The UN Interim Force in Lebanon has a critical role to play in its final years—either proactively helping to stabilize Lebanon, or securing a legacy of well-intentioned impotence.
At the end of August, the United Nations Security Council renewed the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) for the final time. For nearly half a century, blue helmets have been a fixture in South Lebanon, an extraordinary tenure for a country only eight decades old. In many ways, UNIFIL’s longstanding presence served as a reminder of Lebanon’s struggle to assert its sovereignty, which has had destabilizing consequences for international peace and security.
Now, that dysfunction may be nearing resolution. Hezbollah, which for decades undermined the state’s monopoly on force, is at its nadir. Hassan Nasrallah, the group’s charismatic leader, is dead. The once-mighty arsenal Tehran assembled to make Hezbollah the spearhead of its deterrence against Israel has been so degraded that the group’s decimated guns stood silent throughout Israel’s military campaign against Iran’s nuclear program. Unlike in the past, its land supply routes through Syria have been severed following the fall of Bashar al Assad’s regime, denying Hezbollah the pathway to rearm as it did after its 2006 war with Israel. Equally important, Lebanon’s new government has taken the historic step of rejecting Hezbollah’s narrative that its arms are aligned with the state, committing instead to disarm the group once and for all.
UNIFIL is going home, but its drawdown does not begin until December 2026. Its final months will determine how history remembers it: as a cautionary tale of the pitfalls of international peacekeeping, or as a mission that ultimately helped the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) establish authority in South Lebanon, prevented Hezbollah’s return to the border, and oversaw the transfer of the five remaining Israeli-occupied positions to Lebanese control. UNIFIL’s story will not unfold on its own: Washington can leverage the changes in UNIFIL’s mission, along with a more favorable strategic context, to ensure that it fulfills its raison d’être and helps enhance Lebanese sovereignty at a time when it is finally within reach.
The Difference a Year Can Make
2006 was a transformative year for UNIFIL. UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which sought to prevent a relapse into war after the 2006 Israel-Lebanon conflict, restructured UNIFIL into a robust force tasked to help turn the area between the Litani River and the Blue Line, the de facto border between Israel and Lebanon, into a buffer zone under the authority of the LAF.
UNIFIL was endowed with a robust mandate and the resources to match. Its hybrid mandate borrowed language normally applied to “peace enforcement” missions. This authorized its soldiers to use force when necessary, while still avoiding a Chapter VII designation that would risk framing Lebanon as a failed state.
The force expanded from under 2,000 to a ceiling of 15,000 across a compact 1,060 square kilometers. As troop levels fluctuated between 10,000 and 12,000 over nearly two decades, UNIFIL maintained the densest concentration of peacekeepers of any UN peace operation. Matching an increase in personnel, its armament capacities were upgraded to include mechanized units, armored vehicles, artillery, and anti-defense systems. NATO powers including France, Spain, and Italy were deliberately brought in as major contributors to strengthen the force’s credibility, while an innovative command-and-control structure, shaped by lessons from past failures in the Balkans and Somalia, was introduced at the behest of these contributors to enhance operational mobility, establish a de-politicized chain of command, and encourage NATO oversight on a strategic level.
In that first year, the revamped UNIFIL—especially Spanish, French, and Italian troops assigned to the force—demonstrated the initiative to act on its mandate with the resources at its command. UNIFIL documented Hezbollah sites and worked to uncover weapon caches, independent of Lebanese authorities and despite protests from local pro-Hezbollah residents. That assertive posture faced a defining test in June 2007, when a roadside bomb killed members of the Spanish contingent. A string of other attacks, including on French and Italian convoys in 2011, exposed a core vulnerability of UN peacekeeping: troop-contributing states are reluctant to sustain casualties for foreign peace missions. As force protection took precedence over mandate implementation, UNIFIL retreated into risk aversion, effectively accommodating a status quo in which Hezbollah quietly but steadily rebuilt its presence in the south.
Yet in spite of its failure to help establish a buffer zone, UNIFIL did not exit the stage. Instead, reflecting a broader UN institutional instinct for operational continuity, annual renewals were justified on the basis of secondary objectives like documentation, mediation, and local peace building activities that did not require such a heavily resourced force.
Recognizing the dysfunction, Washington aimed to correct UNIFIL’s behavior by modifying its mandate. In 2022, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2650, clarifying that UNIFIL “does not require prior authorization or permission to undertake its mandated tasks and is authorized to conduct its operations independently.” The clarification also emphasized the force’s ability to perform announced and unannounced patrols, confirming its activities were not dependent on permission from the Lebanese authorities. But these adjustments to the mandate’s text had little effect on the ground; UNIFIL’s spokesperson publicly stated after the new resolution that “nothing would change” in its day-to-day operations. A bit more than a year later, and only a day after the October 7th, 2023, Hamas attacks on Israel, Hezbollah and Israel were at war again.
The period from the adoption of Resolution 1701 to the start of the 2023–2024 conflict offers three lessons. First, UNIFIL’s assertive posture in 2006 demonstrated that neither mandate nor resources were the real barriers to action. Second, the turn toward caution after the 2007 attack revealed the limits of maintaining that posture, as troop contributors proved unwilling to bear the costs of prolonged confrontation. Third, UNIFIL’s subsequent drift toward passivity reflected the UN’s organizational tendency to continue peacekeeping missions, even when they fail to meet their primary objectives.
