Proposed federal funding cuts threaten biosafety, undermining the safeguards, oversight, and resources needed to keep research labs, scientists, and the public safe.
Federal research funding doesn’t just advance science. It also helps to keep it safe. When the US government invests in research in the life sciences, it is also investing in the oversight and safeguards that help prevent lab accidents and biological threats.
Threat of Drastic Cuts
It’s certainly true that drastic cuts to federal research funding would threaten America’s ability to make biomedical breakthroughs, as has been discussed widely. President Donald Trump’s fiscal year 2026 budget proposal would slash funding across the board for the nation’s top scientific agencies, including cutting the National Institute of Health’s (NIH) budget by nearly 40 percent and the National Science Foundation’s (NSF) by fifty-five percent. While both the House and Senate Appropriations Committees have put forward bills rejecting such cuts to the NIH, it’s not the end of the process. Funding cuts and frozen or delayed disbursements have already disrupted high-profile research on Alzheimer’s disease and delayed treatment for patients with late-stage cancer. And predictably, other countries are courting leading US researchers with offers of more stable funding and support abroad.
But one critical consequence has received far less attention: what these cuts mean for the safety and security of biological research.
Federal Dollars as a Safety Lever
Federal funding isn’t just about enabling discovery or global leadership, though it plays a critical role in those areas. It’s also one of the US government’s most powerful tools for ensuring that research is conducted safely, securely, and responsibly. Outside of direct funding, the federal government has surprisingly few levers to shape how science gets done in the United States. Leverage from federal research funding comes in three forms: requirements, oversight, and resources.
First, federal dollars come with strings attached. Many US federal funding mechanisms include strict conditions for measures like risk assessments, containment plans, emergency procedures, and approval by Institutional Biosafety Committees (IBCs) and/or federal agencies. Additional requirements apply to any research involving humans or animals.
Second, research funding offers sweeping visibility into what research is being conducted, by whom, and where. Grant proposals and progress reports give agencies detailed insight into emerging scientific trends and potentially risky research areas. They also require researchers to disclose foreign funding, describe research equipment and containment facilities, report the results of reviews by ethics committees, and document and report safety protocols and infrastructure.
Third, safety costs money. Federal funding pays for the resources that protect laboratory workers from accidents that could expose them—and their communities—to dangerous materials. Routine equipment maintenance, personnel training, and infrastructure like fume hoods, biological safety cabinets, and air filtration and ventilation systems all depend on grant funding to keep under-recognized safety processes running smoothly. And biosafety officers, the professionals tasked with overseeing it all, need more resources to do their jobs effectively, not less.
Budget Risks to Biosafety
All three of these levers are at risk if the US government cedes the leverage it has long held over biosafety and biosecurity. Fewer and smaller grants mean that more research will fall outside the federal government’s purview. Some researchers may shift to private or foreign funders, not all of whom require the same safety standards. While initiatives like the International Bio Funders Compact show promising leadership from private actors, there’s no guarantee that all new funders will follow the same best practices. And in the worst-case scenario, researchers who struggle to secure funding may try to stretch their budgets by cutting corners.
The proposed cap on indirect costs compounds this risk. Also known as facilities and administrative (F&A) costs, these are the funds that support shared research infrastructure that is not tied to any one project. Indirect costs pay for safety measures ranging from replacing high-efficiency particulate arresting (HEPA) filters to hazardous waste disposal to expenses related to complying with regulations and export controls. Capping these costs, especially in the context of massive overall funding reductions, will leave institutions facing a net funding loss that disproportionately affects these essential services.
Reform Without Undermining Safety
To be sure, the current system isn’t perfect. Biosafety practices at research institutions could be made more cost-effective and efficient, and the lack of transparency in indirect cost accounting can erode trust in public research institutions. These are valid critiques. But the solution is to fix those problems, not gut the infrastructure that keeps science safe.
One solution could involve rethinking the indirect cost model and shifting funding for biosafety talent and infrastructure into direct cost categories. Another would be to provide such funding for institutions rather than for individual research projects, allowing the federal government to retain oversight over facility-level safety even as private funders take on a larger role in project funding. Regardless of who funds a given study, it’s in everyone’s best interest that the labs conducting the work are well-maintained and properly equipped.
If the US government wants to remain a global leader in bioscience—and prevent future lab accidents, biosecurity lapses, or public health threats—it needs to maintain leverage over how research is conducted. Federal research dollars buy more than scientific progress. They also purchase the ability to set safety standards, monitor high-risk work, and support the infrastructure that protects both researchers and the public.
About the Author: Steph Batalis
Steph Batalis is a research fellow at Georgetown University’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET). Her research examines a number of issues at the intersection of artificial intelligence and the life sciences, including how emerging technologies will impact both biomedical innovation and US biosecurity. Steph holds a Ph.D. in biochemistry and molecular biology with a focus in structural and computational biophysics from Wake Forest University’s School of Medicine, as well as a B.A. in molecular and cellular biology from Vanderbilt University.
Image: Andrii Yalanskyi/Shutterstock
