategic competition that threatens to redraw the security architecture of the Middle East. Recent statements from Turkish and Israeli officials reveal that relations between the two states are at their lowest point in fifteen years, with the specter of conflict looming over Syria’s contested territories.
This deterioration represents more than bilateral discord. It signals a fundamental shift in regional power dynamics that could have far-reaching implications for US interests, regional stability, and the broader struggle for Middle Eastern influence. As Israel pursues what Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu calls “The Greater Israel”—an expansive hegemonic project that has been used by Israelis, especially following the Six-Day War of June 1967—while Türkiye accelerates its military modernization and indigenous defense industry program, the stage is set for a confrontation that could reshape the region’s strategic landscape.
The mutual threat perceptions have reached alarming levels on both sides. Israeli security experts now openly describe Türkiye as a primary regional threat. This assessment has been formalized at the highest levels of Israeli strategic planning. Last January, the Nagel Committee—an Israeli government-commissioned committee— issued a report identifying Türkiye as a “strategic threat” and calling on Israel to prepare for a potential war with Ankara.
Israeli intelligence officials describe the burgeoning Türkiye-Qatar alliance as presenting a “strategic threat” to Israeli interests. Likewise, Minister of Diaspora Affairs Amichai Chikli, a member of Netanyahu’s Likud party, said during a TV interview that after Iran, “Türkiye should be next,” suggesting that Israel should launch an international media campaign against it.
From the Turkish perspective, the threat assessment is equally stark. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has declared that Netanyahu represents “the biggest threat” to the Middle East region. At the same time, Turkish officials describe Israel’s lawless attitude as posing a clear threat to international security. The Turkish Foreign Ministry has stated, “Israel has become the foremost threat to the security of our region through its attacks on the territorial integrity and national unity of the regional countries.”
This escalating rhetoric reflects deeper strategic calculations. Turkish officials place significant blame for the current crisis on Netanyahu’s leadership, viewing his policies as contentious and increasingly unaccountable. Netanyahu’s domestic political strategies to avoid internal accountability have driven Israel’s regional conflicts, from Gaza to Lebanon to Syria. Netanyahu’s recent announcement of plans to “take control” of Gaza City and realize the “Greater Israel” project reflects what is seen from Ankara as an expansive and highly destabilizing agenda aimed at fragmenting neighboring states into sectarian or ethnic enclaves and enforcing Israel’s hegemony by military dominance.
Netanyahu’s pursuit of what he calls a “1967 moment”—referencing Israel’s decisive victory in the Six-Day War—suggests an attempt to alter regional power balances through military force permanently. Turkish officials view this as a direct threat to their national security, particularly given Israel’s operations in Syria, where Turkish forces maintain a significant presence and have the utmost priority to preserve the unity and territorial integrity, achieving the stability of the country.
The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government in December 2024 has transformed Syria from a proxy battleground into a potential site of direct Turkish-Israeli confrontation. With each nation adopting a contrasting agenda for Syria’s future, the risk of miscalculation has increased dramatically. Despite several de-conflicting meetings and attempts by Turkish officials with their Israeli counterparts in Azerbaijan, no progress has been achieved yet in preventing potential clashes.
The military geography makes conflict almost inevitable. Turkish forces control a significant swath of northern Syria, while Israeli operations have intensified in the south and center. The two spheres of influence are converging dangerously. For Ankara to fully benefit from a new Syria, it is essential to achieve a stable, united, sovereign, terror-free, and prosperous state in Syria. This vision aligns not only with the desires of Syria’s neighbors but also with the interests of regional and international actors, including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United States, and Europe. However, two regional players—Israel and Iran—perceive such a Syria as a threat to their interests.
Israel views the emergence of a strong Syria with a majority representative government rather than a minority one, such as the toppled Assad regime, as a challenge to its regional hegemony and dominance. Its strategy revolves around ensuring that Syria remains a failed state with a weak government and a fragmented society and is preoccupied with internal sectarian and ethnic conflicts. To this end, Israel has launched the most extensive aerial campaign in its history against the forces of the new Syria following the ousting of Assad. This campaign aims to prevent the new government from establishing control over the entire country. Israel specifically targeted key government positions last July, including the Ministry of Defense and the presidential office.
Moreover, Israel has openly supported ethnic and sectarian minorities against the central government, encouraging them to seek autonomy and potentially fall under Israeli influence. Notably, some Druze and Kurdish leaders have called for the establishment of a so-called “David Corridor,” which would connect the southern region of Syria, where the Druze minority resides, to the northeastern part of the country, home to the Kurdish PYD. This corridor would effectively extend Israel’s geographical influence from the occupied Golan Heights to eastern Syria and Iraq on the borders with Türkiye, a scheme that Ankara perceives as a significant national security threat.