These dynamics fostered a mindset that best explains the mission’s dysfunction. UNIFIL was unwilling to take the risks, including confronting Hezbollah, that came with implementing its mandate. Yet it was also unwilling to acknowledge that failure and go home. The result was an indecisive force that did little as Hezbollah cemented its security presence in southern Lebanon. By operating within Hezbollah’s rules of engagement, rather than vice-versa, and accommodating the status quo it was mandated and equipped to resolve, UNIFIL became part of the problem, eroding its credibility in the process.
UNIFIL Can Still Prove Itself
Nearly two decades of lost credibility are not so easily rectified. Still, the recent adoption of Resolution 2790, coupled with the tectonic political changes in Lebanon, create the conditions for UNIFIL, if matched by bold leadership and active US engagement, to reset the dysfunctional mindset that defined its past.
By setting a firm departure date while delaying the actual drawdown until December 2026, the resolution helps correct UNIFIL’s mission drift. The delayed drawdown ensures UNIFIL is not consumed by exit logistics during a critical period and instead focuses on delivering the results outlined in Resolution 2790. Importantly, the resolution clarifies priority behaviors, positively acknowledging recent progress after the November ceasefire in “discovering weapons caches and in increasing its presence through patrols and inspections of locations of interest.” It also encourages the Force Commander to proactively search for tunnels and caches, fully utilize the rules of engagement to counter restrictions to its freedom of movement and adopt a proactive approach to strategic communications. As UNIFIL’s past record demonstrates, mandate language alone does not guarantee operational change. Still, the combination of a fixed departure, delayed drawdown, and guidance on operational behavior, helps channel the mission toward a more focused execution of its mandate. With vigilant oversight, steady pressure, and positive encouragement, Washington can foster a dynamic in which the LAF and UNIFIL mutually reinforce one another to keep a proactive approach and avoid slipping back into complacency.
Relatedly, while a narrow timeframe will not entirely remove troop-contributing states’ aversion to casualties, it makes robust commitments more bearable. Washington should encourage NATO partners to have their peacekeepers take the initiative in uncovering clandestine tunnels and depots. Big wins make all the difference. Major successes disrupt Hezbollah’s rearmament when its capacities are acutely constrained, substantiate the seriousness of Beirut’s disarmament pledges, and build up UNIFIL and the LAF’s confidence to do more. With sustained US focus on Lebanon and coordinated intelligence sharing, including through the US-led mechanism established to monitor the implementation of the November ceasefire, partners are more likely to accept short-term risks for such a strategic long-term pay-off.
In reciprocation, however, Israel must guarantee the safety of UNIFIL. Attacks like the recent drone strike near peacekeepers endanger lives, undermine confidence in the demilitarization process, and feed Hezbollah’s narrative of selective bias. Israel’s mistrust of UNIFIL runs deep, but US guarantees and steady engagement can enable the successful implementation of its plan for a gradual disarmament of Hezbollah and phased withdrawal of Israeli troops. As it has since the November ceasefire, UNIFIL can support a smooth transition as Israeli forces are replaced by the LAF.
Finally, the strategic terrain has created a more manageable context, especially in UNIFIL’s area of operations. The LAF reports clearing up to 90 percent of Hezbollah’s infrastructure in the South, while the group’s disrupted land supply lines from Syria have constrained its capacity to rearm. Hezbollah has also lost the charismatic leadership that was instrumental in bolstering the organization’s legitimacy during its past crises. This creates space for the Lebanese state to approach the reassertion of sovereignty as a national priority rather than foreign imposition. Resolution 2790 reinforces this sentiment by anchoring state authority in both past UN resolutions and the Taif Accords that ended Lebanon’s civil war, reaffirming, “There will be no weapons besides those of, and no authority other than that of the Government of Lebanon.” Continued backing by the US and its partners, including intelligence sharing, equipment transfers, military training, non-lethal assistance, and strategic support to the LAF, is key to sustaining that progress and preparing for the day after UNIFIL leaves.
Resolution 2790 gives UNIFIL a time-bound horizon and clear directives; Lebanon’s government has committed to reclaiming its sovereignty; and Hezbollah is weakened in arms, leadership, and legitimacy. For the first time in generations, the stars are aligned for Lebanon to overcome its instability and dysfunction. But whether that potential becomes reality depends on strategic choices taken or missed in the next year. UNIFIL has a focused role to play in the critical months ahead. By helping the LAF establish itself as the sole security presence in the strategic border area, UNIFIL can generate the momentum and precedent needed to ensure the broader process to disarm Hezbollah succeeds. As Washington holds the cards to finally remedy one of the Middle East’s most pressing security challenges, it must commit to its step-by-step roadmap, balancing the need for Israel to withdraw to give the effort space to succeed while simultaneously ensuring Beirut and UNIFIL stay the course and execute their respective responsibilities.
About the Author: Fadi Nicholas Nassar
Fadi Nicholas Nassar is a Senior Fellow at the Middle East Institute and Director of the Institute for Social Justice and Conflict Resolution at the Lebanese American University.
Image: Shutterstock / Sebastian Castelier.