These contrasting objectives of Türkiye and Israel have created what military analysts might call a “collision geometry,” where both sides’ essential interests and objectives cannot be simultaneously satisfied. On July 21, Türkiye’s President Erdogan strongly implied that such a situation represents a red line, vowing to defend Türkiye’s interests and intervene to prevent such a scheme if necessary. His foreign minister, Hakan Fidan, asserted this position when he stated that Türkiye would intervene against any attempt to fragment Syria and would treat efforts toward Syrian division or autonomy by militant groups as a direct threat to Türkiye’s national security, saying, “Intervention would be on the table if diplomacy failed.”
The structural factors driving this confrontation extend beyond individual leadership and Syria. Türkiye’s emergence as a regional power with global ambitions conflicts fundamentally with Israel’s vision of achieving regional dominance over its neighbors by military force. As Iran’s influence appears to decline, both Türkiye and Israel see an opportunity to fill the resulting power vacuum—a competition that may prove irreconcilable through diplomatic means alone.
Following the swift 12-day Israeli war with Iran, many Israeli officials and experts enjoyed a state of euphoria in which they openly stated that Türkiye should be Israel’s next target. Israeli security and military thinkers are looking for a broader regional coalition against Ankara that includes Cyprus and Greece, among others. Israel’s newspaper, Hayom, suggested that “Israel, in coordination with Greece and Cyprus, must prepare a contingency operation for liberating the island’s north.”
Türkiye’s response to the perceived Israeli threat following Tel Aviv’s war with Iran has been comprehensive and alarming. President Erdogan has announced plans to “boost Türkiye’s missile production” and achieve “fully independent defense industry” capabilities, explicitly linking these efforts to the escalating Israel-Iran conflict. Turkish Defense Minister Yaşar Güler has denounced Israel’s “unlawful attacks” while outlining a broader strategy to shield the nation under what officials call a “Steel Dome” defense system.
The scope of Türkiye’s military modernization reflects the seriousness of its threat assessment. A pro-government Turkish think tank has explicitly warned that Türkiye should prepare for multi-front scenarios that involve Israel’s alliance with Greece, backed by foreign powers. Türkiye’s unveiling of its first indigenous hypersonic missile, the Tayfun Block‑4, as well as a bunker-buster weapon, Gaza, in July 2025, sends a clear signal about Ankara’s military priorities and deterrence messages. Such weapons are specifically designed to accurately target hardened underground facilities—precisely the type of infrastructure that Israel has developed to protect its strategic assets.
The development of indigenous defense capabilities—including the KAAN fighter jet, advanced drone systems, and recently unveiled bunker-buster munitions—represents a strategic response to what Ankara might perceive as unreliability of traditional Western allies during crises. Although Türkiye’s military buildup serves broader strategic goals beyond simply responding to Israel, the emphasis on indigenous capabilities suggests a desire to reduce dependence on Western suppliers who might restrict arms transfers during a regional crisis.
Perhaps most concerning is the emergence of domestic calls within Türkiye for nuclear weapons capabilities as security concerns mount. The recent conflict involving Israel and Iran and the Western unrestricted support for Israel during the war in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, and Iran has led to growing domestic calls for Türkiye to develop nuclear capabilities. While noting that such development would likely take significant time to materialize and would definitely face significant challenges, the mere consideration of nuclear options reflects the Turkish perception of Israel’s grave threat.
While Netanyahu believes that confrontation with Türkiye is “inevitable,” Turkish officials might not necessarily share his view, but they acknowledge that the risk significantly increases under the current Israeli leadership and its destabilizing regional agenda. Having said this, the evidence suggests that both sides are preparing for conflict. Israeli strategic planners have warned that Israel must prepare for a potential war with Türkiye, while Turkish officials speak of the need to deter and counter Israeli threats.
For the United States, the Türkiye-Israel rivalry presents a particularly acute dilemma. Washington’s close relationships with both nations create competing obligations that may prove impossible to reconcile. American efforts to maintain strategic partnerships with both Ankara and Tel-Aviv could become untenable if tensions escalate to actual conflict, forcing difficult choices about regional priorities and alliance commitments.
The current dynamics suggest that some form of strategic competition is likely to persist in the short and medium terms, regardless of immediate diplomatic efforts. The challenge for policymakers in Washington is to minimize the risk of escalation and prevent Israel from dragging the US into yet another quagmire in the Middle East that most probably will not even be in Israel’s interests in the medium and long term. This will require the US to go way beyond the mere words of wishes and requests and to seriously put pressure on Netanyahu to change his destabilizing policies completely. The question is whether President Trump possesses the wisdom and political will to act before it is too late.
About the Author: Ali Bakir
Ali Bakir is an assistant professor of International Affairs, Security, and Defense at Qatar University, and a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s “Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative” and Middle East programs.
Image: Shutterstock/Novikov Aleksey
